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When Universalism Met Nationalism

Justin Smith-Ruiu

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▶︎ 0:00 Hello, this is Justin Smith-Ruiu, and this is now the final lecture of our course on the Enlightenment and its discontents. We're going to be discussing some core counter-Enlightenment ideas, and we remain concerned to understand the pre-Enlightenment or proto Enlightenment or very early Enlightenment roots of these ideas.

▶︎ 0:32 Here, let me just say we're following somewhat in the spirit of Jonathan Israel, who is the historian who wrote many volumes of historiography on the Enlightenment and who has been pioneering in a number of respects, but among other things, he's been important in showing the need, if you want to understand the Enlightenment, the need to start in the 17th century at least, and to understand the way figures like Spinoza, but not only Spinoza, the way figures like Spinoza contribute to the emergence of the recognizable shape of what is called the high Enlightenment.

▶︎ 1:34 Now, Leibniz, who keeps coming back as well for us, is a complicated figure. In many respects, he is the ultimate Enlightenment philosopher, particularly with respect to his views about progress. Leibniz believes that the future will be a utopia. He doesn't use this term, but it will be a utopia that will run effectively in an automated way. He understands the potential of computing technology, or, to use his language of the reckoning engine that he himself has devised, that this could ultimately serve as a prosthetic of human reason so that we could outsource or externalize all those functions of reason that it's too dreary for us to have to do ourselves so that we can spend all our time doing beautiful things like contemplating the divine or the beautiful and not having to worry ourselves with bookkeeping.

▶︎ 2:52 He sees that on the horizon, and he thinks that's going to be great. And again, in that regard, Leibniz's optimism and his progressivism position him squarely as an Enlightenment philosopher. At the same time, as I already indicated in a previous lecture, he is plausibly identified as well as a counter-Enlightenment thinker to the extent that he is a perspectivalist in his metaphysics. That is to say that ultimately he thinks that the way you individuate a given substance, which is technically for him any monad, but you could include us, me, or you as individual substances, the way we're individuated is by appeal to our point of view.

▶︎ 3:59 We occupy a different space, different point of view in the order of coexistence of substances, so that makes things come out different for us from our perspective, even if the God's eye view, so to speak, of the order of coexistence of substances has us all kind of representing the same rational order of reality. So we don't need to get all too into detail, into the thick of that part of Leibniz's philosophy. What's crucial here to understand is simply that this perspectivalism translates for Leibniz into a political sensibility, or a sensibility in his political thought that you could plausibly call communitarian.

▶︎ 5:02 And I want to dwell on that a little bit. What is communitarianism exactly? There are different figures who use this term in different ways, but if you think of the modern secular state as an administrative or bureaucratic and ultimately, so to speak, generic system that doesn't pay attention to the centrality or the importance of individual cultural traditions, folkways, things like that, or indeed religious affiliation that abstracts away from those things and it treats us as uniquely identifiable through our date of birth and our name and our social security number alone, but not through our community affiliations or our family attachments, things like that. That is the schematic presentation of what the modern administrative state does.

▶︎ 6:32 Communitarianism, you could say, and this is one way of defining it, among others, communitarianism is the view that as long as you only focus on that level of social organization that is occupied by the administrative state, the indifferent administrative state, as long as you abstract away from these other elements of human social embeddedness like family bonds and your church and your folkways and religious traditions and so on, as long as you abstract away from those things, you're missing a pretty important ingredient of or a pretty important explanatory factor in accounting for why people behave politically the way they do.

▶︎ 7:35 And so broadly speaking, a communitarian is someone who says, "No, you're going to have to take that stuff seriously." And communitarianism can be on the left or the right or neither. It's more a question of which kinds of attachment, which kinds of social relationship you think need to be drawn out and emphasized in making sense of human political behavior.

▶︎ 8:18 Leibniz then is leaning towards a communitarianism that seems to translate from his metaphysical perspectivalism. We don't need to argue for that translation here that you can find elsewhere, including in some of my own published work. We don't need to do that translation here, but it might help if we were to do it more fully to make sense of some of Leibniz's writings, for example, on the German language, in which he says explicitly that we need to establish an academy inspired by what we've already seen for the Italian language going back into the Renaissance, an academy for the standardization of the German language that will celebrate the great heroes and milestones of German literature and that will put in place or institutionalize a capacity for German language expression that no one had ever thought to do before, at least not to the extent that Leibniz is suggesting it be done.

▶︎ 9:54 And in some respects this process of standardizing national languages, it's one that happens earliest or earlier with French. But you can see it, and the wonderful work on this has been done by the historian Peter Burke, you can see it then radiating out, again, to more marginal places like Germany and Sweden, and even much later, places like Lithuania, Norway. It's a slow process, but the way a particular national polity comes into its own in terms of consciousness or construction of a national identity has much to do with the standardization and institutionalization of national languages.

▶︎ 10:56 And indeed, by the 19th century and into the 20th century, it's a very familiar pattern. Every country has its national poet, ideally also its national epic, and in the capital city, you will find statues to the national poet. Perhaps you will find an academy or a university bearing that person's name. And these figures, take Mihai Eminescu in Romania, for example, these figures are used, so to speak, to prop up the shared perception of a national identity.

▶︎ 11:40 I don't mean to say it's just an illusion when I use expressions like prop up. It's not an illusion, it's real. There is such a thing as a Romanian national identity. But it takes some work. This is the result of a conscious effort of identity construction. And this conscious effort of identity construction is one that we can already see happening in the early modern period with a figure like Leibniz. Now, Leibniz is early enough and, let's say, moderate enough that we don't really detect anything particularly noxious or sinister in his recommendations for reform of the German language.

▶︎ 12:38 We don't see anything in there that makes us say, "Hey, hold on a minute, this could take a dark turn." By contrast, the usual argument is that Counter-Enlightenment is expressed early on in what is sometimes called soft nationalism, but then soft nationalism gets harder and harder as we move in history, and we can go from Leibniz through Herder eventually to Bismarck and Hitler. And you can see a continuous development that is also a continuous hardening of the project of national identity construction into something that is more like rabid nationalism.

▶︎ 13:38 But these are complicated issues, and it would be, of course, rather naive to project back into the early figures associated with this project any of the blame for what comes later. Now, when Leibniz is writing, there is something missing that will become central to the opposition between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment by the late 18th, early 19th centuries.

▶︎ 14:18 And that is namely the contrast that starts to emerge, in particular in the work of Herder in the 1760s, 1770s already, the contrast between civilization and culture. Now, these are very difficult terms to get a handle on. Sometimes they're used interchangeably. Sometimes they're used without much regard for their precise meanings at all. But one thing that it's really important to emphasize is that no one prior to the 18th century was talking about French culture, German culture, Swedish culture, et cetera. That was not an available lexical resource or conceptual resource for conceptualizing what it is that members of different national groups have in common.

▶︎ 15:31 You will notice, and this is more pronounced, say, in everyday French than it is in everyday English, but even in English, we have some hints of it. When you buy some yogurt at Whole Foods and you read that it has 12 different bacterial cultures in it, and you think, "Wait a minute, what does yogurt have to do with, say, German national identity such that both of these are described as cultures?" Well, the answer is that when the concept of culture is taken up in the context of late 18th century Counter-Enlightenment, it is taken up explicitly as a vegetal or a, more broadly, biological metaphor. And in French today, the primary meaning of culture is cultivation. As in the cultivation of a crop. And then you have different kinds of culture, like agriculture or viticulture, growing wine, or I'm trying to think of another more precise example. Poultry culture, raising chickens.

▶︎ 17:08 So that sense of culture is still there in contemporary everyday French, whereas for us in English, it's somewhat forced, or we have to work to remember it. But originally, culture was first and foremost agriculture and stuff like that. And so the key thing to appreciate about the emerging distinction between culture and civilization is that the very idea of culture is one that is connected to a particular place. In order to grow, you have to grow up out of the ground, out of the soil, and different places will have different soil conditions that will yield up different crops or crops with different qualities. And so already in the idea of culture, we have the idea of polities as connected with particular plots of soil.

▶︎ 18:34 And of course, when you speak about this in more elaborate terms as blood and soil nationalism, you know that, okay, something has taken a turn here. But even in the innocent-seeming idea of culture, we have an implicit idea of non-negotiable attachment to a particular plot of soil. And this is a problem. This is a problem because even soft nationalism, to the extent that it presupposes that each national group has a necessary or a definitional or a foundational attachment to a particular plot of soil creates a huge problem for the place of minorities in that polity. And so already at the outset, there's a tension between Counter-Enlightenment organic nationalism and the alternative models that do more to make room for minorities within a given society.

▶︎ 19:54 So here, if just to go back to what we've already discussed, you take the emerging idea of a neutral secular public sphere in a place like Amsterdam. You've got people coming and going from different sects, but they all adopt the same basic framework and the same set of principles for interacting with one another in public, independently of their community affiliations. That model of how to organize society is called into question by Counter-Enlightenment thinkers who are more interested in a kind of localism and particularism that, again, resists conceptualizing the public sphere as neutral.

▶︎ 20:54 So for now, it's enough to hold on to that distinction between culture and civilization. In the Counter-Enlightenment culture, Kultur with a K, is practically synonymous with Germanness, whereas by contrast, civilization is practically by definition what the French, and in particular what the French Revolution proposes to export. And so civilization then is universalist, or at least has universalist pretenses, whereas culture is particularist, local, and irreducibly specific to a particular group of people or a community.

▶︎ 21:52 So where does Kant fit into all of this? Well, Kant is German, but he is resistant to the tendencies that we already see brewing in Leibniz. And in fact, it's hard to find a better kind of moment in intellectual history where Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment tendencies come to a head than in Kant's disagreements with his fellow German, Herder, in particular on the question of race, as we'll see soon enough. But let me also mention that Kant, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, which we've already spent considerable time discussing, articulates his own view of history and of cosmopolitanism that positions him very, very squarely as an Enlightenment thinker with no time or patience for local communitarian commitments. And I'll talk just a little bit about that.

▶︎ 23:15 We were discussing in a previous lecture the antinomy of teleological judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, and I mentioned that Kant is particularly concerned with the problem of ends in nature, and he proposes that at most, when you're observing nature, you can identify a Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zwecke, as I put it before, a kind of end-directedness or connection to ends of some sort, but without any particular concrete identification of what those ends in nature are. Now, Kant was, among other things, a physical geographer. He spent a lot of time studying sediments in riverbanks and stuff like that. He was particularly influenced by the work of Linnaeus, whom we've already mentioned, not so much The System of Nature, but also the naturalist descriptions of Lapland.

▶︎ 24:41 And Kant seems to have a total fascination with the far north of the Scandinavian peninsula, both the culture and the natural side of it. And so he draws a lot of examples from Lapland or from what he imagines to be Lapland. It's a somewhat fantastical Lapland, and he asks the question, when he's reflecting on subordinate ends in nature, why do reindeer have long tongues? To pierce through the snow, to lick the moss off the rocks beneath the snow. Okay, fine, but why are there reindeer? That's the next question you have to ask.

▶︎ 25:38 The geography of Lapland seems perfectly arranged to maintain reindeer, even when certain features, like for example, the fact that the nutrition is buried under snow, would knock other animal species that were transplanted there quickly out of the running. So there seems to be a kind of fit there, even if Kant can't think in evolutionary terms, in terms of fitness. So what we have then, whenever we ask a why question about ends in nature, about subordinate ends in nature, is another why question, saying, "Okay, but why that?" So why reindeer? Well, the answer seems to be, well, because reindeer are a good source of food and milk and hides for the Sami people, or for Laplanders, as Kant would conceive them.

▶︎ 26:45 And then Kant makes a peculiar move, asking, "Okay, but why Laplanders? For what purpose do Laplanders exist?" Elsewhere in the critique, his other famous stock example of indigenous people, as what he refers to as the New Hollanders, which is to say Indigenous Australians. And in both cases, Kant explicitly says that as long as these groups of people, the Laplanders or the New Hollanders, are living and dying in the same way their parents and grandparents and great-grandparents lived and died, they are, Kant says, boldly and, by our standards, offensively, they are living for nothing. Their lives are no more for something than the lives of sheep that appear generation after generation in the same troop formation. Nothing changes.

▶︎ 27:59 So the only thing, in turn, that would enable us to keep answering that chain of why questions that starts with the moss on the rock beneath the snow, the only thing that would enable us to move beyond the Laplanders and why they should be sustained at all, is the historical process by which the Laplanders or the New Hollanders get enfolded into the fold of history, which is to say, by definition, the expansion of European institutions of education, which are alone positioned to inculcate in an individual the proper use of reason in alignment with duty, which alone makes us free and which alone makes the "but why live at all" question one that can be answered in a satisfactory way.

▶︎ 29:19 So, this is Kant's cosmopolitanism then, and it is a commitment to a thoroughgoing universalism, which indeed, from our point of view today, looks like an apology for imperialism. Apology in the sense of mounting a defense of imperialism, and it is indeed at least that. But what's important for our purposes is to understand how it emerges directly out of this commitment to Enlightenment universalism. We're all rational beings. We're all capable of living according to the moral law within, et cetera. But we're going to have to do some institution building in order for that to really be a realistic aim in most corners of the world.

▶︎ 30:25 And then, I would say in passing also, this Enlightenment spirit, I'll mention this just in passing because it is somewhat outside the usual narrative of the Enlightenment, but I myself have done some pretty significant, in the sense of sustained research on the reception of the Enlightenment in 18th century Russia and in particular, Leibniz's relations with Peter the Great. And what's very interesting here is that Peter the Great is plainly only interested in allowing in whatever amount of Dutch or German learning is required in order to build a powerful modern navy. That's really all Peter the Great wants. Leibniz manages to convince him that ultimately naval architecture relies on certain principles of mathematics that are best taught as a branch of philosophy. The mixed mathematics of naval architecture as a branch of natural philosophy, so to speak.

▶︎ 32:00 So Peter the Great then is an impatient guy. He's got a lot going on, is kind of like, "All right, go ahead and import all that philosophy stuff if you must, as long as we get some good modern ships out of it." But then over the course of the 18th century, you have the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences that is founded according to Leibniz's instructions, founded in 1725. Over the course of the 18th century, you have members of the St. Petersburg Academy, people like Stepan Krasheninnikov, to give you just one name, who give lectures on philosophy and the importance of philosophy in society.

▶︎ 32:45 And for them, for Krasheninnikov for example, in lectures given around 1750, philosophy just is the body of knowledge that facilitates technological progress. That is how philosophy is understood as it radiates out into new institutions that exist in a cultural space that has, so to speak, a problematic relationship to modernity in a way that you don't find in Paris or London or Amsterdam.

▶︎ 33:33 So again, there are real geographical differences here. Then this point, in fact, I can add again in passing, this attention to the geographical margins and the way ideas like Enlightenment, progress, and indeed philosophy itself are transformed in these marginal spaces in particular. This is something that the author Pankaj Mishra, I think, has been very good at emphasizing, especially in a book called The Age of Anger, which I can't recommend enough. It's a zoomed-out history of the Enlightenment up through the present moment or up through circa 2016 anyway, and the argument being these basic oppositions are with us still.

▶︎ 34:34 One thing I particularly value about Mishra's book is that he consistently shows why if you want to understand a concept as nebulous and polysemous as Enlightenment, you have to move well beyond the centers where it's first articulated and look at somewhat more liminal spaces like, in particular, Eastern Europe. You could also mention the colonial world and indeed Germany itself. And this is something that's really hard for us to appreciate in the 21st century. Germany itself in the 17th and 18th centuries is already a bit marginal in that at least northern and eastern Germany are beyond the bounds of what historically had been the Roman Empire. And this becomes important for a thinker like Leibniz to grapple with the fact that his own national identity is rooted in the migrations of paradigmatically barbarian tribes, likely from the central Eurasian steppe.

▶︎ 36:02 The original ancient Germans were roving alongside the Huns and the Scythians and other groups that were conceptualized in antiquity as barbarian par excellence. So that's a drag to be called a barbarian, but what you start to see with Leibniz and indeed with Rudbeck in Sweden is a proud reappropriation of these terms. A yes, we are barbarians, and that's an important part of the way our identity has been shaped. And we need to seize on to that and understand it, and to own it. So that is going on then in Leibniz's world, in northern Germany, in the late 17th century in a way that wouldn't be happening in Paris or London.

▶︎ 37:09 So in that respect too, even if with the rise of Bismarck's Germany and then with fascist Germany in the 20th century, we tend to think of Germany as the heart of Europe and nothing more paradigmatically European than Germany. But when Leibniz is writing, and still to some extent when Kant is writing, there's a conscious sense of the place more as a liminal zone between the world of classical civilization and the great barbarian forest expanse beyond it. And one way of understanding the civilization versus culture contrast is it maps on roughly to the boundaries of what had been the Roman Empire. And everything that had been part of the Roman Empire then has a greater claim to the sort of universality that is articulated in civilizational terms.

▶︎ 38:29 And the fact that Kant goes with the universalist and civilizational, or as we've put it previously, he goes with cosmopolitanism, is a bit of an oddity for a provincial Königsberger. And you can't make it all fit perfectly, but that he goes with cosmopolitanism and that he rejects the Counter-Enlightenment push towards the valorization of culture is absolutely certain. And in fact, you can't find a better representative of this position than Kant.

▶︎ 39:16 I wanted ultimately to talk about Kant and Herder, but because I've already mentioned Russia, let me just say a few more words here. One of Mishra's preferred case studies is the contrast between Voltaire and Rousseau, and he takes Rousseau as a paradigmatic proto-romantic thinker and as representing the Counter-Enlightenment position. And indeed, this is, I think, fairly plausible. Rousseau is a complicated person, difficult to classify.

▶︎ 39:59 He is Genevan, and Geneva is a complicated place because it's a bastion of Protestantism, and it's also a place that has a long tradition of some kind of egalitarian self-governance. Of course, this is actually only the wealthiest men of the community. But still, and it was often run as something like an authoritarian regime. But nonetheless, there was a principle of self-governance of which the Genevans were very proud.

▶︎ 40:46 And Rousseau coming from that background and an odd background where he was an apprentice watchmaker, he was terribly abused by various authority figures in his life. He didn't get off to a good start, but he was always very out of place by his own admission in the salon culture of Enlightenment Paris. And he had a sense of his own otherness that shaped basically everything that he wrote. And he's also, of course, one often notices the importance of the Alps as a kind of litmus test for where to place a given thinker on the Enlightenment versus Romantic spectrum.

▶︎ 41:50 And the Alps are, in particular, important as a stock example for sublime experience. And the sublime as an aesthetic category is something we haven't discussed, but it's quite important in Kant's aesthetics, in predecessors like Burke, Shaftesbury in the 17th century. All of these thinkers are interested in the aesthetic experience that is of an object that is experienced as being incomprehensible in the literal sense of being something that cannot be taken in, that cannot be comprehended. That's one way of understanding the sublime.

▶︎ 42:48 In some variations of it, it's also key that the sublime is experienced as dangerous or as something that, if you were exposed directly to it, could crush you, could annihilate you in an instant. Standing on a cliff side, for example, or on an alpine precipice, or looking out at the surface of the ocean when you're on a ship at night and you have the experience of these massive, incomprehensible, natural scapes that is terrifying and yet cool at once. You seek it out even though the ultimate experience is not totally independent of an experience of horror. That's the sublime.

▶︎ 43:48 And I mention that just somewhat in passing. I would have liked to discuss it in greater detail. But what I wanted to mention about Rousseau is that even if he's not thinking in terms of the aesthetic category of the sublime, he certainly has a lot of positive things to say about taking an alpine stroll. And he's a famous walker and mountaineer, and this is something that comes back again and again in the history of Romanticism.

▶︎ 44:28 The ideal setting for contemplation for a Counter-Enlightenment Romantic thinker is not the seminar room. It's not the agora or anything like that. It is a forest path. And ideally, one with sublime views attached to it. So one way of characterizing the Counter-Enlightenment thought is preferring the sublimity of nature, the unbounded experience of nature over the very bounded, limited, and rule-governed experience of social interaction in a seminar room.

▶︎ 45:25 And this is very interesting. I can also mention that this is a rift in the history of philosophy that starts very early. An important part of Aristotle's philosophical project is going out and wading in tide pools to look at sea anemones and things like that. And Aristotle famously pleads for the recognition by his contemporaries of the fact that there is a certain amount of divinity even in the lowliest fish or tide pool creature.

▶︎ 46:08 By contrast, we find Socrates before Plato, well, at least according to what Plato attributes to Socrates, Socrates explicitly saying, "My place is not out there with the rocks and the trees, but in the city with men." Socrates explicitly says that. That's almost an exact quote. "My place is not with the rocks and trees, but in the city with men." As if to say philosophers don't need their forest paths, they don't need their alpine strolls. That's not where the thinking happens.

▶︎ 46:53 And again, this is not to say that Socrates is a proto-Enlightenment thinker and Aristotle is a proto-Romantic. That would be a stretch. But this division is one that gets repeated in the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment eras again. And one good way of slotting a philosopher is by considering what their assessment of the value of solitary encounters with unbounded nature is. So that's just a little bit by way of intellectual biography of Rousseau.

▶︎ 47:45 It's all there in his wonderful Confessions. But what I wanted to emphasize about Rousseau is that his attachment to the local and the perspectival comes through very vividly in his disagreements with Voltaire, in particular as to the right to national self-determination of the Poles. Why the Poles? Why Poland? What is the story with that? Well, as I've already mentioned, Catherine the Great of Russia was Voltaire's patroness. She, again, had an interest in importing the Enlightenment brand, so to speak, and positioning her own reign as the reign of an enlightened sovereign.

▶︎ 49:01 And this is something that we see more paradigmatically, as I believe I've already mentioned, in the case of Friedrich the Great of Prussia, who is often described by the moniker the Enlightened Monarch, and who famously, and much to Herder's chagrin, famously spoke a German that was extremely reliant on borrowed French vocabulary. Instead of saying Treue, you would say fidélité or something like that. You take the French word like fidelity or loyalty, and you use the French root with a German ending added to it, rather than using the alternative available Germanic-rooted vocabulary alternative. And that's the kind of thing Herder just absolutely despised. And he wrote some early poetry that viciously denounced the habit of his fellow Germans of relying on French vocabulary whenever it came to the expression of distinctly German ideas.

▶︎ 50:31 And this is, as well, in the history of nationalism, there's a long history here. What is the political significance of a linguistic situation where you have to rely on borrowed vocabulary, or even sometimes switch to another language altogether in order to express certain ideas? We have trouble appreciating this fact in the English-speaking world where our language reigns supreme, but there are many places in the world where you speak one language with your family, but then if you want to go and study physics or computer science or something like that, you have to switch to another language. And indeed, it's quite possible that physics and computer science have never even been discussed at all in the language you speak with your family. That's a very common situation in the world.

▶︎ 51:32 So in the 20th century, you find the same project as Herder is engaged in, in the late 18th century, you find this far beyond the boundaries of Europe, so that a Pan-Africanist thinker, like Cheikh Anta Diop, for example, will attempt to produce a dictionary of chemical terms entirely expressed in roots found in the Wolof language. That is to say, you don't say things like sodium bicarbonate, because all of those words come from Greek or Latin origins, but you find the Wolof equivalent for sodium bicarbonate and so on. I don't know how he did it. I don't speak Wolof, but that's a good example of a mid-20th century effort to seize on what is universal. Chemistry is universal. It works the same in Senegal as it does in Paris, but to liberate it from the historical ownership of the universal science that is signaled every time you revert back to a Greek or Latin root to express what you're talking about.

▶︎ 53:11 So this is, again, a long history. That's what I want to emphasize with the example from Wolof. And in a sense, if we think about West Africa or South Asia, relative to 20th century politics as subaltern, to use a fashionable term, we have to remember that this is only a further development of an ongoing process that takes place squarely within continental Western Europe beginning in the late 18th century. And from this particular point of view, a case could be made that Germany is, so to speak, the original subaltern, the original political community making a case for the irreducible distinctness of its own way of being against the claim to universality of its then more powerful neighbor.

▶︎ 54:24 But I wanted to finish the thought about Rousseau and Voltaire and Poland. So Catherine is using Voltaire to promote the new Enlightenment brand, and she's also interested in gaining political control over Poland, also a rather old story. And part of the rhetoric around Russia's designs on Poland in the era of Catherine the Great is to highlight the backwardness of rural Polish traditional culture. And so effectively, to say, "We've imported enlightenment from France, and now we're going to export it to Poland." That's the idea.

▶︎ 55:28 And this gives Rousseau, in turn, the occasion to argue the contrary, that it's nobody's business but the Poles, so to speak, to determine what form of life is best for them. And so I think here in the content, there's a set of publications that lay this all out, there is a clear direct conflict between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment tendencies in this encounter between Voltaire and Rousseau over the question of Poland. And so that's one of the great moments. That's the one that Pankaj Mishra has studied in, I think, very fruitful detail.

▶︎ 56:31 Another such kind of exemplary moment that I also wanted to discuss is the conflict between Kant and Herder. You've got these two moments, both of them playing out in the late 18th century, one in French and the other in German. Well, actually German and Latin, but in, let's say, the German language sphere. Both of them giving us, again, representative, exemplary cases of the Enlightenment, Counter-Enlightenment opposition. One, Voltaire and Rousseau, the other, Kant and Herder.

▶︎ 57:15 Kant and Herder were both preoccupied with the question of human racial diversity. This is something we've touched on briefly. I mentioned previously that one way of understanding the Enlightenment is one of the key headings under which we might understand some of the historical processes of the Enlightenment. One of the key headings is naturalization. That is to say that the human comes to be restyled, newly understood as an appropriate object of scientific inquiry, rather than as a kind of transcendental perspective looking out upon the appropriate objects of scientific inquiry.

▶︎ 58:21 Again, the key kind of proof that that is something that was happening that I have given in a previous lecture was Linnaeus's choice to include Homo among other anthropomorpha. That is to say that with Linnaeus from the System of Nature, first published in 1739, we get an insertion of man into the natural world. And then we get, in subsequent editions of the System of Nature, further subdivisions within the category of homo, like homo europaeus, homo asiaticus, homo americanus, and so on. And this, in turn, will be something of the basis, there are several sources coming together, a basis for the kind of classical taxonomy of early physical anthropology, or what you might call of early race science or race pseudoscience, depending on how you prefer to emphasize the point, of the sort that you see in authors like Blumenbach, another contemporary of Herder and Kant.

▶︎ 59:55 You get the classic kind of three races, typically with two other races, the Malay as kind of intermediate between the African and the Asian, and the American as intermediate between the Asian and the European, things like that. Anywhere between three and five basic biogeographical subtypes of the human species. And such taxonomic approaches to humanity itself certainly did not exist before this period. In fact, we can identify 1686, an article by a French author named François Bernier, called "A New Division of the Earth." This is the first attempt to subdivide the human species into biogeographical subtypes.

▶︎ 1:01:13 And obviously, the preoccupation with this question in the 18th century is significantly shaped by the economic and political reality of slavery, in particular transatlantic chattel slavery. Earlier in the 16th and into the 17th centuries, the question of human biodiversity is by contrast, mostly shaped by reflection on the significance of the existence of Native Americans. Who are they? How did they get there? How did they migrate all that way from the Garden of Eden? And so on. Africans take the place of Native Americans as we move from the 17th to the 18th centuries as the paradigmatic example of otherness in need of explanation for many European authors.

▶︎ 1:02:21 Blumenbach, just to finish out that thought, is the author of a 1776, I don't want to give you a year without being absolutely certain, but roughly around then. Around the same time as Kant's 1775 work called On the Different Races of Men, Blumenbach publishes a treatise in Latin called On the Innate Variety of the Human Species. And in some respects, Blumenbach's treatise on the innate variety of the human species is the foundational work of physical anthropology. You can still, if you go to the University of Göttingen today, you can see Blumenbach's collection of human skulls classified according to race.

▶︎ 1:03:25 And so this is the beginning of physical anthropology in the sense that he's the one who had the idea, okay, if we want to ground claims of real racial difference in something real, we need to start measuring cranial capacity and stuff like that. Physical anthropology as the method of establishing the bounds of the variety of the human species through measurement begins with Blumenbach.

▶︎ 1:03:57 All of these characters who are reflecting on race in the mid-18th century, with the exception perhaps of Voltaire, and I'll speak to that in a moment, are defenders of monogenesis. That is to say, everyone is descended from Adam and Eve. We're all the same people, and you get all sorts of proposals to test this experimentally. Buffon, the natural historian Buffon suggests transplanting West Africans to Denmark and vice versa in order to see how long it takes for the physiological or the phenotypic transition of the change of skin color and so on to take place. So obviously that's naive to think that such a thing would happen just by an environmental change. But it reveals a deep underlying commitment to the view that all human beings are descended from the first parents, and that makes them fundamentally the same kind of creature.

▶︎ 1:05:22 It's only in the 19th century, mostly in the Anglophone and American contexts as more hardened apologia for the institution of slavery, that you start to get full-throated defenses of polygenesis. That is to say, the idea that different human racial groups are fundamentally different kinds. And you also see a little bit of a hint of polygenesis in Voltaire, both in some racist comments he makes about Africans and also in some of his rather shocking antisemitic comments. But in these cases, you just have to say that Voltaire is probably just shooting off his mouth. He's being a polemicist rather than a theorist. He's not making theoretical claims, he's just trying to be outrageous.

▶︎ 1:06:23 So we can leave Voltaire aside and basically converge on the fact that 18th century racial theory is almost without exception monogenist, and that certainly includes Kant in his On the Different Races of Man of 1775. He defends a theory of what he calls germs or keima, which is effectively, in the absence of any knowledge of the science of genetics, the idea is that we all contain germs of all possible human phenotypes, and it's different environmental circumstances that, so to speak, activate a certain latent phenotypic trait. But the germ is there in all of us, and that's why tropical birds have more colorful feathers than their northern cousins. The germ of the colorful feathers are there even in the dull-colored bird as well, things like that.

▶︎ 1:07:36 But what justifies the claim of an attribution of sameness to two beings is what Kant calls Buffon's law, somewhat unusually. A lot of other thinkers said this besides Buffon. But what Kant describes as Buffon's law is namely what he calls the unity of the generative principle. That is, if two beings can procreate with one another, then they're the same kind of thing. And sharing the same lines of descent, absent the possibility of speciation, which Kant will not acknowledge because he's not an evolutionist, sharing the same lines of descent, having the same first parents is enough to make two creatures the same kind of creature.

▶︎ 1:08:33 Therefore, Kant is committed to the view that Africans and Europeans are absolutely the same kind of creature. And so if we conceive his cosmopolitan project as, let's say, civilizational, as Eurocentric, as imperialist, it's important to counterbalance those descriptive terms with an insistence on the point that all of this makes sense for him, from his point of view, only on the presumption of an innate universal equality of all human beings.

▶︎ 1:09:26 Now, Herder enters into a kind of triangle of disagreement and fruitful conversation and debate between himself and Kant and Blumenbach, and writes in particular in response to Kant on the different races of men. And I should have also mentioned Buffon. I could have mentioned Maupertuis, another important French philosopher and scientist writing in the 1740s, particularly interested in the phenomenon of albinism among Africans. The fact that certain individuals are, let's say, anomalous with respect to skin color. How does that happen for an individual within a population?

▶︎ 1:10:31 And also there are numerous treatises, particularly clustered in the 1740s, attempting to give broadly, one of them is, I forget the exact title, but a treatise treating the question of dark skin color as a question of Newtonian optics. So using a Newtonian frame to account for racial phenotypic difference. Herder is aware of all of this, of this whole long history of writing on racial difference even if he's responding most immediately to the work of Kant and Blumenbach.

▶︎ 1:11:30 And it's in this connection that Herder is able to say that it already presupposes too much to take for granted that it is the darkness of an African's skin color that is in need of explanation rather than the reverse. Why not take as in need of explanation the phenotypic traits of Europeans? That is to say, what is it exactly that enables a European thinker to take his own appearance as the default setting of humanity, so to speak. So that then is a rebuke to the overtly racist hierarchical views of human inequality that are also circulating, but it's also a rebuke to the Kantian cosmopolitan universalist approach that would not focus on phenotypes, but that would focus on cultural forms, and that would presuppose that there's anything, any standard set here at home in Europe that can be meaningfully extended for measurement, whether it's of phenotypic traits like skin color or of, let's say, degrees of cultural complexity like literacy or institutions of higher education or whatever.

▶︎ 1:13:26 Herder is now in a position to insist that one cannot, without argument, simply take the European as the measure at all. And in fact, he has occasion to say in his response to Kant on race that there is, so to speak, nothing at all to be learned from European institutions or from European ways of doing things if one happens to be born and raised in an African society.

▶︎ 1:14:16 And there is a long history of rhetorical uses of cultural relativism. You find this already in the mid-16th century in Montaigne's famous essay "On Cannibals," by which he means on the indigenous people of the Caribbean. Yes, cannibal also means people who eat other human beings, but this was also in the 16th century a particular kind of ethnonym and ethnic designation, an inexact one, but nonetheless. So Montaigne's use of the figure of the cannibal there is to highlight all the various respects in which Europeans are equally vicious without realizing it, and so living as hypocrites. At least the cannibals face up to just how gruesome and transgressive what they're doing is, or something like that. That's roughly Montaigne's argument.

▶︎ 1:15:27 So there's a long history of that. But one could argue, and we're getting close to my conclusion here, one could argue that it's only with Herder, it's only roughly in the era of Herder that that kind of reflection of the sort we already see in Montaigne being used for rhetorical purposes, that that kind of reflection becomes the basis for a new, so to speak, third way political philosophy. That is to say, it carves out a special space. It's a third way political philosophy relative to the options that we have today.

▶︎ 1:16:20 It is conservative in the sense that it is preoccupied with tradition, with folk ways, with habits that grow up organically in a particular place for particular contextual environmental reasons, all of that. It's conservative in that it adopts all of those stances, and at the same time, it is egalitarian in that it doesn't deign to adopt a universal frame to compare these different local contexts. So that then is the moment, I think, with Herder, that the thought of cultural relativity becomes elevated to the level of an actual coherent political philosophy.

▶︎ 1:17:33 In the early 19th century, we get the emergence of Romanticism as a conscious movement. Herder occupies a difficult relationship to Romanticism. Here as well, there are very loose and partially overlapping tendencies. Herder and Goethe are both somewhat romantic, more properly associated with the so-called Sturm und Drang movement, or the storm and stress movement of the late 18th century, that then for Goethe, Goethe goes off into what's sometimes called Weimar Classicism, which is a very backward-looking, but also very classical tendency.

▶︎ 1:18:31 But Romanticism is, narrowly speaking, an early 19th century movement associated with such names as Novalis and Schlegel. And also, and this is the part that I wanted to emphasize maybe more than you'll get from other people talking about this subject, it's also associated with the projects of people like the Brothers Grimm. Who are the Brothers Grimm? What were they doing? They were out there collecting fairy tales. This happened earlier already with Perrault in the French-speaking world, and that's where we get the tales of Mother Goose.

▶︎ 1:19:10 The Brothers Grimm go out and collect their tales. Why are they doing that? Who cares about tales? Fairy tales are for children. It's not serious. Well, the answer is that these, it was starting to become clear, are, so to speak, the kind of cultural lifeblood of a given people. And if you want to know what a given group of people is all about, where its soul is, so to speak, you pay attention to its recipes, its bedtime stories, its songs and dances, and costumes and things like that.

▶︎ 1:19:59 In the 17th century, by contrast, there's scarcely any acknowledgment of the dignity or value or nobility, let alone the theoretical importance, the importance for knowledge's sake, of popular traditions of that sort. And one way of understanding Romanticism, and there are a lot of different dimensions of it that could be emphasized, one way of understanding Romanticism is that it is the discovery of vernacular forms as something that is both valuable, but also, again, theoretically important. The discovery of vernacular forms as worthy of scientific, theoretical attention alongside the kind of elevated, high-art, classical forms that already had their place as objects of study.

▶︎ 1:21:16 And again, you see this already being anticipated by Leibniz. He's very much ahead of the curve, and in this, he embodies, as I put it already, both Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment tendencies. But it's really only as we move from Herder and the Sturm und Drang era into the kind of golden age of German Romanticism that valuing such things starts to take on the political significance that in some respects, it continues to have even today.

▶︎ 1:21:59 Let me just conclude, because I've certainly used up enough time, let me just conclude by saying that we're dealing with, again, I'm repeating myself, but I think this is really important, we're dealing with overlapping notions. Sometimes the terms we're using are opposed, sometimes they're complementary. Many of the figures we're looking at can be read both as Enlightenment and as Counter-Enlightenment figures, such as Leibniz. Many of the doctrines we've considered, like sensationalism, for example, can be considered both as central to the Enlightenment, as a staple of the empiricist method, but also as central to the Counter-Enlightenment as an expression of the subjectivism we associate with Romanticism.

▶︎ 1:22:57 Very difficult to tease out and to isolate the key terms and concepts, which again, can easily make us think we're talking about nothing at all, or we're trying to carve intellectual history elsewhere than at its joints or something like that. But I would disagree. I would say that these are meaningful categories, Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, Romanticism, rationalism, empiricism. These are meaningful categories. We can't scrap them, even if we constantly have to remind ourselves how difficult they are to pin down, and even if, and this will be my final point, even if this difficulty has led, especially in the present day, especially in, say, online social media spaces, has led to a lot of confusion and often pointless polemics over the legacy of the Enlightenment from people who often scarcely understand what they're talking about.

▶︎ 1:24:10 So it's complicated, it's messy, it takes a lot of work, a lot of reading, a lot of patience to get a handle on all of the many different dimensions of the legacies of these intellectual tendencies of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. I think we've gone some good distance towards tackling those difficulties, and I thank you for your attention.