▶︎ 0:00 Welcome back. This is the fourth lecture in our course on the Enlightenment and its discontents. I am Justin Smith-Ruiu. In the previous lecture, the third lecture, we set everything up to move now to what we can see as the crescendo or the denouement or the final scene of the Enlightenment, which is Kant's critical project.
▶︎ 0:33 The three critiques that he wrote between the late 1770s and 1790 constitute some kind of maybe resolution, or if you're more skeptical or critical or distanced, perhaps a swan song of the project of Enlightenment philosophy, after which it moves out in different directions, including Romanticism and various other currents of post-Kantian philosophy that are in different ways absorbing and taking stock of the lesson of the ultimate failure of the highest aspirations of the philosophy of the Enlightenment.
▶︎ 1:36 So what we want to do now is to move through that denouement/swan song, and then after that, in the final lectures, look at some of the more critical, by which I mean hostile or opposed stances towards the aspirations of Enlightenment philosophy in figures like notably Herder, but also the later German Romantic post-Kantian thinkers. We'll get there soon enough.
▶︎ 2:20 We might, before we get to Kant himself, talk a little bit more about where Kant comes from. Obviously, he's a German philosopher, and that's significant because he is operating in a geographical and cultural context of, let's say, the outward radiation of the Enlightenment. He's not working in the capital of the Enlightenment, and that has significant consequences for his project. And this is in some respects, as I think I've mentioned, also the case for Leibniz, and I wanted to talk a little bit more about Leibniz and Leibnizianism in order to set the stage for the arrival of Kant.
▶︎ 3:11 And I say this in particular because Kant famously will say at the beginning of his critical project, that this critical project is the result of having been awoken by David Hume, we'll get there, we'll get to the significance of that later, of having been awoken by David Hume from his, Kant's, dogmatic slumber. And by dogmatic, Kant means precisely the school of thought represented by Leibniz, by his successor Christian Wolff, and to some extent also by Alexander Baumgarten.
▶︎ 3:59 And this is paradoxical, and it's, I suppose, typical of the history of intellectual movements, that no matter how original and innovative you are, if your work has any lasting impact, by the second generation, it's going to turn into a new dogma. That's really your only choice. Be forgotten or become a new dogma. And the latter is what happened with Leibniz, and this was in part the result of the intellectual activity at and around the University of Halle in the early 18th century.
▶︎ 4:45 And I wanted to talk a little bit about Halle. It's a place I've studied in some detail, and I think it's very significant for understanding the stakes of the Enlightenment. And in fact, maybe it gives us a clearer picture than what we would get if we were content to dwell only in Paris and maybe a bit in Scotland too.
▶︎ 5:15 So Halle is in Saxony. It's in eastern Germany. And it was alongside Wittenberg, one of the most important centers of Lutheran teaching. And of course, the legacy of Lutheranism is complicated. We've barely addressed this, but in some respects, obviously the Protestant Reformation itself is one of the important preconditions of the Enlightenment, the doctrine of sola fide, by faith alone, the Protestant idea that it's your individual, personal, intimate relationship with God, and it need not be mediated by confession and all the other middle management type stuff that Luther would see the Catholic Church as requiring.
▶︎ 6:23 This is part of the broad modern, Renaissance and early modern discovery and valorization and centering of the individual. And I just wanted to flag that because I didn't earlier. Among the preconditions of the Enlightenment, we have not just heliocentrism and mechanism and these other components we've discussed, but also we have to look at all aspects of cultural history, including religious history and sectarianism, and the Protestant Reformation is clearly a signature event in this regard.
▶︎ 7:14 Luther himself, like many revolutionaries, is very hostile to tradition and much like Descartes in a sense, a century later, Luther is hostile to the idea that one needs book learning and erudition and immersion in intellectual tradition in order for the soul to be saved, but more generally in order for society to function. But of course, this creates a certain paradox when you want to found a Lutheran university, you have to teach the students something. You can't be hostile to all book learning if you're founding institutions like universities. So by the second generation, Luther's proteges or disciples like Melanchthon in particular, work very hard to come up with a new and moderated Protestant educational curriculum that retrieves quite a bit from Catholic scholastic intellectual tradition rather than denouncing it all as mere Latin book learning the way Luther would have wanted to do.
▶︎ 8:58 By the early 18th century then, you have a very vibrant world of Protestant and intellectual life centered in particular at a place like the University of Halle, which is also a key node for Protestant missions out to the non-European world, in particular into Eastern Europe and, broadly speaking, the steppe zones and Central Asia and South Asia. And so as a result, Halle becomes a very cosmopolitan center where you have people studying Arabic and Persian and ultimately also Sanskrit and an interest in the world out there. But also you have every opportunity taken to bring people in from South Asia and Ethiopia. And it's a small place, but at the same time, it's very worldly in that regard.
▶︎ 10:08 And a philosopher like Leibniz is really keen on promoting and developing on the model of what the Jesuits have already done, promoting Protestant missionary activity which will, Leibniz says, result in a two-way, note the metaphor, a two-way commerce of light. He loves that phrase. We need, in our relations with China, he says, not just a commerce of goods, but a commerce of light. It will be bidirectional in the case of missionary activity because we'll be sending them the truth of scripture and they'll be giving us samples of their languages in which we'll find translated the Our Father and so on. So bidirectional commerce of light, that is a very important dimension of the Enlightenment project.
▶︎ 11:19 People today think that missionary activity is politically suspect, that this is shrouded imperialism, and certainly a case could be made in that direction. But if we want to look at the way the people of the period understood it, Leibniz understood it as a straightforward kind of sharing of the truth, in a way that could not but be for the human good wherever it's going on.
▶︎ 11:52 Often attempts are made to divide or to identify camps in the Halle Enlightenment context and to see some of the figures at that university as relatively more progressive and others as relatively more backward-looking and conservative. And what I've found is that this doesn't really hold up. There are individual personalities, and they're interconnected in complex personal ways. And in fact, it's rather difficult to divide the Enlightenment camp from the conservative camp, or more particularly, from the Pietist camp.
▶︎ 12:42 The Pietists were a school of missionary activity and theology founded in Berlin in the 1670s that somewhat overtook Halle. You have figures like Georg Ernst Stahl, who is a Pietist philosopher, Pietist physician, has a long and rancorous debate with Leibniz about the source of motion in the body. It's true that, and also I should add that Stahl was a great enemy of Christian Wolff.
▶︎ 13:26 And I wanted to focus on Christian Wolff for a moment because he's so important for turning Leibniz into a dogma and establishing Leibnizianism as normal curriculum in the early 18th century so that Kant, by the time he's studying in the 1740s will think, "Oh, no, not more of this Leibnizo-Wolffian stuff that they feed us in a German philosophical education." So Christian Wolff is interesting in part because he's driven out of Halle by Stahl in, I think it's 1723. And the basis of this purge is precisely the lectures and the work that Wolff had been doing prior to his expulsion on the natural theology of the Chinese.
▶︎ 14:42 And this is in part in development of a work of 1714 that Leibniz himself had written called Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese. And that work, that 1714 work, in turn, by Leibniz, was a somewhat delayed response to an event that had occurred in 1705, usually described as the Rites controversy. So this was a Jesuit controversy between representatives of the order based in Rome and Jesuit missionaries in China. And it had to do with the question whether Chinese converts to Catholicism should be permitted to go on practicing traditional rites of ancestor veneration, the annual cleaning of the gravestone, and things like that.
▶︎ 15:59 The Jesuits in China, who typically spoke Chinese and had really dedicated their lives to the place, tried to explain that it's not so easy simply having converted immediately to drop all of the inherited cultural forms. And if you guys in Rome were out here in the field, in the real world like we are, you would understand that one needs to be rather more flexible in what one tolerates as cultural practices after conversion. And some of these priests ended up getting excommunicated, and it was a controversy.
▶︎ 16:42 Leibniz, curiously, Leibniz is a very fascinating person in terms of his history of navigating the various religious movements of his era. He's born, of course, a kind of conventional dogmatic Lutheran, and he remains a Lutheran his whole life. But he's, I suppose, a rare person who moves from being relatively conservative to being relatively open and flexible in his conception of religion.
▶︎ 17:23 And in his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese of 1714, Leibniz seems pretty close to being a deist in the sense that he wants to argue that conceivably, natural religion is sufficient for the salvation of the soul, that you don't need exposure to revealed truth in order to have everything it takes, so to speak, to achieve salvation. It's enough that you dredge up the a priori knowledge that's already there lying latent in your faculty of reason, and in doing so, you will understand, no matter who you are or where you are in the world or what information you've been exposed to, you will understand that there is an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God who created us and wants the best for us, and so on.
▶︎ 18:33 And Leibniz claims to be able to establish this through a somewhat tendentious analysis of certain technical terms in the Chinese language, establishing that traditional Chinese cosmological representations make room for a distinction between a transcendent divine creator and nature. And in this connection, he's also somewhat surreptitiously criticizing the Newtonians who have followed in Newton's line, according to which, as Newton puts it, nature is God's sensorium, or in a sense, God's body. And the idea of nature as God's body is a fascinating strand throughout history that we'll have to avoid here.
▶︎ 19:46 But in any case, this idea, Leibniz's defense of the liberal Jesuits in the Rites controversy and the idea that in a sense, all human groups, being groups of beings endowed with reason, have what it takes to understand everything that actually matters about religion is extremely liberal and extremely flexible, and it will still be too much for certain parties at the University of Halle to tolerate when Wolff gets chased away in the early 1720s.
▶︎ 20:37 There are many steps that we're leaving out here, but Wolff both at Halle and elsewhere has a very, very productive writing career. His collected works are massive, and most of it is devoted to systematizing, vulgarizing in the sense we used earlier, and somewhat simplifying the philosophy of Leibniz. And this then is the curriculum that Kant was exposed to as a student.
▶︎ 21:21 Famously, Kant never left Königsberg, which is today the city of Kaliningrad. It's a Russian exclave on the North Sea just to the south of Lithuania. And so it was a cosmopolitan port city, and Kant was exposed to people who spoke all different languages. He saw a group of Sami or Laplanders at some point going through town and was able to do his ethnographic, cultural, geographical work based on a certain amount of observation, even though in the end, he was a rather provincial person. He never even left his hometown. Königsberg then is one of these geographically far-flung places where enlightenment happens, but it happens, so to speak, on local terms, you could say, and Kant, I think, is a very good representative of this.
▶︎ 22:33 Curiously, in Kant's early work, the so-called pre-critical work, he begins his career writing in Latin, and his career marks the coming into its own of the German language as a language adequate for philosophical expression. Leibniz only writes maybe one-third of his works in German and has a difficult relationship to the language. He sees it as one that needs to be developed actively and somewhat artificially in order to be able to express what we're already so used to expressing in French and Latin. But it's really Kant who pushes that through.
▶︎ 23:20 Some of his very earliest pre-critical Latin language work is very much in the vein of natural philosophy. His dissertation itself is called On Fire, that is to say, on the physical phenomenon of burning. And this is, of course, very significant. Émilie du Châtelet also writes a treatise called On the Nature and Propagation of Fire, and much of this is, in fact, going on in reference to the most famous false theory in the history of science that was proposed by none other than Georg Ernst Stahl, whom we've already seen, the conservative Pietist physician at Halle, who in the 1690s came up with the theory of so-called phlogiston, which we hear evoked all the time in contemporary analytic philosophy of science, a hypothetical entity that turns out not to exist.
▶︎ 24:35 Phlogiston is, as Stahl argued, the substance of fire. When you light something on fire, the phlogiston comes out. And it's a beautiful theory, totally false, but it's falsity that gave us this classic example in the philosophy of science. But also in the early 18th century, you find a lot of early chemical, natural philosophical exploration of this particular natural phenomenon, very productive, and Kant is a part of that as well.
▶︎ 25:17 A 1755 pre-critical work called the Monadologia Physica, again written in Latin, The Physical Monadology, another fascinating text, in part because if there's one thing Leibniz would have liked for you to remember about monads, it's that they're not physical. And in fact, the whole point of introducing the monad was for Leibniz to say, "I don't believe in physical atoms. I believe in metaphysical atoms. Monads don't have extension. Monads don't occupy space. Rather, space is a result of the activity of monads." Nonetheless, over the course of the 18th century, monads get reconceived as, so to speak, the vital particles of nature.
▶︎ 26:15 Kant's argument in the Monadologia Physica is more complex than that, but I just wanted to flag this, that he is among the many 18th century thinkers who, in a very unfaithful spirit, unfaithful to Leibniz, physicalized the monad. But you get the feeling when you read pre-critical works of Kant's, like the 1755 Monadologia Physica, that he's trying to work within a particular research paradigm, but he's not all that excited about it, and he's just drudging along, doing his job.
▶︎ 26:56 And then, according to what he himself writes, it must have been around 1770 that he is exposed to the work of David Hume, and then he has a decade of relative quiet. He goes quiet in order to absorb the shock of reading Hume, and we'll get to what that is in a moment. And then he comes out of that after nearly a decade with the Critique of Pure Reason.
▶︎ 27:39 Why was it so shocking to read Hume? Well, again, far be it from me to knock Leibniz, but it's certainly true that Leibniz is not all hung up on how he can know what he claims to know. He takes this as just flowing from first principles that he has as a rational being, and the mind of a rational being, as Leibniz expresses it, a mirror of the rational order of nature. So we know stuff because our minds are mirrors of the rational order of nature, and that's good enough to figure out what the structure of reality is actually like. That's Leibniz's spirit, for better or worse. And some people think that's over bold, some think it's cool just to see someone philosophizing so freely in a metaphysical vein like that.
▶︎ 28:50 Hume is the exact opposite in a sense. Well, let me just say something here. Obviously, we've been circling around the idea of skepticism, but just to be explicit about it, skepticism is the idea or the proposition that nothing can really be known or that we're not in a position to make any ultimate definitive knowledge claims. Descartes is an important figure in the history of skepticism, but in the end is not a skeptic himself. It would be a mistake to characterize him as a skeptic. He uses the method of doubt, or as it's sometimes described, methodological skepticism, in order to establish that even if you commit yourself to doubting absolutely everything, you can reestablish foundational truths and get your world of yourself and God and external reality and all of that back again, having gone through the exercise of radical doubt, of methodological skepticism.
▶︎ 30:24 Hume, by contrast, never gets all that good stuff back. And he's very funny about this. Hume is very clear that if we're relying on philosophy alone, we are going to inevitably have to content ourselves with the realization that we don't truly know anything. Rather than pushing through to a new foundational knowledge through the exercise of skepticism in the way that Descartes does, Hume's solution to the skeptical problem is saying, "Yeah, well, I don't have to be a philosopher 24/7." "I can suspend all that and go have drinks with my friends at the pub." He literally says this. And once I shift into that mode, I'm no longer thinking, but does this mug exist or anything like that? Do I really know? It's only when we're in the mode of the philosopher, which we are free to take on or put back off again. It's only when we're in the mode of the philosopher that the skeptical challenge bears upon us.
▶︎ 31:59 So, nonetheless, Hume, insofar as he is doing philosophy, insists that skepticism is defeating. And one of his favorite examples from which to draw this out is causality. And I've mentioned this a little bit in a previous lecture. Causality is, if you read a 20th century philosopher like Bertrand Russell or, in the late 20th century, the philosophically-minded computer scientist Judea Pearl, who has a book called Causality, there's a general convergence in, let's say, scientifically oriented philosophy. There's a general convergence on the view that it should be sufficient for our purposes to understand causality as based in statistics. Smoking causes lung cancer because there's a significant statistical correlation and that's good enough. You don't have to go and find that additional metaphysical je ne sais quoi that is giving you the actual causal oomph in the real world.
▶︎ 33:42 And all for the better, because the search for that additional metaphysical je ne sais quoi was, of course, hopeless. Hume understood that it was hopeless, but he also refused to accept constant conjunction, as he calls it, as an adequate proxy or replacement for causality. And so the problem is if you notice over and over again, well, again, if you're an empiricist about knowledge like Hume is, and you notice over and over again that event A is followed by event B, you're never going to be in a position to say with justification that A causes B. All you're going to see is the constant conjunction, and there's never going to be anything to promote that conjunction, to lift it up from mere conjunction to causation.
▶︎ 34:49 And you can explicate this in a lot of ways, examples abound. One problem is that any attempted causal explanation is going to, upon scrutiny, turn out to be arbitrary, to be just isolating one particular sliver of the relevant sequence of events. If a lawyer and a doctor both show up at an accident site and say, "What caused this person to die?" The lawyer is going to say, "Wanton drunk driving" or something like that, and the doctor's going to say, "Internal hemorrhaging" or something like that. And both are right. Both are speaking at different levels about a particular event in the world. And you could easily get the feeling that you could add, after the doctor and the lawyer, an infinite list of other people who would have a different angle. So where is the cause in all of this?
▶︎ 36:07 If you are looking at a bullet in a murder victim as a forensic detective, you can say, well, there's traces of gunpowder on the bullet. There's all sorts of physical properties here, but you're not going to find the traces of causality out there in your empirical investigations of the world itself. So banish cause as a part of any responsible scientific explanation seems to be, in part, the lesson. And again, Hume is good at just shrugging his shoulders and saying, "Okay, I guess we're going to have to live with this." "I guess this is as good as it gets. Now let me go to the pub and meet my friends." Kant is of a
▶︎ 37:04 Very different disposition, intellectually speaking, and one way of understanding his reaction to Hume is, "Yes, this is a compelling point that Hume is making about causation. However, I, Kant, cannot content myself with quietism or complacency or saying, well, at least I don't have to do philosophy 24 hours a day. No, I'm not going to stop there with Hume. In other words, I'm going to join neither the camp of the dogmatists nor the camp of the skeptics. I'm going to push things further, and I'm going to solve the problem by, so to speak, moving up a level to the level of what Kant is starting to articulate as critical philosophy, which refuses to take as given these stagnant antinomies as between, for example, dogmatism and skepticism."
▶︎ 38:26 If you are confronted with a seemingly irresolvable opposition between any given A and any given not A, Kant thinks only a fool would say, "Eh, I'm going to go with A, and I'm going to make the best case I can for it," when what one should be doing is saying, "What is it about the theoretical frame we're using such that both A and not A seem to present themselves both as necessary but also as mutually incompatible." So again, one way of understanding critical philosophy is to take such antinomies not as requiring a solution on their own terms, but rather as requiring us to call into question the entire theoretical frame that yields the antinomy up.
▶︎ 39:42 And so, for example, there is freedom in the world or all is determinism. There's a necessary being, or by contrast, there's nothing but an infinite series of contingent causes. There's a boundary to the universe, or the universe goes on forever. All of these are the antinomies through which Kant develops his critical solution to the impasse that both dogmatism and skepticism have left us with.
▶︎ 40:23 And significantly, in the first critique, Kant explicitly describes this move as a Copernican revolution. The Copernican revolution in theoretical philosophy comes with him. In natural philosophy, it came with Copernicus. And now he's going to do the same thing with the fundamental questions of theoretical philosophy.
▶︎ 40:55 Now, I can't possibly summarize in any detail at all the contents of the first critique, the critique of pure reason. Still less am I going to attempt to talk about the second critique, the critique of practical reason. I'm most interested in talking you through what is, in some respects, the most oddball and black sheep of the three critiques, namely the critique of the power of judgment, the third critique of 1790. I do want to say at least a few words first about the overarching project of all three critiques, and also a little bit about the project of the first critique, the critique of pure reason, and maybe I'll start with that.
▶︎ 41:52 So, causality, let's just focus on causality. Causality, Kant argues in the first critique, is one of the concepts of the understanding, also known as the categories. Aristotle has a work called The Categories. He says there are 10 primary ways or categories in which, to quote Aristotle, "Being is said." And the first of these is substance, and then you have quality, quantity, et cetera. 10 of these.
▶︎ 42:36 Kant will criticize Aristotle for having simply arbitrarily listed 10 variations on his idea and then getting tired and stopping, whereas he, Kant, is going to give us a rigorous transcendental deduction of the concepts of the understanding. And there are going to be 12 of them, and they're neatly divided into four groups of three. Everything is very orderly and systematic and exhaustive in Kant, in a very impressive way, but also in a way that you can't help but suspect that there's a certain amount of forced symmetry to it all. Why does each of the four groups have to have three concepts each, and so on. So we're going to skip all of that. That would take a proper course in its own right.
▶︎ 43:34 But take, for example, causality as one of the concepts of the understanding. The move that Kant is making here is to suggest that ultimately, what happens when we make a causal judgment, X caused Y, is not that we are getting this from our perception of the world. What we're getting in a pure form is intuition. Intuition is what enables us to perceive the world spatiotemporally. But when we make the causal judgment, that is rather an application of a concept of the understanding to what is given in intuition. In other words, to put it very succinctly and inadequately, we're the ones providing cause. It's coming from us. And it is, moreover, what is elevating intuition to what can properly be called experience. Experience being what comes out of the application of a concept of the understanding to the intuition.
▶︎ 45:12 And as I briefly mentioned already, though too quickly for this to have sunk in, likely, there are in fact three levels here of mental faculties, the intuition, the understanding, and beyond that, reason. The objects of reason that correspond to the concepts of understanding are, for example, like causality. The objects of reason are the so-called transcendental ideas, and there are three of these, namely God, the soul, and the world. The world conceptualized as a totality.
▶︎ 45:54 And the reason to shift these ideas to the faculty of reason and to distinguish between the faculty of reason and the concepts of the understanding is because it's crucial for Kant to expel God and the soul and the world as totality from the understanding itself, and thereby to insist that there are these entities that you can't get rid of altogether, but that cannot be understood as given to the understanding in experience. So you can't become an atheist because God, as a transcendental idea, is going to be lurking, so to speak, beyond the bounds of understanding, but nonetheless playing what Kant describes as a regulative role in the way that the understanding is deployed. So it is a way of having your cake and eating it too, getting rid of God as object of philosophical inquiry, while not in so doing tumbling into atheism. That's one way of understanding part of the project of the first critique.
▶︎ 47:31 Now, very briefly, the second critique is concerned with practical reason, that is to say, what ought I to do? And a key part of Kant's project here continues the engagement with how to maintain what used to be provided by religious faith, but in a world where you can no longer dogmatically affirm the central claims of religion. In the second critique, the critique of practical reason, Kant ultimately grounds moral philosophy in duty. Duty is conceptualized as an internal, I don't want to say power, that's not quite the word, as something internal to each of us, such that when we act morally is precisely when we are acting as our own lawgiver.
▶︎ 48:40 So we are each our own legislator, and moral action is not to be understood any longer as action in accordance with an externally imposed or coerced rule, but rather action in harmony with an internal sense of duty. The moral law within, as Kant emphasizes it. And this is, again, one of the ways in which Kant is very different from a thinker like Pascal, who wants to make an argument in the form of his famous wager, according to which if you follow the dictates of reason, you're going to commit yourself to a life of religious faith. Because it's rational to avoid the fate of eternal suffering.
▶︎ 49:45 For Kant, that can't be a proper account of the, let's say, religion shaped by morality, because acting out of fear of an external force cannot possibly be considered moral. The second critique then is largely an effort to find a solution to the apparent opposition between our own individual freedom and the need to live in accordance with duty.
▶︎ 50:36 So then we have, from the first critique, a recognition of nature as a deterministic system, and the second critique as a grounding of human freedom in duty and the idea of each of us as our own self-legislator. The third critique then can, in a certain respect, be seen as an effort to resolve the tension between the first and the second critiques, between determinism and freedom. But it's harder to classify, it's harder to state in a single sentence what the third critique is doing in the same way that you can rather easily do for the first and second critiques.
▶︎ 51:35 And many people have tended to interpret the critique of the power of judgment as a weird residual text, an afterthought that seems, in certain respects, to staple together two very different undertakings. One is the first half of the third critique, the critique of aesthetic judgment, which is concerned with what we today call aesthetics. I'll speak to that in a moment, with coming to an understanding of what a judgment of beauty, in particular is. While the second part of the third critique, the critique of teleological judgment, has to do not with aesthetics, but with what we would today call biology. That is to say, the nature of what Kant calls organized beings, what you could also call organic or living beings. There's a long history to all these terms. But broadly speaking, biology.
▶︎ 52:51 So what's going on there? Why would you have a single treatise that is concerned with paintings and sculptures in the first half, and then with lizards and seashells and parrots in the second half? It doesn't make any sense. Or does it? Well, there's much to be said here. First, let me say a little bit about aesthetics. What is aesthetics?
▶︎ 53:19 Well, if you think about the word, it bears a very interesting relationship to that thing that happens when you go to the dentist and they inject a little liquid into your cheek. That liquid is an anesthetic. That is to say, it deprives you of the aesthetic. It's not to say it deprives you of the ability to appreciate beautiful art, but rather it deprives you of sensation. So aisthesis in Greek just means sensation. That's all it is.
▶︎ 54:05 And when we first have aesthetic as a category in the history of philosophy, it's very recent. In fact, it's 1741, in the work of the philosopher whom I just mentioned not so long ago, Alexander Baumgarten, who is a Leibnizo-Wolfian himself. In 1741, he writes a treatise called Aesthetica, which does touch on questions of the appreciation of works of art, but takes aesthetics, which is the title, to be the philosophy of sensation in general. Sensation of what? Well, toothaches, but also looking at moss that covers a rock, but also admiring a beautiful painting or sculpture. All of that is aesthetics, and that remains the case in Kant's use of the term aesthetic still in 1790.
▶︎ 55:15 Now, before the term is used, if you read early modern works that are often taught in, say, courses that are an introduction to the philosophy of aesthetics, something like that, you read, for example, Shaftesbury. What he writes about in a way that is considered relevant to the history of aesthetics is mostly the sensation of natural beauty. In particular, contemplating the infinite intricacy of the moss that covers rocks in an English garden. That's much more interesting than talking about paintings.
▶︎ 56:04 And you also have to appreciate that museums did not yet really exist as the institutions we understand them to be today. So the idea of a special, uniquely edifying experience of going to the museum to look at a particular work of fine art was not really in place. And most people who were thinking about aesthetic experience in a broad sense tended to just take it for granted that at the end of the day, nature puts on a lot better show than we ever could, and that the moss that covers a rock gives you a lot more to look at than any Zeuxis the painter.
▶︎ 56:54 And that's also connected to the flip side of the same coin, which is that really until quite late, what we call biology, and the term biology is only used for the first time in the early 19th century. But even by the late 19th century, if you look at the illustrations of a pioneering biologist like Ernst Haeckel, for example, those beautiful colorful medusas and ctenophores and things like that. Or if you look at the contributions to the life sciences of Goethe to give another very clear example. Through the 19th century, the life sciences were typically in this strange kind of boundary-straddling position where one wanted to establish scientific physics, like laws of the growth and development, and descent of living kinds. But one also spoke of the entities in living nature as unapologetically as things of beauty.
▶︎ 58:25 And so to find a work in 1790 that proposes to talk about beautiful artificial objects, and about biodiversity, and the diversity of forms given in living nature, it's not as strange as it might look at first glance.
▶︎ 58:54 And there is, moreover, an even better reason why these two things go together, why the critique of aesthetic judgment is followed by the critique of teleological judgment. That is, namely, that these are both domains of human life where we use our judgment. And that's ultimately the topic of the third critique. That's what the third critique is about. It's not about paintings, it's not about living forms, it's about judgment. And it just so happens that in the case of the fine arts and in the case of biology, we have two domains where judgment par excellence takes place.
▶︎ 59:52 And what judgment is, is a kind of intermediate power that human beings deploy in cases where objective grounding of our claims cannot be arrived at. Yet, nonetheless, we have the strong impression that our judgments flow from our rational nature and that they agree with reality. And so the most we can hope for in aesthetic judgment, for example, when we say, "This painting is beautiful," the most we can hope for is intersubjective agreement. My fellow observer says, "Yes, indeed, it is beautiful." That we can get, and when we get that, we feel like we're vibing together qua rational creatures and like our intersubjective agreement is, moreover, not at odds with reality itself, even if we're never going to be able to find in the painting the precise kind of molecular composition of the globs of oil that justify, that ground the claim, "This painting is beautiful." That molecular structure is not there. You're never going to find it.
▶︎ 1:01:45 Now, you can, I'll just say as an aside, in the past 20 years or so, there's been some talk of what they sometimes call Darwinian aesthetics, and Denis Dutton was a proponent of such an approach to aesthetics. We naturally, for evolved reasons, prefer to observe symmetries and things like that because we want our mate to be healthy and bilateral symmetry in the body is a good proxy for health and things like that. And by extension, we like to see regular symmetrical patterns in our art. And that certainly explains something, though it doesn't do much to explain why people like Kazimir Malevich's Black Square or Jackson Pollock. Things get more complicated when, in the history of art, people start valuing certain art objects for reasons other than their beautiful symmetry.
▶︎ 1:03:01 In any case, Kant was not an evolutionist. That creates some problems for him in accounting for the beauty of birds' feathers and seashells and things like that. He was not an evolutionist, and he didn't think that you could possibly find any objective grounding for aesthetic judgments of the sort, "This painting is beautiful." Nonetheless, you can study what goes on when such a judgment is made as an example of this kind of intermediate experience between subjectivism and objectivity, and that's what the third critique is actually about.
▶︎ 1:03:48 I want to spend most of the rest of this lecture talking, however, about the second part of the third critique. That is to say, the critique of teleological judgment. That is to say, the part that deals with biology. And again, the term doesn't exist in 1790, and so we're being somewhat anachronistic, but the critique of teleological judgment is concerned precisely with the living world, with plants and animals in particular.
▶︎ 1:04:29 And the problem is this, as he puts it, writing in 1790, we've had 150 or so years by now of this deadlock between mechanism and teleology, and we don't seem to be getting anywhere at all. 150 years ago, Kant thinks, it made good sense for Descartes to boldly see how far he could get by explaining the formation of the fetus as the simple law-governed consequence of a thermomechanical process of particles bumping into one another and heating up and the blood clotting and so on. That was a bold attempt, but Kant cannot help but note in the subsequent decades, you find backtracking and supplementation.
▶︎ 1:05:40 You find Leibniz saying, "Okay, well, maybe yes, the body is a machine, but it's an infinitely complex machine with no lower level of organization." That's what makes organism a special case of mechanism for Leibniz, and Leibniz thinks Descartes unable to understand this special infinite complexity of the organic. Descartes didn't have the resources to account for the living world in strictly mechanical terms.
▶︎ 1:06:25 You have other alternatives, others who, in contrast with Leibniz's adoption of the notion of infinity to get this work done, you have others like the Cambridge Platonists, like Henry More, or Ralph Cudworth, who introduced principles like Cudworth calls it the plastic nature, More calls it the archeus. Cudworth actually uses the term, I love it, the plastic nature is something like the vicegerent, so literally like a middle manager. The vicegerent, which, I should say takes care, and I'm quoting Cudworth here, "takes care of those operations of bodies that are too operous, solicitous, and distractious." He has wonderful English. "Too operous, solicitous, and distractious for God to see to them directly." So in other words, a plastic nature is the immaterial force that goes to work in the process of gestation and animal development, that goes to work on the hot blood that clots early on, and that shapes it into a partridge or a horse or whatever.
▶︎ 1:08:00 And so again, you have many people, Cudworth doesn't even try to make peace with mechanism, but you have many people like Nathaniel Grew and names that are basically minor figures who are like, "Yeah, fine, mechanism, good as far as it goes, and great for explaining the orbit of planets and the arc of a projectile and stuff like that. Not so great for explaining the gestation of partridges." So you have many people after Descartes being kind of domain-specific mechanists, mechanists up to a point, while nonetheless continuing to insist on the need of a special principle, a little asterisk for living nature, where ultimately we recognize we have to hold on to some kind of pre-mechanistic teleological principle.
▶︎ 1:09:06 Just to make sure we're all on the same page, when I say teleology, what I mean is this idea that's strongly associated historically with Aristotelian natural philosophy, that natural processes happen in view of an end. That is to say, they are end-directed. Now ordinarily for us today, we assume that only human beings exist teleologically. If you want to know why I got up and moved towards the freezer, the answer, in order to get the ice cream, seems to make good sense as an explanation.
▶︎ 1:09:56 Whereas if you ask, why did you get up and move to the freezer? And I say, "Well, because my calf muscles contracted and then released repeatedly, thereby propelling my body across the room," or something like that, you'd say, "Shut up. That's not what I'm asking about." That's not the level of explanation that matters here. What matters is the fact that I was envisioning the eating of the ice cream. And so it was, again, end-directed or goal-directed.
▶︎ 1:10:29 By contrast, we tend to think that when it comes to anything else in nature with, of course, the intermediate gray area of animal motion, when it comes to anything else in nature, we tend to think that teleological explanations are out of bounds, that if your computer or your car conks out on you, it's not for any other reason than that some micro component of it ceased to function for reasons explicable in strictly physical mechanical terms. So even these artificial systems like computers that seem to have intentionality, we know in the end that they're just doing what they have to do because that's what their inner mechanism compels.
▶︎ 1:11:30 But if you're Aristotle, everything in nature is moving towards its end. The end of an acorn is to be an oak. The end of a puppy is to become a grown dog and to reproduce, and so on. And even earth, air, fire, and water have their own natural end to return to their appropriate place in the cosmos, and so on. And so everyone after Descartes was worried about this.
▶︎ 1:12:10 In the contemporary philosophy of biology, it's often observed that even if you're the best Darwinian in the world, the most disciplined Darwinian, if you look at, say, the common example, the pseudo eyes, the big black spots that appear on some species of moth's wings, these resemble eyes to the extent that when predators see them, the predators tend to think, "No, I'm not going to waste my time on this giant creature with these giant eyes." And so even if you're a very good orthodox Darwinian, you might well find yourself saying such things as, "That moth has pseudo eyes on its wings in order to scare away predators."
▶︎ 1:13:07 Now, strictly speaking, that trait is not there in order to do anything. It's rather the reverse order of explanation. That thing happens because the moth has this trait. And the reason the moth has this trait is not in order to do anything, it's simply because in the past, the ancestors that had the random genetic mutation of relatively smaller pseudo eyes had more likelihood of surviving to reproductive age. So we know that's what's really going on, and yet, there's something about living nature that makes us particularly comfortable with teleological explanations, whether we're actually committed to them as a final account of what's going on or not.
▶︎ 1:14:16 And so this shows Kant in an interesting light. Again, he is not an evolutionist, though it's certainly possible to be an evolutionist in 1790. This is only five years before Erasmus Darwin, Charles' grandfather, publishes a remarkable poem, called Zoonomia, which is an evolutionist account of the origins of species, and this is just all over the place in Enlightenment thought.
▶︎ 1:14:54 In fact, one interesting thing, getting back to our discussion of the features of the Enlightenment, the final heading I gave you was progress. In a way, you can see early pre-Darwinian evolutionary thinking as an extension of the Enlightenment ideal of progress from society to nature as a whole. Darwin subverts Enlightenment-style evolutionary thinking by saying it's not a progression, strictly speaking, from lower to higher. It's just a question of adaptation and what is lower and what is higher, what's inferior and what's superior always has to be indexed to a particular environmental niche.
▶︎ 1:15:49 When it comes to breathing underwater, fish are superior to me. When it comes to doing calculus, I'm superior to fish. Well, barely. But the idea is there has to be some kind of context or environmental frame for making sense of judgments of better or worse. Whereas in earlier evolutionary theory, what you typically have, and this is definitely the case for Erasmus Darwin, what you typically have is evolution conceived as a progressive march that culminates in the most impressive of megafauna.
▶︎ 1:16:36 Kant withholds. Kant does not want to go there, and he has interesting correspondences with the French comparative anatomist, Georges Cuvier, who's actively digging up ichthyosaur fossils from Montmartre, and coming to terms with the fact that there used to be giant sea creatures living in the region of Paris and having to deal with the fact that things are now not necessarily as they always were. So Kant resists evolution, but
▶︎ 1:17:15 He is still faced with a problem of understanding living systems in terms of their function or end, even though he recognizes that straightforward, dogmatic explanations of that sort, teleological explanations, are unacceptable. That's a reversion to dogmatism, and he's already eschewed dogmatism as a matter of principle at the very beginning of the critical project. In light of what I said about the moth with the pseudo-eyes, there's a passage in The Critique of Teleological Judgment, the second part of the third critique, where Kant says very famously, this is one of the most famous lines, "There will never be a Newton for the blade of grass."
▶︎ 1:18:27 One way of understanding that is just that Kant was premature. He made a hasty conclusion, and if he had waited around for Darwin and Mendel and Julian Huxley and the new synthesis in Watson and Crick and so on, he would've said, "Oh, yeah, I was wrong. There's at least a collective Newton that has effectively told us everything we need to know in order to understand the nature and origins of a blade of grass." And indeed, if you look at 21st-century genetic engineering and CRISPR technologies and things like this, where they're actively slicing up and recomposing DNA, you can easily think, "Eh, yeah, Kant was just premature."
▶︎ 1:19:20 But again, consider that point I was making about the moth with its pseudo-eyes. Whether or not we can treat the underlying protein blocks that gave rise to that trait on the moth's wings, whether or not we can treat those as building blocks akin to a molecular structure in chemistry or something like that, we're still confronted with the fact that when we perceive nature, when we cognize and apprehend nature with our minds, we seem to be constrained to represent nature as a teleological system. We can't help but represent it to ourselves as if it were end-directed.
▶︎ 1:20:24 Kant spends a great deal of time, both in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and in the Critique of Teleological Judgment, on seashells, and this is a particularly interesting case, and also on the beautiful feathers of certain species of bird. These are very interesting cases because we know today, at least in the case of birds, that usually with colorful feathers, there's a history of sexual selection that has yielded these traits, and that they look that way because their mates prefer them. Flowers are also a very interesting case because this is cross-species preferences, but in a sense, flowers did indeed evolve to be beautiful, or at least to be attractive to the perceptual apparatus of insects. That's why flowers look that way.
▶︎ 1:21:32 But if you're Kant and you're opposed to evolution, it's going to be a problem that bird feathers or seashells should be beautiful. He describes these as free natural beauties, and again, devotes a good deal of time to reflecting on how such things are even possible. But in a sense, organization is itself sufficiently analogous to beauty, that it gives us all the same conceptual fodder that looking at beautiful feathers does. So again, even if the animal is ugly or dull, the fact that it seems to have a kind of internal principle of thermoregulation and the fact that the function of the gallbladder seems to be so perfectly complementary to the function of the liver and the kidneys and so on, all of that is already enough to give you the idea of end-directedness, which is again, conceptually parallel to the problem of beauty in the case of aesthetic judgment.
▶︎ 1:23:04 So the solution that Kant comes up with, and I'm not going to be able to give it to you in great detail. Again, we would have to do an entire course on the third critique, at least, like we would have to do on the first critique. The solution is that it would indeed be dogmatic to revert back to, he's critiquing something that you might call an Aesopian view of function in animal and plant kinds. The idea that bees exist in order to make honey, to use a classical example, is Aesopian in the sense that it's like Aesop. It's taking a very human-centered, anthropocentrist value, like we like bees because they make honey, and making it the raison d'être itself of the entire species.
▶︎ 1:24:06 We're never going to be able to retrieve a teleology like that, a kind of dogmatic teleology that says, this organ exists in nature in order to execute this function and this species, which is an assemblage of subordinate organs that yields up a totality of an animal. We're certainly never going to say that this animal, being an animal of this or that type, has this or that natural end. We're never going to be able to say that. We can never identify objectively or dogmatically concrete ends in nature.
▶︎ 1:24:57 What we can identify, this is an extremely difficult phrase to translate, I'll give you the German. What we can at least allow ourselves is what Kant calls Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zwecke. That is to say, end-ishness, end-directedness, end orientation without ends. That is to say no concrete ends. You can't say this exists in nature in order that this or that end be realized.
▶︎ 1:25:45 Nonetheless, Zweckmässigkeit, again, impossible to translate. I'm thinking of the French translation here, excuse me for this, which is just typically it would be literally finality without ends. That's how the French translate it, and I'm just blanking on how Paul Guyer renders it in his authoritative English translation of the Critique of the Power of Reason. In any case, the idea here is that you can allow yourself a thought of end-directedness when you're considering an organized being or a living system, even if there's no plausible expectation of identifying what the end is. And in this regard, it's analogous to the way you can allow yourself an intersubjective judgment of beauty before a work of art, even if you know that that judgment is never going to be objectively grounded.
▶︎ 1:26:56 And so this is among other things, I don't want to say the definitive end, but it is among other things, a kind of tying off of a century and a half of ultimately fruitless debate. And again, what you could call a historical deadlock between mechanism and teleology. And this is, I think, a very interesting feature, and I'll try to conclude simply on this point of Kant's work.
▶︎ 1:27:34 Kant is a systematic philosopher. He's not a historicizing philosopher in the way that those of the coming generations will be, especially Hegel. Unlike Hegel, Kant is not concerned to identify the specific modes of explanation appropriate to different phases of history. Nonetheless, you can see in this point he makes about the deadlock between mechanism and teleology, and you can also see it in the shorter work called the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That May Come Forward as a Science. You see this reflection on this, this stock-taking. Here we are nearly at the end of the 18th century, and metaphysics is just not budging. It's not doing anything. It's in a total slump, and it has been for a long time.
▶︎ 1:28:45 What are the conditions that would make it possible to get out of that slump? In a way, that and the example of the deadlock of teleology and mechanism show a dawning historicism or a dawning awareness that you have to take into consideration the track record of lines of investigation in the history of philosophy. But also you have to start to judge as appropriate for a given time or historical period, certain kinds of explanation that might no longer be acceptable. And then that just explodes onto the scene in the 19th century when Marx following Hegel thinks that, well, why does Marx think that Diderot is a vulgar materialist? Well, because he's operating within a frame of bourgeois ideology, and he can't conceptualize the underlying material causes of things in a historically dynamic way and so on. So in the 19th century, it's all about conceptualizing the history of philosophy as one of modes of explanation appropriate to various historical periods, but only to those. And you start to see a glimpse of that in Kant.
▶︎ 1:30:14 But the real contribution of the third critique, and I'll just try to wrap up things here, is to, again, resolve the apparent conflict of the first and second critiques between natural determinism and human freedom, but also more locally and narrowly to resolve the conflict between mechanism and teleology. And this resolution is one that navigates carefully, as Kant does across his critical project, between skepticism and dogmatism. But what we get at the end of it, and this is where we want to leave off today, because in our coming lectures we're going to look at counter-enlightenment tendencies, including romanticism. What we get at the end of the third critique is in some sense a fork in the road, and we're free to take either of these forks. And along the one line, we get the continuing development of and autonomization of natural scientific inquiry that we'll see over the course of the 19th century, especially with the emergence of positivism and utilitarianism and tendencies such as that. And on the other hand, you get romanticism and a sharp concern with the limitations of positive scientific inquiry when it comes to certain domains of human life in this world.
▶︎ 1:32:14 So in some sense, Kant is the last philosopher we all have in common, the last common ancestor of every philosopher working today, in the sense that you have elements of his work that can support both of the main lines of post-Kantian philosophy. Which are, on the one hand, broadly speaking, positivistic, science-friendly, or scientistic concern to yield up positive results on the one hand, and then positive shared rational knowledge on the one hand, and on the other hand, the current of post-Kantian philosophy that thinks that you can only go so far in the project of yielding up positive results. And in the end, the goal of philosophy is something quite distinct from natural science and should concern itself with such things as emotion and mood and should make better friends with poetry and the arts. In some sense, you can see you have a significant starter material for both of those tendencies in Kant, and I would say above all in the third critique.
▶︎ 1:33:42 So next time then, we're going to consider at least some of the, let's say, fallout from the culmination of Enlightenment philosophy in Kant's critical project. And we're going to be looking in particular at some of those latter people who, for various reasons, believe that philosophy cannot remain in an ancillary position to the natural sciences, and continue in the role of yielding up positive research results, as we say today in grant applications. So we'll be looking at that, and I think it will be a lot of fun. So we'll see you soon.