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Is the Universe a Machine?

Justin Smith-Ruiu

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▶︎ 0:00 So welcome back. I'm Justin Smith Ruiu, and this is the second lesson on the series on the Enlightenment and its discontents. When we left off at the end of the first lesson, we had been considering the three broad headings under which I want to attempt to cluster the ideas we associate with Enlightenment philosophy, and I noted a change in the relationship to authority, a new commitment to the universality of everything that is worthy of being called true.

▶︎ 0:37 That is to say, if something is true, then it's true always and everywhere in the same way. And then finally, the heading of progress, which I stressed is a historical and conceptual notion, and also is irreducibly political and ideological as well. We'll come back to the question of progress at the end of this second lesson when we talk a bit about freedom. But there's something I want to talk about before we get to freedom, which is the question

▶︎ 1:18 In natural philosophy and metaphysics concerning the deterministic order of nature. In the 17th century, one of the favored metaphors for the function of nature, for natural processes, natural change, was the horologium, or the clockwork. And there are complicated reasons in the history of technology for this that we don't need to get into. The actual advances in the technology of clockmaking and timekeeping in the early modern period are quite important.

▶︎ 2:08 What we need to appreciate is the way that these advances helped to shape an idea or a kind of projection of this paradigm scientific instrument that is the clock, onto the cosmic scale. So we now live in a clockwork universe. Everything that happens in nature is analogous to the entirely deterministic, regular motions of the clock as a result of the mechanical winding of its gears. And this is interesting for a lot of reasons.

▶︎ 2:59 This chapter of the social history, or let's say the cultural history of science, is often evoked today when we're talking about so-called simulationism, which has been of interest to philosophers like Nick Bostrom and David Chalmers. Elon Musk was really into simulationism for a while.

▶︎ 3:25 The idea that our fundamental reality shares in the nature of a computer program, or in the cruder versions, a video game. In any case, the idea being that computers are not just particularly useful machines that we have devised in the past decades, but rather are the model or the clavis, or the epitome of reality itself.

▶︎ 4:00 Somewhat historicizing critics of the simulationist view will say, "Well, actually, this isn't the first time in history that people became so impressed with their latest gadgets that they dared to conceptualize reality as a whole on the model of those gadgets." We see more or less the same thing when Robert Boyle, for example, appeals to clockworks as the model for understanding the cosmos.

▶︎ 4:41 Robert Boyle is a particularly interesting figure. He's working in the late 17th century. He describes himself primarily as an experimental philosopher, and we have the term ex-phi for contemporary experimental philosophy in the 21st century. When I'm talking about Boyle as experimental philosopher, I do not mean ex-phi. I do not mean what is mostly these days a kind of hybrid of analytic philosophy, analytic epistemology in particular, with some social, scientific, and behavioral psychology, clinical psychology methods adapted to working through philosophical hypotheses.

▶︎ 5:38 That's not what Boyle means by experimental philosophy. By experimental philosophy, he means let's put a parakeet in this evacuated chamber and see how long it takes before it stops breathing. Or let's do some experiments touching upon cold or the refraction of light off of ice, things like that. That's what Boyle means by experimental, and that's what Boyle means by philosophy. To be a philosopher just is to pursue such things. And key to this also is to pursue them without any particularly pressing need to offer theoretical explanations.

▶︎ 6:27 So Boyle then is working within the context of the Royal Society of London in the 1670s, 1680s, in a spirit that was defined decades earlier at the turn of the 17th century by Francis

▶︎ 6:46 Bacon, who is himself a statesman, a key figure in British history for all sorts of reasons, but also notably often cited as the pioneer of what would come to be the scientific method. And we don't need to go into detail about Bacon's conception of that method and how it would evolve after him. We might just note his famous imperative, "Lay your notions by." That is to say, in his somewhat antiquated English, just put your notions or put your account of how things work to the side. Bracket it for now and let's do some experiments. Let's see what happens when we do experiments.

▶︎ 7:39 And at some later point, we can elaborate new theoretical accounts. That tends to be the spirit that animates the work of a figure like Robert Boyle decades later. It's also obviously what is the simplest account of the method of the school of philosophy known as empiricism, which is typically associated with the British Isles, with figures like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and then with Bacon as a forefather of what would later be called empiricism.

▶︎ 8:20 I want to focus when it comes to Boyle, however, he's not usually classified as an empiricist. He's too busy doing experiments to contribute arguments in favor of doing experiments. Maybe that's why he doesn't get so classified. Yet, he's very typical of the era in many respects. He is the first, as I've already mentioned in the first lesson, to use the term mechanical philosophy to describe his own commitment. And he is surely the most enthusiastic about the clockwork metaphor for describing natural change in motion.

▶︎ 9:05 And Boyle is also actively trying to work out to his own satisfaction how one can remain a faithful Christian on the presumption of a clockwork universe. In particular, we run into trouble, and the same problematic will be echoed in the eighteenth century by David Hume. We run into trouble when it comes to affirming the possibility of miracles. A clockwork universe is necessarily a deterministic universe. If something moves, it's because the gears behind it are moving in such a way that it can't do otherwise. And determinism excludes the possibility of sudden, unexpected upheavals that violate the ordinary, regular motion of nature.

▶︎ 10:14 So Boyle, in works like a text called The Christian Virtuoso and others, tries to work out a conception of religious commitment or a conception of God and God's greatness on which it would be precisely to undermine his own status as omnipotent and omniscient if God were to come and interrupt the perfect mechanical gear-driven turning of the natural world.

▶︎ 11:01 So in other words, miracles, far from confirming God's power, would be practically a disconfirmation. The really impressive move that God made was a kind of one and for all or one time for all creation of an absolutely perfect deterministic order. And that's, again, something that's echoed in Hume, as we'll see in a later lesson. And it is something that creates problems. And of course, we can always ask how much a figure like Boyle is straining to hold together two elastic bands that are inevitably going to snap apart or something like that.

▶︎ 11:57 We can also ask, to give you an earlier example, before the Metaphysical Meditations of Descartes of 1641, '42, he includes a dedicatory letter to the faculty of theology at the Sorbonne, in which he, Descartes, says, "Now look, guys, we're Christians. We're faithful. We already know that God exists and that the human soul is immortal and subject to salvation or damnation, all of that stuff. We already know that, but there are atheists and heathens abroad in the present day." Fortunately, however, I, Descartes, also know how to communicate with them. I can use arguments that appeal to reason alone, and we all have reason. Pagans and Christians and Gentiles, to use Thomas Aquinas' language, all have reason simply in virtue of the fact that we're human beings. So I can work with them on that level, even though they deny the faith.

▶︎ 13:19 But if it were just us guys, like theologians at the Sorbonne, if it were just us, we could just vibe together with our faith without having to appeal to reason. And of course, you can ask of Descartes, is he just covering himself? Is he just trying to give himself a bit of extra insurance that this is not going to be misunderstood as itself an argument of not just methodological skepticism, but actual skepticism regarding the existence of God?

▶︎ 13:59 And so we can see from a zoomed-out, long-term historical perspective that these guys were playing with fire, in the sense that the 17th century cautious interrogations as to how much we can get from the faculty of reason alone without appeal to divine power or to any divine source of knowledge, how far we can get with reason alone. By the 18th century, what you find is plenty of people saying, "We can go all the way. We don't need God at all." As Laplace puts it, "I have no need of that hypothesis," referring to God. So, in other words, for Laplace, I can do all of my scientific explanation without God doing any of the work for me, therefore, I can get rid of God.

▶︎ 15:09 You typically don't see that in the 17th century. Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza are two possible exceptions, both very complicated cases we can come back to at a later moment. What you typically see in the 17th century is opening the door to a naturalistic explanation of many commitments that in an earlier era would have been seen as having belonged to the domain of faith alone.

▶︎ 15:50 And again, so for example, to come back to Robert Boyle then, you see Boyle attempting to make the argument that God does not, need not intervene in the ordinary course of nature, because it is the clockwork of nature itself that is the greatest testimony, the greatest witness to God's perfection and infinite power. This creates what's sometimes discussed as the problem of the deus absconditus, the God who does all the creating, but then disappears from the scene because there's no need to do the regular maintenance work, so to speak, that miracles used to seem to involve. But instead, you just have the minimal laws of nature ensuring that everything will unfold precisely in the way God had initially conceptualized it.

▶︎ 17:03 That's certainly the picture of natural motion and change that you get in Leibniz's philosophy as well, to come back to Leibniz, who believes that, in effect, there is no causal interaction between substances, that every successive state of every substance is the unfolding of its complete concept or, so to speak, its own program, to use somewhat anachronistic terminology, and that this pre-established harmony between substances was entirely fixed at the moment of the divine creation of the world, which is conceptualized as a sort of maximizing of composibles, as Leibniz would put it.

▶︎ 18:02 That is to say, bringing about a universe that has as many possible kinds of thing in it that can coexist in the same universe, that don't mutually exclude one another. So that's what God created, and then God doesn't need subsequently to tend to it in any way. So this is the emerging Enlightenment conception of miracles then.

▶︎ 18:32 Miracles are a kind of folk belief that once we apply philosophical rigor to our thinking about religious commitment, this folk belief, in fact, isn't doing a religious belief any good. It isn't doing the work that it's supposed to do. So nature almost without exception then is deterministic. That is to say that its subsequent states are contained within its earlier states, and that a wrench is never thrown into the continually unfolding processes of natural change in motion.

▶︎ 19:25 And obviously, this is a bit of a problem for understanding how the human subject fits into the picture. Because obviously, we have some interest in thinking, in continuing to think that if we step one foot to the left or one step to the right, at least in principle, that can be simply because we decided to do so with absolutely no prior physical forces determining that outcome. And obviously, this is particularly important in the history of Christian philosophy as well. Freedom of the will isn't particularly pressing in ancient philosophy.

▶︎ 20:16 You can read wonderful accounts of the philosopher Bernard Williams, who has written in a work called Shame and Necessity, on a wonderful account of the way in the Greek context if a javelin thrower accidentally spears another athlete at the stadium, has to be treated as if this were the same kind of crime as actually intentionally spearing the guy, whether there was malice aforethought or not. The idea being that for the most part in Greek antiquity, being able to do something just because, rather than as a result of the prior determining forces, just didn't really present itself as a particularly salient problem. It becomes salient within the context of early philosophical reflection on the Christian doctrine of salvation and sin.

▶︎ 21:29 And in that context, we have Augustine trying to work out a notion of what in the Latin is liber arbitrium, which is something like free will, but notice the Latin arbitrium, which is connected to the English word arbitrary. Being free is being able to do something arbitrarily, or again, as I just put it, just because. But that is a commitment with a particular history. Not all human civilizations have been preoccupied with, wait a minute, can I really make my own choices and therefore be held morally responsible for them and so on?

▶︎ 22:11 That's a problem, that's a philosophical problem with a contingent history. And I think philosophers like Nietzsche would later understand how contingent and how particular it had been. Nonetheless, in the 17th century, it was a pressing problem because we now had a universe conceived as a clockwork, and we wanted to find a way to preserve the human that did not reduce the human to a clockwork.

▶︎ 22:48 And again, you have by the 18th century, a kind of high enlightenment figure, like Julien Offray de La Mettrie, who writes a text in the 1740s. Check the date. Circa 1740, called Man a Machine. Man a Machine, the French is L'Homme Machine with a hyphen. So there, the commitment is quite open. The argument is already there in the title. If you look a century or so earlier with Descartes,

▶︎ 23:25 He's trying to make everything a machine but man. The human beings. So trying to carve out one special little space, even if puppy fetuses and moss have to follow the same rules as the stars and the tides. Nonetheless, Descartes still has one little exception, and that is for the so-called res cogitans, the thinking thing, which is to say the self or soul, of the human being alone. That is an entirely separate ontological domain from res extensa, or extended stuff, with nothing in common and entirely autonomous principles of functioning.

▶︎ 24:28 And so that, again, from a zoomed-out historical point of view, you can see that effort to carve out one exception. You can see it's bound to fail. You can see it's a stopgap measure on the way from a whole set of metaphysical commitments about what lies beyond the natural world studied by empiricism. And so what happens then is that all of those commitments to any such transcendental principle lying beyond this world get evacuated by the 18th century.

▶︎ 25:13 And the 17th century can be seen, again, as a kind of a period of struggle over which principles are going to be preserved from the transcendentalist point of view, if any. So that then is one of the consequences of the scientific revolution, which I think we've discussed sufficiently in the previous lesson.

▶︎ 25:47 We talked about heliocentrism. I introduced at the beginning of the lesson just now, Francis Bacon and the experimental method. And I suppose the third pillar of what we have in mind by scientific revolution is broadly a commitment to mechanical determinism in explanations of the natural world.

▶︎ 26:14 Very like Enlightenment itself, scientific revolution is a very fuzzy notion. There's a famous book by Stephen Shapin called The Scientific Revolution. The first sentence, I believe I'm citing this correctly, is, "The scientific revolution did not take place and this is a book about it." In other words, we know that this is something of a historiographical fiction, but we do our best to make sense of the past through partially fictitious narrative impositions like that.

▶︎ 26:57 Returning then to the second half of the 17th century, well after the main pillars of the scientific revolution have been erected and everyone is more or less working in the same spirit in that regard, we find various efforts to preserve something special, something distinct, that is irreducibly human in a world of mechanistic and deterministic natural processes. All of this comes to something of a head in the work of Kant, in the late 18th century, and I wanted to try to get to Kant by the end of the discussion today. That will be the end of lesson two. Briefly, I wanted to bring up two approaches to knowledge in the second half of the 17th century that are also something of a historiographical fiction, but also necessary to understand what Kant's project is, and that will be very important in our upcoming lessons.

▶︎ 28:16 We've already seen that Descartes talks about the light of reason, and that can be seen as a kind of early anticipation of the Enlightenment. And the faculty of reason, for a number of early modern thinkers, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, in particular, is the key starting point for everything. The faculty of reason as expressed paradigmatically in geometrical reasoning, for example, is the gold standard of knowledge. This is as good as it gets when it comes to knowledge. This is what knowledge at its best is. Whereas knowledge that comes via observation, including observation of scientific experiments, is not nearly as valuable and certainly not as important as a first principle as the starting point for philosophical reflection.

▶︎ 29:35 So a rationalist then, again, we hear the term rationalist a lot these days in online amateur philosophy communities. Rationalist in the historical sense is someone who believes that knowledge is, in its truest sense, a priori, that is to say, prior to experience, and accessed via the faculty of reason. Surely, no one is more rationalist in this regard than Leibniz. Effectively, Leibniz believes that everyone is, as you might say, somewhat paradoxically, dimly omniscient. That is to say, we all know everything and every mind is pre-stocked, so to speak, with all of the same infinitely many truths. We seem to know different things or disagree, only because different of us have different levels of difficulty in accessing all the truths we all already know.

▶︎ 30:55 Now, that is hyper-rationalism. That is rationalism to the max. Even Plato in antiquity, who was a rationalist, would not say we have a priori knowledge of everything. He would only say we have a priori knowledge of the important things. Leibniz comes and adds a new twist and says, "Well, actually, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths as well. It's just that it would take us infinitely many steps in order to access all these truths, so they appear contingent. Whereas if we were maximally clear in our omniscience like God is, we could just logically deduce even empirical truths, like say, about the temperature in this room today," things like that. So again, really, really hyper-rationalist stuff, rationalism at its limit.

▶︎ 31:58 And then there's a kind of caricatural view according to which a rationalist is not interested in empirical science and vice versa. If we look at the empiricists, again, figures like John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, there is obviously a genuine interest in empirical science and even at least in all three of their cases, they themselves conduct experiments. But the truth is, Descartes and Spinoza and Leibniz conducted scientific experiments as well and believed in the value of empirical inquiry as well. For Leibniz, empirical inquiry is one of two paths starting from opposite directions, leading to the same truth. It can buttress or support or enrich or draw into clearer relief truths with which we are already somehow familiar via a priori rational means. That's for Leibniz anyhow.

▶︎ 33:14 But again, for a rationalist, the paradigm of knowledge is going to be a deductive domain of inquiry like geometry. For an empiricist, typically, and again this is very oversimplifying, the paradigm of knowledge is going to be what someone like Robert Boyle does, experiments with an evacuated chamber, for example, or an air pump, in other words. So these are different approaches, but the peculiar thing about this difference, this division, which is again largely a didactic and artificial division that we created in order to teach the history of philosophy. The peculiar thing about this division is that a case can be made both for rationalism and for empiricism as the characteristic epistemology of Enlightenment philosophy. In other words, both of them seem to have a claim to being the theory of knowledge that makes the most sense when one is committed to the principles, the ideals, or perhaps the values that we associate with the Enlightenment.

▶︎ 34:45 Now, I want to finish out for today, again, by returning to the question of freedom, and this is going to take center stage in a later lesson. Freedom is, again, a historically contingent notion. It is something that has been particularly important in Western philosophy since Augustine. And that comes into crisis in the 17th century with the rise of mechanical philosophy.

▶︎ 35:22 I've already said that for Descartes, the domain of thinking and the domain of extension have nothing in common. Descartes nonetheless has to face up to the fact that if you throw a rock at my head, it's going to hurt. The impact of the rock and the skull is a physical event, but the experience of pain is a mental event, and clearly, these two events are connected somehow and therefore, like it or not, Descartes, it's pretty clear that you're going to have to give some kind of account of how you get this kind of interchange, this causal interchange between the mental and the physical.

▶︎ 36:13 So in a late treatise, the so-called Passions of the Soul, Descartes gives a somewhat coerced and obviously inadequate account of the seat of the soul being in the pineal gland, and that might be connected to ancient medical traditions going back deep in Indo-European tradition. But the only explanation that he gives of it is, well, the pineal gland is the one part of the brain that is not split into two hemispheres, into two lobes. But of course, that's no explanation at all. Why should that be the thing that makes it the ideal seat of the soul, where physical signals are translated into mental ones and vice versa? Not at all clear.

▶︎ 37:03 So this is a huge explanatory failure that post-Cartesian philosophy has to face up to. And what we find in the later 17th century are pretty desperate radical counterintuitive explanations. For example, I already mentioned Leibniz's pre-established harmony, who would basically say that every time I will my arm to go up and every time my arm goes up, those are two totally separate events with no causal connection between them. They just are so perfectly synchronized that the willing and the going up happen at more or less the same time. That's the pre-established harmony.

▶︎ 37:53 We find in Malebranche an equally outlandish argument called occasionalism, according to which God is the direct cause at each moment of everything that happens. So I will my arm to go up, and God makes my arm go up. And occasionalism is an interesting theory, in part because later philosophers, like Bertrand Russell in particular, would see Malebranche as a foreshadowing of Hume, who tries to get rid of causality altogether as a part of scientific explanation, because it has no place in empirical observation. You don't see the cause when you see someone throwing a ball in the air and the ball going up. You see a conjunction, but you don't see the cause.

▶︎ 38:57 So one way of thinking about Malebranche's attribution to God of all causal power is, let's just leave it with God so we can offer cause-free scientific explanations. That's one way to understand it. Another way to understand it is just we got to put cause somewhere, and it certainly ain't going to be stuffed into the pineal gland, like Descartes in his kind of desperate, last-minute, hasty explanation suggested. So all throughout this period then, you have a sense of a real problem that was in need of resolution, that had to do with finding an account for human freedom in a deterministic world.

▶︎ 40:02 And as we're going to see in a later lesson, Kant is going to give us at least the best attempt, if not a definitively successful one, at resolving this antinomy as he would see it. And the final point I wanted to emphasize about this is that even as freedom is becoming a bigger and bigger conceptual metaphysical problem, it's also emerging as a political ideal. And in particular, the elaboration of a notion of freedom that's not just a power to make my arms go up when I will them to go up, but also, so to speak, a political status.

▶︎ 40:56 And this will be most pronounced, as we'll see in later lessons, in the work of Spinoza, who as a contemporary of Leibniz, Leibniz being a stubborn monarchist to the end, Spinoza is attempting to articulate a political philosophy that makes room for freedom precisely by conceptualizing the individual as a free citizen of a different kind of political entity, namely a republic. So republicanism in the classical sense, as we'll discuss in later lessons, emerges in part in complex ways out of this intense reflection on the question of how to preserve metaphysical freedom in a deterministic universe. Now, it will be in a later lesson that we're going to look in detail at the notion of freedom as a political ideal in the context of Enlightenment philosophy.

▶︎ 42:13 But I wanted to read to you now a passage that is taken from Kant's 1784 text, What is Enlightenment? This passage, or this text, was published in a monthly periodical in Berlin, in response to a question that was already circulated, what is Enlightenment? So it's become a problem where, and again, we're in what we call the high Enlightenment here, when the question or when we see not only the main themes emerging as we see in the 17th century, but we also see a kind of higher order reflection on the meaning of the concept itself.

▶︎ 43:05 So Kant answers this question with a very brief and very well-known, much cited passage. "Enlightenment is the release of man from a state of bondage for which he is himself responsible. In this state of bondage, he is unable to fulfill his intentions without the help of another. He is himself responsible for this bondage where the cause is not a lack of understanding, but a lack of resolution and courage to use it unguided. Sapere aude, have the courage to use your own understanding. Such is the motto of the Enlightenment."

▶︎ 43:51 So this is interesting for a lot of reasons, but it reduces the question, or the effort to define the Enlightenment to what is in some sense only one part of it. The very practical question, how ought I to conduct myself? This is a question of practical philosophy in the way Kant defines it here. In Kant's practical philosophy, there is the idea that a person should strive to be, so to speak, their own lawgiver. And that by acting on duty, which is internal, one can be free.

▶︎ 44:49 So freedom is for Kant then not the ability to do X rather than Y, or Y rather than X just because, but rather the ability to act in accordance with law, but where the law doesn't come from externally imposed power. And this then is something that opens out into wider questions or wider dimensions of Kant's philosophy, that answer, I think, many of the problems of the 17th century debates regarding freedom and determinism, but also that enable a kind of preservation of a newly conceived notion of religion that decouples it entirely from reason.

▶︎ 45:51 And I can give just one example here of a very different conception in the 17th century. We have Blaise Pascal's famous wager, where Pascal argues that it is rational to adopt religious commitment because the punishment for getting the question wrong is infinite suffering in hell. On the presumption that you deny religion, but it turns out to be true. If you affirm religion and it turns out to be false, then no big deal, you're dead either way. So the idea then is that given that the punishment if you're wrong is infinite, then the cost of actually committing, whether in fact you believe it's true or not at the outset, is one worth paying.

▶︎ 46:52 Now, notice, Pascal is a very difficult thinker, and in some ways the wager is misleading as regards his whole kind of philosophical sensibility because for the most part, Pascal is the guy who's telling us that the heart knows things that the mind knoweth not, and so on. He's the one in the period who's giving us the most literally heartfelt pleas regarding the limits of reason. But at least when it comes to religious commitment, we find him trying to give an argument in favor that appeals to a literal kind of exercise in rational choice theory, so to speak. It's a rational choice exercise.

▶︎ 47:43 Now what Kant would say by marked contrast, is that that could not possibly count as religious commitment if it is adopted in view of any kind of external, so to speak, coercion. If you are afraid of punishment, then you can't possibly act for the right reason in such a way that it would count as religious belief. But in order to make that shift, we have to also shift, for Kant, the object of religious belief, namely belief in a transcendent, omniscient, omnipotent God. We have to eject that idea from the faculty of reason altogether and place it outside of reason, as what Kant calls a kind of regulative idea that helps us to deploy our faculty of understanding in a more productive way without ever becoming the object given in the understanding, if that makes sense.

▶︎ 49:05 So in Kant then, we have, and we'll see much more of this in further lessons, we have the resolution of tensions that emerge in early modern philosophy largely as a result of, let's say, as Kant would see it, early modern philosophers taking up dogmatic positions. Like for example, the world is an entirely deterministic order, or there are appearances of freedom here and there in the world, things like that. Early modern philosophers committed themselves to taking up a particular position and fighting for it, and that's certainly what Leibniz does. Leibniz is a thoroughgoing dogmatist in the sense that he thinks he knows what's true and he's going to tell us.

▶︎ 50:03 The spirit of Kant's philosophy, by contrast, will be critical, which is to say precisely that it avoids dogmatically affirming one or the other of two opposed theses in a given antinomy, say, regarding freedom. And this in turn will enable Kant to resolve some longstanding, dichotomous problems that are inherited from 17th century philosophy that are, as he will understand by the 1770s, not going to be resolved by more argumentation, but rather by moving to, so to speak, a higher level and seeing opposed arguments from a higher critical point of view. This is the critical philosophy. This is the project of the critical philosophy. And it is in some sense also the closure, the ending of the sequence that begins in the early 17th century with the mechanical philosophy and Cartesian dualism.

▶︎ 51:29 So in the next lesson, we're going to look at Kant's critical solution of these inherited problems and consider this as a kind of culmination of the problems of Enlightenment philosophy before moving on in later lessons to look at some more of the vigorous and direct expressions of opposition to some of the principles of the Enlightenment that we've already evoked. So that's it for today. So we'll see you at the next lesson.