Can Free Will Escape Causation?
Reed Winegar
In this lecture, Reed Winegar walks through Kant's theory of knowledge, beginning with the fundamental distinctions between analytic and synthetic judgments and between a priori and empirical knowledge. He explains why Kant believed that synthetic a priori knowledge, such as mathematics and causation, is possible, drawing on the famous example of how we judge causal connections to be necessary, even though experience alone could never show them to be more than regular. Winegar then traces the limits of this framework: while knowledge applies reliably to objects of possible experience, it cannot reach beyond those bounds to things in themselves. This limitation, however, opens a surprising door. Through the Third Antinomy, Kant reveals a paradox in causal reasoning that leaves room for a special kind of uncaused freedom. Winegar concludes by exploring how this gap between appearances and things in themselves allows Kant to argue that humans might possess genuine moral autonomy, choosing between morality and desire in a way that escapes thoroughgoing causal determination.
Suggested reading:
Associated Kant Readings:
Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Analytic: System of Principles, Second Analogy
Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic: The Antinomy of Pure Reason, Section II. The Antithetic of Pure Reason, Third Conflict
Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic: The Antinomy of Pure Reason, Sections VII-VIII
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Part 1
For a prominent alternative approach to Kant's theory of free will, including its relationship to transcendental idealism, see Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (1990).