▶︎ 0:01 Welcome back. This is the third lecture in our course on the Enlightenment and its discontents. I'm Justin Smith-Ruiu. By the end of the next two lectures, we will have covered the key figures of Enlightenment philosophy, and we will be prepared then to move on to an exploration of the other part of our course, namely the discontents, the people who were not entirely happy with the spirit of the Enlightenment.
▶︎ 0:35 Some of those figures might come up today. There might be some mention of Herder, or of the polemic between Voltaire and Rousseau. But for the most part, we're going to try to trace the arc of what we're calling, somewhat simplistically, Enlightenment philosophy, up through the end of its golden age, which we can see as coming to its completion in 1804 with the death of Immanuel Kant, somewhat arbitrarily. There's already plenty of counter-Enlightenment sensibility circulating around in the latter half of the 18th century.
▶︎ 1:19 Before we begin the lesson or the lecture properly speaking, I would like to make a few preliminary points.
▶︎ 1:29 One is, while we aren't emphasizing this side of the discussion too much, you might have noticed that the question of the legacy of the Enlightenment continues to attract a lot of attention in the 21st century, including in online discussion. Popular authors, I can cite, for example, Pankaj Mishra, I can cite Steven Pinker, have taken up positions relative to the Enlightenment. Pinker, for example, very much wishes to see himself as continuing the legacy of the Enlightenment, celebrating the values and discoveries of the Enlightenment period, and arguing that it was, on balance, a very good thing to have happened to us.
▶︎ 2:36 At the same time, you have many people today returning to organized religions, or discovering Romanticism, or concerned in one way or another with the limits of the power of reason and human agency to get us everything we need in human life. And so while we aren't emphasizing this fact, this is a topic that is clearly coursing through our algorithms in the present day. And what we're trying to do is to get some good historical and conceptual basis for this discussion, in some way to be more historically and philosophically informed about a broad topic that many people who are, well, let's put it nicely, less informed, like to talk about nonetheless.
▶︎ 3:48 So that's one preliminary remark. Another is I wanted to go into a little bit more detail today, before we get started in earnest on the philosophical side of things, into a little bit more detail regarding the social context of the emergence of Enlightenment philosophy. One thing I haven't emphasized as much as I perhaps should have at the very beginning is that there was a significant shift over the course of the 17th century in the way knowledge was produced and circulated.
▶︎ 4:30 For one thing, of course, over the course of the prior century, indeed beginning at the end of the 15th century, we have a very important development, which is namely the printing revolution, or the Gutenberg revolution, which fundamentally restructures the way knowledge circulates. And we're seeing this again today, of course. This makes the early modern period, in some cases, a laboratory test case for thinking about what is happening in the present moment, in the 21st century.
▶︎ 5:06 If you read a historian, for example, like Anne Blair, wonderful book called Too Much to Know, that's about the efforts to reclassify information, in particular library classifications and so on, in the early modern period as a result of what she sees as an information explosion. And of course, we're undergoing an information explosion in the present moment as well, but we can learn how to navigate this in part by looking at the fallout and the cultural realignments that occurred as a result of the print revolution five and more centuries ago.
▶︎ 5:57 Part of what happened as a result of new information technologies, new possibilities for communication and circulation of ideas, is that universities, indeed then as now, universities retreated as the site of central importance in the generation and dissemination of knowledge for almost 200 years, between the early 17th century and the late 18th century, when you start to get the emergence of the German research university of the sort that would survive up to the end of the 20th century. Things are changing now again.
▶︎ 6:49 In that period between the early 17th century and the end of the 18th century, a university was the last place, not the last place, I'm sure there were places even less propitious, but a university was far from being the first place you would want to go in order to get up to speed on the latest ideas. For example, the young Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was born into an academic family in Leipzig. His father was a professor of law and a jurist in Leipzig. He could have stayed on in the scholastic, lethargic, somewhat, let's say, dusty world of the provincial Saxon Protestant university, but that would not have been very useful for his particular set of intellectual and worldly ambitions. He had to get to Paris to work in a more informal way with the most brilliant mathematicians of the era.
▶︎ 8:01 In 1672, he rushes off to Paris to work with Christian Huygens, and he's operating in an informal circle rather than in an institution. That's one key feature of Enlightenment knowledge. It's happening just wherever people get together to pursue questions. Often this happens, particularly in the English context, in coffee houses. You go to a coffee house to watch someone dissect a dolphin or give a lecture on Icelandic feldspar or who knows what.
▶︎ 8:44 There's a more formal or institutional side of knowledge production and dissemination as well that is emerging parallel to the universities or picking up some of the institutional, let's say, work that has now migrated out of the universities, and this is namely the new scientific academies and societies that are emerging, often on the model of what Francis Bacon had conceptualized in utopian terms in the early 17th century. Francis Bacon envisions new collaborative institutions for the pursuit of scientific knowledge. This gets realized decades after his death.
▶︎ 9:42 In the English case, in 1660, you have the foundation of the Royal Society of London, which is the context in which so many people, including Robert Boyle, including Isaac Newton, many of the luminary British figures of late 17th century science and natural philosophy are working in the context of the Royal Society, which by 1666 begins publishing a journal called the Philosophical Transactions. This exists still today. You can read in the Philosophical Transactions articles about insulin and groundhogs and all sorts of things that would seem to us by today's standards have nothing to do with philosophy. But the name Philosophical Transactions is, so to speak, a vestige of the spirit of philosophy as it was understood circa 1660.
▶︎ 10:46 Then over the course of the late 17th century, you start to get, I don't want to say duplicates, but new scientific academies founded somewhat on the model of what had already been successfully achieved in London. You see the same thing in Paris. You see the same thing in Berlin. By 1725, you also have the Academy of St. Petersburg, again founded on the same model. It radiates out as the new institutional context for natural philosophical inquiry that has, again, largely migrated out of the universities.
▶︎ 11:31 Another key, so to speak, sociological dimension of enlightenment philosophy is the famous salon. What is a salon exactly? Well, it's an informal setting that has a lot of implicit rules of exchange communication, and it is something that is typically spearheaded by members of the aristocracy, and more particularly, aristocratic women. So there are famous 18th century salon women like Madame de Pompadour, who is the king's, what's the term? The king's favorite, as we say in French, but is also a driving figure in the promotion of the enlightenment spirit that is ultimately going to lead to the revolution.
▶︎ 12:40 We'll talk some more about the politics of enlightenment philosophy soon enough, but there's a very interesting tension over the course of the 18th century, where you've got aristocrats getting together to talk about and to indulge the figures and ideas of enlightenment philosophy that are willy-nilly tending towards republican revolutions. Perhaps the most obvious case of this is the case of the enlightened sovereign as he's often described, namely, Friedrich of Prussia, who is often depicted in the salon context talking about philosophy and enjoying the fruits of the enlightenment.
▶︎ 13:40 And in some cases, I should also mention in the case of Russia, Russia is a lovely example, where you have a very overt effort to import enlightenment, in particular through Catherine, through the empress's sponsorship of Voltaire. And this is a way of signaling modernity by the 18th century. It's a way that sovereigns can show the rest of the world that they're up on the latest trends in thinking, but also in arts and fashion and music and so on.
▶︎ 14:31 So enlightenment, as it were, as a brand. And of course, Voltaire's career path as a courtier and as a sponsored philosopher, so to speak, is not at all unusual in this period. You can't earn a university salary as a philosopher, but you can get royal patronage. This is indeed a pattern that we see repeated over and over again. Leibniz is the tutor to Princess Sophie Charlotte of Prussia. Descartes gets an even more impressive gig some decades earlier as the court philosopher to Queen Christina of Sweden. That didn't work out very well. Descartes dies of pneumonia after four months of Stockholm winter.
▶︎ 15:30 But this was again, a very, very common pattern, male philosophers making their careers under the patronage of women royalty. And in some cases, of course, indeed in the case of the correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, another example is the correspondence between Leibniz and Sophie Charlotte herself, whom I already mentioned. And in many cases, the aristocratic woman patron is not just paying to hear someone talk about philosophy, but is also substantially contributing to the practice of inquiry itself. And surely one of the best examples is in the early 18th century, Émilie du Châtelet, another very significant salon figure again of the upper aristocracy, but also a very, very important critic, and programmatic developer of the philosophy or of the philosophical implications of the work of Isaac Newton.
▶︎ 16:50 And that just is finally one other point. Émilie du Châtelet is working at the highest level. We also see a lot of what in French is horribly called vulgarization, which is to say versions of sophisticated philosophical treatises like, for example, Newton's Principia Mathematica, circulating in the salon context in a simplified way and often being presented as version of Newton's philosophy or of Locke's philosophy, pour les dames, for the women. So there's this idea, and it's somewhat, of course, obviously patronizing when it's put like that, but what we're actually seeing is the expression of a new value, the idea that philosophy is for everybody, and irregardless of sex or gender, and that moreover, it is something that can be translated into terms that everybody, no matter what their prior education, is capable of understanding. So everybody in principle, but in truth, almost exclusively the upper classes.
▶︎ 18:22 I think it's important to get a sense of the social context of the circulation of these ideas, and also of the geography of the whole thing. In some respects, when we say Enlightenment, we mean, most importantly, the French Enlightenment. There's a sense in which Paris is the undisputed capital of the Enlightenment. But at the same time, it's important to pay attention to the whole map of the Enlightenment and the way different geographical and cultural historical locations on that map lead to very interesting and very different results.
▶︎ 19:15 I already mentioned the case of the Russian Enlightenment, which is particular in the way it's imported whole hog, and also in the way it's experienced mostly as a kind of attempt at rebranding, so to speak, if you want to put it somewhat crudely. And then we can also look at the way Enlightenment radiates out into the colonies. And here, it's really important to emphasize that the American Revolution, like the French Revolution, is in large part a product of the circulation of Enlightenment philosophical ideas. In particular, the crucial emphasis on individual rights being grounded in individual self-evident human dignity, which is, in turn, grounded in the faculty of reason.
▶︎ 20:25 And this is all, in turn, articulated relatively independently by many of the American Founding Fathers, as they're called, relatively independently of any consideration of the transcendent grounds for, say, individual rights. And so you have a relatively far advanced decoupling of the explanation of the dignity and rights of man, as it was often said, from any considerations of organized religion. And typically, we describe at least the majority of the American Founding Fathers, there are, of course, exceptions and complications, as adhering to deism, which is to say to a doctrine according to which reason compels us to believe in the existence of a supreme being. But beyond that, it's impossible to specify any particular creed or doctrine as fine-grained as, say, the Trinity.
▶︎ 21:45 We'll come back to deism and to natural theology soon enough. For the moment, I just wanted to emphasize the geographical dimensions of Enlightenment. It's a global phenomenon in some sense. Indeed, the first fully global phenomenon in modern intellectual history in the way that it ripples out around the world, and shapes both the mindsets, but also more importantly, the political history of the European colonies around the world. And we'll have some opportunity to get back to that in a later lecture as well.
▶︎ 22:35 For the moment, I want to maybe say a few words that do continue in this line I've just introduced, which is considering the global context of Enlightenment philosophy and considering, in particular, the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world, the West and the rest, as it's often said, in light of the dynamics of Enlightenment philosophy. Now, I've mentioned in a previous lecture Descartes' doctrine of dualism, the idea that the soul stuff and body stuff, or as Descartes prefers to put it, thinking stuff and extended stuff have nothing in common. They're entirely ontologically distinct from one another, and ne'er the twain shall meet, except later he has to say, "Okay, well, actually, they do meet in the pineal gland," and that creates some complications for him.
▶︎ 23:54 But we can bracket that for now, and simply emphasize that Descartes' dualism is concerned to keep the human soul or mind, it's the same thing for him, no difference, perfect synonyms, to keep the human soul or mind out of any inquiry into the natural world. That is to say that the human soul or mind is not an object of study, properly understood, of natural philosophy. That is to say, of science. And this is ultimately a failed exception, as I've said. By the 1740s, you have La Mettrie, for example, arguing that man is a machine, in the same way as in the 1640s, you have Descartes arguing that animals are machines, but human beings are an exception.
▶︎ 25:16 And one way of understanding at least one important dimension of the broad course of Enlightenment philosophy, and by philosophy, I include natural philosophy, I include science. One way of understanding the broad arc of Enlightenment natural philosophy is that it little by little encroaches upon and absorbs or swallows up those things, those entities that had earlier been considered beyond the bounds of natural philosophical inquiry. For example, the human essence or that which makes a human being distinctly human. A human being then, the terminology differs from author to author, how this distinguishing principle is identified, call it a soul or an essence, we can be somewhat loose with the language here. But the key thing is that whatever it is that makes a human being human, prior to the Enlightenment, would not have been considered an object of study of natural philosophy. Take an interesting case, the case of, say, the possibility of naturalistic origins for human beings.
▶︎ 27:02 Now, traditionally, it was taken for granted that human beings were divinely created, that the first parents were willfully brought into existence by God and had themselves no ancestors, certainly not proto-hominid ancestors, or earlier than that, bilaterians or anything of the sort. Already in the 16th century, in particular in the school of thought we often describe as Italian libertine thinking, or sometimes we also refer to them as free thinkers, people like Lucilio Vanini and Giordano Bruno begin to articulate or to touch upon, to flirt with the possibility of naturalistic origins for human beings by proposing that Native Americans are Earth born.
▶︎ 28:19 So this is not so long after the first contact with the Americas, and what happens over the course of the following century after Columbus is that the Americas become increasingly a kind of place on which to project thought experiments at a large scale. It feeds the imagination. It offers up stock examples for thought experiments and conceptual reflection on the new world, broadly speaking. So Vanini in the 16th century is already prepared to venture the possibility that Native Americans were born out of the Earth while reassuring his contemporaries that as for us, we're descended from Adam and Eve. Don't worry.
▶︎ 29:24 Now, terrible things happen to Vanini and Bruno. I'll spare you the gory details, but they were killed by the Inquisition, in part for entertaining such heretical views. But the door was already open with them by now. In the 17th century, you have people like Isaac La Peyrère reflecting on what he calls pre-Adamism, the idea that there were already other human beings before Adam. Many people start reflecting on the possibility that there are multiple Adams, and indeed, the prospect of what's sometimes called polygenesis, or different origins for different groups, in particular, increasingly racialized groups, start to be discussed in the context of European philosophy. Now, jump forward a bit to the early 18th century.
▶︎ 30:29 We have a very important contribution to what you might call the naturalization of the human being in the work of the Swedish naturalist taxonomist, Carl Linnaeus. Linnaeus is, of course, the person who gave us Linnaean taxonomy, the system of using a binomial nomenclature for identifying the genus and species of every kind of living being. This originates in the work of Linnaeus entitled Systema Naturae, a system of nature, the first edition of which was published in the 1730s, and then we have several successive editions.
▶︎ 31:23 One of the most remarkable things is that in later editions, Linnaeus makes a double move that is very historically significant for understanding what happens to the human in the Enlightenment. Among other things, he includes the human. So this is the first move that I want to draw out. In later editions of the System of Nature, he includes homo alongside various other species that he describes as anthropomorpha, that is to say, the beings that are human-like, and he has in mind, namely, what we would call the great apes. Now, his particular designation of the great apes is largely mired in myth, and it's hard to know which species he exactly understands under a given name. But the key thing is that he's prepared to see human as a taxonomic designation alongside related natural entities like the Satyrus indicus, or the pigmaus, likely orangutans and chimpanzees respectively.
▶︎ 32:58 The first move then is to include the human alongside the human-like in a taxonomic scheme that purports to portray the order of nature as it actually is. A second move is to include sub-designations under homo, for example, homo afer, homo europaeus, homo asiatikus, and so on. In other words, we get, in the early 18th century, thanks to Linnaeus, the first articulation of the idea that there could be natural subtypes, also known as races, that truly exist as what John Stuart Mill would later call natural kinds.
▶︎ 33:49 So what we see then is that there's a process, as I've put it, of absorption, of swallowing up the human into the order of nature and conceptualizing the human as something that is exhaustively investigable by natural philosophical or natural scientific methods. And one of the things that this does is it opens up the possibility of a new kind of inegalitarianism. Of course, human beings were always unjust towards one another, and they came up with all sorts of reasons to hate one another, since forever, presumably. But only from the Enlightenment do we start to have the new possibility of articulating a basis for inegalitarian understanding of the human species as, for example, divided into hierarchies of races. We have, for the first time in the Enlightenment, the possibility of articulating that inequality in terms that are effectively borrowed from natural science.
▶︎ 35:12 So this is a big question, and it combines both the history of science and the political legacies of the Enlightenment that, again, I hope we can discuss in some detail in a later lecture. But just to close out this thought, what I did also want to emphasize was we tend to find dualism a bit antiquated today, or at least many people do. One thing that can be said for dualism, however, is that it is a kind of protective barrier around the human that in some ways, while it resists naturalization, it also resists a certain kind of inegalitarian thinking about the human.
▶︎ 36:12 All right. Now, I'd like to return to the question of materialism versus idealism that's already been evoked at a few moments, try to characterize some of the most basic oppositions in 17th century philosophy in a way that might be introductory for some, or too introductory for some, but on the way to an account of Kant's critical solution to some of the problems we saw earlier. Now, I thought perhaps we should, in a very elementary way, define some of our terms. And again, this might be too basic for some people, but it might come as a relief to have explicit definitions attached to the isms we're throwing around.
▶︎ 37:19 And so one important thing to emphasize is the very unstable meaning of materialism, in particular. Materialism is often cited as the ontology of Enlightenment philosophy, as a general rule, but it's actually a lot more complicated than that, in part because what we mean by matter is always in flux. It's not at all a stable historical category, and it changes indeed quite a bit from the 17th to the 18th centuries.
▶︎ 38:11 Now, when we talk about Enlightenment materialism, this is often a manner of talking that we have got from Marxist philosophy, Marxism itself being a materialist philosophical theory. The Marxists tend to describe themselves as dialectical materialists. That is a very complicated notion that we don't need to discuss in detail, but rather to invoke only to better understand what they usually describe as the vulgar materialism of the Enlightenment. Vulgar materialism is what a Marxist would say about the materialism of a philosopher like Diderot, but that doesn't really get to the heart of things, because again, we have to ask what is meant by matter.
▶︎ 39:28 Diderot is a materialist, a vulgar materialist if you will, indeed to the extent that he believes that there is no element or principle ontologically distinct from whatever it is that composes the natural world that should be held responsible for thinking and acting. So famously in a work called The Elements of Physiology, Diderot addresses the question, can a statue think? And his answer is, yes, a statue can think. You take the statue, you grind it into a powder, you sprinkle the powder over the grass, you have a cow eat the grass, you kill the cow, and you eat it, and then you continue thinking. So the idea is, and this is somewhat facetious, but the idea is that your thinking is itself just a rearrangement of the stuff of this world that includes, among other things, limestone out of which statues are made and so on.
▶︎ 40:54 And that idea in 18th century France is seen as a development of a certain strand of thinking in the philosophy of John Locke. John Locke being a great British empiricist who dies in 1704, publishes his Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1690 and says in the essay that he is not going to attempt even to resolve the question whether thinking requires the hypothesis of an independent principle like the Cartesian soul or mind, or whether, by contrast, thinking is something that can appear as a property of matter arranged fortuitously or arranged in such a way as to facilitate thinking. Locke says, "I don't know. I'm not going to answer that question." But as often happens in the history of philosophy, someone simply considering a possibility but then declining to affirm that possibility outright, what that effectively does is just opens the door in the coming generation for at least a certain number of people to affirm it. And that's what you can certainly see as you move from Locke to Diderot.
▶︎ 42:46 So that is a variety of materialism, again, what I just attributed to Diderot with the example of the statue. Materialism has a significant historical link to atomism. Atomism is an ancient school of thought in ancient Greece. We also see parallels in classical Indian philosophy, incidentally. And it is in its most simple version in the work of the pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus, simply the view that the world consists in nothing but elementary particles that can't be decomposed further, moving around in a void.
▶︎ 43:46 Epicurus develops ancient atomism by introducing a principle called the clinamen, or sometimes this is translated, and we see this in Shakespeare a lot as the swerve, which is the tendency of atoms moving in the void suddenly and without a precipitating cause to shoot off in the other direction, or to do something, as we say today, completely random. And this was seen as necessary because if you don't add the clinamen or the swerve, then it's always possible that all your atoms are just going to move to one side of the universe and clump together there and motion will effectively stop.
▶︎ 44:38 Epicurean atomism was translated into verse in the first century by the Latin poet Lucretius in a poem called the De natura rerum or On the Nature of Things. This was rediscovered in the Renaissance in the 16th century, and one cannot overemphasize the cultural impact of Lucretian Epicurean atomism in the late Renaissance. This is what opens up the possibility for our 17th century mechanical philosophers to take seriously the idea that the world could well be, as Descartes puts it, a system of corpuscles moving in a fixed plenum. In his case, he's a plenist. He doesn't believe there's a vacuum the way the atomists do. But nonetheless, the key element there, the continuity between Epicurus and Lucretius and Descartes is the idea that the ultimate stuff of the world is not fundamentally qualitatively differentiated but is simply different arrangements of fundamental particles.
▶︎ 46:04 Then you have other figures like the contemporary of Descartes, Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi, we sometimes call him in English, who identifies himself explicitly as an Epicurean and is committed to a basically materialist view of nature as a system of atoms. You have other early 17th century flirtations with materialism. It's hard to go all the way, in part because it's hard to be an overt atheist in the 17th century, in contrast with the 18th century, when there's practically an anything goes spirit.
▶︎ 46:55 But already in the early 17th century, you do find philosophers like Thomas Hobbes getting pretty flirtatious even with a materialistic explanation of the nature of God. Hobbes says that God is bodily just like everything else. To exist is to be a body, but God must be made out of very rarefied particles, like some kind of gas. That again is a limit case. Hobbes goes as far as you can.
▶︎ 47:31 And again, there are different kinds of limits to what can be said, depending on one's social standing and on where one is. Certainly the center of radical thought by the mid-17th century is Amsterdam, and in Amsterdam you do get a few anonymously published atheist, overtly atheist treatises, coming out of the underground presses. And of course, Jonathan Israel is very good on the history of publishing and anonymous pamphleteering in the radical Enlightenment. But it's very gradual. And again, at least as prominent figures go, Gassendi and Hobbes are the ones who are really pushing the boundaries.
▶︎ 48:33 But if we leave the question of God's nature out of things and just focus on the revival of Epicurean atomism in the 17th century, we see one very interesting cluster of reflections around the question of whether you need to add a further principle or give some kind of account of the qualitative differentiation of the atoms themselves in order to account for the qualitative diversity of the world as we see it. Can we really just say that the moss covering the rocks and the hair on my head and the tides and clouds and volcanic lava and all of that is really just different arrangements of the same basic kind of particulate entity? Or should we say that there are somehow different fundamental qualitative principles out there in the world?
▶︎ 49:44 You start to see in relatively minor figures, figures like Henry Power, that most people will not have read or heard of, various proposals for reattributing qualitative powers to atoms. Some minor figures even suggest that atoms have a kind of gender, that there are differently gendered atoms, things like this. So all of this can be understood as a somewhat anxious reflection on the difficulty and the implausibility of deriving this world of immense qualitative variety from something so austere and minimal as atoms. Nonetheless, again, that's the direction that the arc of history is tending in over the course of these 200 years or so between 1600 and 1800.
▶︎ 51:02 Now, materialism is complicated in part by the fact that, as I put it, the concept of matter is not a historically stable one. When you get articulations of materialism or crypto-materialism in the 17th century, they usually take for granted that the fundamental particles, atoms or corpuscles, are inert. And this is key to Descartes' physics, in particular. For Descartes to attribute active power to a particle is effectively to slip back into a kind of pagan vitalist understanding of nature. And so for him, the only properly non-pagan Christian physics is the physics that insists on the total passivity of matter. And that excludes the possibility of an intrinsic clinamen, among other things, in the fundamental particles.
▶︎ 52:31 So how then for Descartes can we be certain that matter will continue to remain in motion? Descartes just literally appeals to a deus ex machina and says, well, God functions as, so to speak, the conservator of a fixed quantity of motion in the world at each moment. So God is functioning here for Descartes as a kind of hypothetical entity of theoretical physics rather than as a theological entity or as an entity properly studied by theology. So that's one way of doing things.
▶︎ 53:17 Then, of course, by the next generation, we have Leibniz reintroducing active principles to matter. Leibniz who recognizes that if we stick with inert particles, if we understand the material world, by definition, as lacking activity, then we're just not going to have the theoretical means to account for natural motion. So we start to get nature reanimated again.
▶︎ 53:55 And then, and this is what I wanted to emphasize, in the 18th century, among materialists, you find many thinkers, including Diderot and including essentially everyone who takes off from Locke's suggestion of the possibility of thinking matter. You start to get what sounds somewhat paradoxical, but really is not at all, a broad conception of materialism that could be called vitalist materialism. Again, that sounds like an oxymoron. We sometimes contrast vitalism and materialism. But the overall arc of the history of materialism from 1600 to 1800 is to move from this conception of matter as strictly inert to a conception of matter as having all the principles that we will need in order to account for natural change in motion, including some kind of vital principle. So that's the arc of materialism.
▶︎ 55:24 Let's briefly consider idealism, and I think, again, it's important to recognize that these terms have technical philosophical uses in philosophy, though they're also connected to the everyday uses we're familiar with, where materialism is liking Hermès bags and Lamborghinis and stuff like that, and idealism is sticking to your principles or something like that. The terms are, let's say, distantly related but not totally unrelated to the philosophical senses. The briefest definition of idealism is that it is the view according to which the most basic reality is more mind-like than stuff-like, that it's ideas that are the real entities that make the cut for the final list of things there are in reality, and then bodies and physical entities are somehow the consequence or the product of ideation in some way.
▶︎ 56:50 This is, I think, in the 21st century and the 20th century, let's say, a minoritarian position, and it's generally seen as somewhat screwy or crackpot or marginal position to hold in the context of hegemonic natural science as we know it from the late 19th century on. Nonetheless, idealism has played an important role in the history of philosophy. It's often been a perfectly respectable position to take up. Plato is an idealist of a special sort.
▶︎ 57:39 Leibniz, it's a difficult question. There's controversy here. I would describe Leibniz myself as a phenomenalist. That is to say, Leibniz thinks that bodies or corporeal substances result from the perceptual activity of immaterial monads, and it's confused perception of an immaterial monad that gets translated at the phenomenal level into corporeality. So what we call bodies are actually just the result of confused perception. And confusion here, significantly, is literally the fusing together under the aspect of bodiliness of monads that in metaphysical rigor are discrete, are entirely distinct from one another.
▶︎ 58:45 So it's a beautiful elegant etymology here when you think about confusion as the principle of bodiliness for Leibniz, and then you think, well, that's not very nice to call us confused just because we think there are bodies in the world. Leibniz would say, "Oh, no, no, there's nothing wrong with that. It's a technical term, con-fusion, fusing together of immaterial monads." It's somewhat wrong, but the point of phenomenalism as distinct from idealism is that Leibniz is seeking not to explain bodies away, but simply to explain them. And in order to explain them in metaphysical rigor, it turns out that there are non-bodily principles underlying the world of bodies that we experience phenomenally. So not an idealist.
▶︎ 59:38 A near contemporary, George Berkeley, is often cited as the idealist par excellence. He's the one who gives us the slogan, "Esse est percipi," to be is to be perceived. In fact, interesting contrast between Leibniz and Berkeley. You might say that Berkeley is to be is to be perceived, and he actually says that, but you could summarize Leibniz's view as holding that to be is to be a perceiver. Esse est percipere. To be is to perceive. So the emphasis is different, but in some respects, they're circling around the same tree.
▶︎ 1:00:28 Now, who's doing the perceiving for Berkeley? Well, it's God. It's God who ensures that when you have your back turned to the tree, the tree will keep on doing its thing of just existing, because in any case, God is perceiving it all. And that's not so different from a lot of what we see in the history of philosophical theology in the Christian and Jewish traditions. You have a lot of reflection from Malebranche, for example, everything happens in God. You see the same idea in Augustine, everything happens in God.
▶︎ 1:01:16 And we could also talk about how Spinoza's monism and the identification of God and nature are similarly a variation on this line of reflection. But in a sense, all of these philosophers, including Berkeley, simply want to say that there's no kind of ultimate principle underlying the real existence of corporeal entities independently of God's divine sustenance of the natural world.
▶︎ 1:01:57 Something like that. And then we'll get to Kant soon enough, but we also have some reason to identify Kant as an idealist philosopher, but this is in a strictly critical sense. So to summarize, and again, we'll just bracket Kant for now, and we'll address him soon enough. So to summarize what we've said so far about idealism, it's in some respects simply the opposite of materialism, but then again, what counts as an idea or how exactly it is that ideas underlie or yield or generate reality is as historically unstable as the notion of matter as well.
▶︎ 1:02:58 So one more point I want to consider, one more problem of early modern philosophy that I want to consider that will set us up, I think, very well for a discussion of Kant's critical philosophy in the subsequent lecture, is the way that epistemology becomes fundamentally important in modern philosophy in a way that it previously had not been. So epistemology is a synonym of theory of knowledge. These are the same thing, and it concerns itself centrally with the problem not of what is true or of what there is, but of how you know what is true and how you know what there is.
▶︎ 1:03:57 In some respects, Leibniz is an outlier here. We can see Leibniz as the last of the full throttle metaphysicians who don't really care so much about working through or working across the canyon of epistemology in order to get to the other side. Leibniz just tells you about the ultimate structure of reality, and it's like a take it or leave it principle. And this is interesting because he comes after Descartes, whereas if you want to understand Descartes' contribution to the history of philosophy, you might do well to think about it as the definitive centering of epistemology.
▶︎ 1:04:48 That is to say, from Descartes, with oddball exceptions like Leibniz, who come after him, from Descartes, the problem of philosophy becomes the problem of bridging the gap, so to speak, between the mind and the world. The world is giving us reports about how it is or how it seems to be. We take those in our minds and then we try to figure out whether they're reliable or not. How do we determine whether they're reliable or not? Well, we can't just take in more through our senses because it's our senses that we're doubting.
▶︎ 1:05:32 We're doubting the reliability of our senses, so no new sensorily derived information is going to help us resolve the problem of the gap between the mind and the world. And some philosophers, well, we see anticipations of this already in Galileo. We see it much more clearly in John Locke, who distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities of bodies.
▶︎ 1:06:03 A secondary quality would be, for example, the smell or the color of the body. We generally suppose that a red shirt is not red in some context-independent or perceiver-independent way, that its redness is the result of the encounter between the actual physical object, the shirt, and a color-perceiving being, like you or I. That's a significant distinction. It's a meaningful distinction. So that's the secondary quality. The primary qualities then typically are mass, figure, and motion, which are presumed to be unlike color or smell in that they're there whether you are perceiving them or not.
▶︎ 1:07:13 Now, one way of understanding Berkeley's maneuver, coming somewhat after Locke, following in the empiricist line, is for Berkeley to say, "Wait a minute. We're empiricists. Empiricists think that everything you know is derived from the senses." So how could you possibly uphold a distinction between those features of bodies that are there when the bodies present themselves to the senses on the one hand, and on the other hand, those features of bodies that are there when they're not being presented to the senses? In order to know anything about those latter features, what Locke would call the primary qualities, you would have to observe. But if you observe, then ipso facto, by definition, what you're observing is not unobserved.
▶︎ 1:08:20 So the primary/secondary quality distinction then collapses for Berkeley, and we see a very, very interesting and unsettling tendency whereby firm commitment to empiricism as method almost willy-nilly leads us into the claws of idealism. Of course, most philosophers resist that conclusion, do not want to affirm idealism in the way Berkeley does. But again, the point is pretty compelling. If you are committed to the view that all knowledge comes through the senses, then it's impossible to distinguish the way bodies present themselves to the senses from the way bodies actually are when not so presenting themselves.
▶︎ 1:09:33 So Berkeley then argues in a very interesting way that no one should ever have introduced the idea of an underlying corporeal substratum we call matter in the first place. And in fact, he says, only philosophers with their head in the clouds would ever imagine that such a hypothetical entity is necessary anyway. He says that Irish farmers, if you tell them that there is a metaphysical substratum beneath the rock or the potato that you kick out in the field, their response would be, "Who cares? We don't need such a hypothetical substratum." So Berkeley's idea then is the kind of non mi bisogna. It's not needed. So he solves the problem of external material reality by saying this was just a fanciful distraction on the part of the philosophers anyway.
▶︎ 1:10:56 Now, if you look at a later empiricist philosopher, like David Hume, notably, and Hume is, of course, the central figure of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hume doesn't go along with Berkeley in that kind of biting the bullet and committing to an idealist metaphysics. But he does note that, I love this thought experiment. He says at one point, walk away from a table with your head turned so that you are seeing the table as you get further and further from it. You'll notice that what you're seeing is getting smaller and smaller as you walk.
▶︎ 1:11:50 You have other independent reasons, the testimony of other people, say, people who are standing close to the table and shouting reports to you as you walk away. You have other good reasons to think that the table itself is not getting smaller. But it follows from that that you are not seeing the table. Does that make sense? So what you're seeing is getting smaller. The table is not getting smaller. Therefore, you're not seeing the table. That's a pretty good logical argument.
▶︎ 1:12:23 Now, for Hume then, this leads to something like what would, in the early 20th century with people like G. E. Moore, be called sense data empiricism. If you're a true empiricist, what you're really talking about are the presentations to your senses and nothing more. You're not talking about an external world. That leads Hume into skepticism rather than into idealism, as had been the case with Berkeley.
▶︎ 1:13:01 I want to conclude this lecture, and I think we've set things up pretty well to talk about Kant in the following lecture. I want to conclude this lecture just by noting again that we have overlapping oppositions. One is between empiricism and rationalism, another is between idealism and materialism. Especially in the latter case, these are very historically unstable categories.
▶︎ 1:13:28 But what's particularly interesting for our topic is, often we try to pin particular isms on the Enlightenment, and we say that overall, the Enlightenment is empiricist and the Enlightenment is materialist, and it's overall anti-metaphysical as well. But none of this really works as more than just initial generalizations that have to be complicated, in part because key Enlightenment philosophers like Leibniz and his disciple Christian Wolff are full-bore metaphysicians without question. And another problem, of course, is that there's a tension between empiricism and materialism in the sense that, as I've just explained, you try to be a good empiric and you lose your grip on the external world altogether.
▶︎ 1:14:28 So as an initial characterization, maybe, yeah, most Enlightenment philosophy would like to affirm materialism and most Enlightenment philosophy would like to be empiricist, but it ain't that simple, and it never is. So we'll continue this with Kant in the next lecture. Thank you.