▶︎ 0:00 Hello, I'm Justin Smith-Ruiu. I'm a professor of the history and philosophy of science in Paris, and I am going to speak to you today and over a series of days on the topic of the Enlightenment and its discontents.
▶︎ 0:19 Today, in a first lesson, I would like to go over some very preliminary questions of definition, understanding the terms we use, and then I would like by the end of the first lesson to begin to introduce some concepts and tendencies in what we might call the proto-Enlightenment of the Renaissance and the early modern period. And so we'll be addressing such figures as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton.
▶︎ 0:53 In later discussions, we will get to what you might call the high Enlightenment, notably the work of Immanuel Kant, the author of the kind of paradigmatic Enlightenment text entitled What Is Enlightenment?, published in 1784. And then in later lectures, as the title of this course suggests, we'll be looking at the discontents of the Enlightenment. That is to say, people who find, for various reasons, the aspirations and ideals of the Enlightenment untenable and worthy of rejection.
▶︎ 1:41 First, we have to define our terms, as I've said. We have to understand what we're talking about when we talk about Enlightenment, but also when we talk about Enlightenment philosophy. Perhaps, if we want to start at the absolute beginning, we should talk about the definition of philosophy. Today it's easy to take for granted that philosophy is defined by a certain methodological rigor, that it typically seeks to analyze propositions into their basic constituents, and to develop rigorous, logically deductive arguments on the basis of this analysis. This is a familiar definition.
▶︎ 2:30 There are competing definitions even today. In contemporary French philosophy, for example, or recent French philosophy, you find a philosopher like Gilles Deleuze saying that philosophy is the creation or the coining of new concepts. It's not analytic, it's synthetic, you might say, or it seeks to produce something new. Over the course of the 2,000-plus years that philosophy has been around and identified by that name, it has been many, many different things.
▶︎ 3:09 In the 17th century, 16th and 17th centuries in particular, the period we're starting from, we'll be moving from the 16th through the 18th centuries. In this period, philosophy is often used in a way that is simply synonymous with what we would call science or natural science, but also overlapped in part with what was sometimes called in the period natural history. So anything that involved going and checking how the world works in any way, whether observation or a full-fledged experiment in our scientific understanding of today, all of this was considered philosophical.
▶︎ 4:00 Let me just read you, to begin, a lovely passage from a text of 1661 by the English author John Evelyn called Fumifugium. That is to say, it's a text on how to clean the polluted air of London. It's considered one of the first texts in the history of environmental science, among other things. So Evelyn writes of, and I quote, "These unwholesome vapors that distemper the air to the very raising of storms and tempests, upon which a philosopher might amply discourse," Evelyn says, close quote.
▶︎ 4:44 You might think today that is a weird assignment for someone who goes by the label philosopher. Philosophers today, well, they might actually, these days, philosophers might well discourse on the polluted air, and you have philosophers working with empirical methods that overlap with environmental science and stuff like that. But when we think of classical philosophy, we don't tend to think of the project of philosophy as one of studying how quicklime has coolant properties, or how you can dissolve silver into aqua fortis, things like that. But in the period we're starting in, in the 16th century, that was a very common way of understanding what philosophy is.
▶︎ 5:35 I'm not going to drive this point home many times, but as we're discussing the Enlightenment and as we're discussing Enlightenment philosophy, I want you to bear in mind the contingency and historical life of the concept of philosophy. In particular, when we get to the 18th century, a few lessons from now, and we're looking at the French philosophers of the high Enlightenment, let's say 1750s to 1780s, these are the famous philosophes, with a plural, with an S on the end. And the way of being a philosophe in Paris circa 1770 was not to be giving lectures in front of a classroom, was not to be producing rigorous deductive arguments or anything of the sort.
▶︎ 6:35 It was to be socializing in Parisian salons and discoursing upon preferred themes. That was on, say, liberty or on Newton's mechanical physics. Things like this were discussed under the banner of philosophy by French thinkers of the mid-18th century who went by the label philosophe. So we see a very, very historically polysemic, polyvalent notion of philosophy, even just over the course of the modern period, not to go back further to antiquity.
▶︎ 7:20 So that's one key definition, and the other, of course, is of Enlightenment. Now, it's not until well into the 19th century, the 19th century historiography of philosophy, that we start to see the term Enlightenment as a designation for a certain tendency in the philosophy of the prior century. So this is not an actor's category, as we say it sometimes. This is not a way that people self-designated in the 17th or 18th centuries.
▶︎ 8:01 Though, of course, if you look at the root of the word and it's the same, it's interesting to look at this across languages. What we call Enlightenment with a capital E is called in French Les Lumières au pluriel. So in the plural, that is uppercase L. So the lights, literally, and in German it's Aufklärung, also capitalized, but all German nouns are capitalized. So Aufklärung is like the getting clear, so to speak. It doesn't contain the term light the way French and English do, though it does suggest something similar to what happens when there is light, or something that does happen when there is light.
▶︎ 8:51 Now, light, of course, is a metaphor, and you might even say a leitmotif, in the history of philosophy going back to antiquity. It's key in Plato's elaboration of his theory of forms. It's key also, obviously, in Christianized philosophy of late antiquity in Augustine, for example, and throughout medieval scholastic philosophy. The obvious utility of light metaphors that are anyhow all over the place in Christian theological tradition. It's not surprising to see it working its way into medieval philosophy conceived as the handmaiden of theology either.
▶︎ 9:45 Now, in what we might call the very early Enlightenment, which you could say starts with the scientific revolution, and we'll get to that soon enough, there is also frequent reliance on the metaphor of light. In particular, we see this in the work of René Descartes prominently. Descartes, who is in some sense the great founding figure of modern philosophy. He kind of kicks it all off, or at least that's how we teach the history of philosophy. He lived from 1596–1650, so he covers the first half of the 17th century.
▶︎ 10:27 We'll get back to him later. There's a lot more to be said about him, but a key thing to notice is that he is very reliant on the metaphor of the light of reason. And this is something that will come back again and again, the idea, the twin notions of light or illumination on the one hand, and reason on the other. So again, this is proto-Enlightenment because there's a lot more that has to fall into place before we can talk of the full Enlightenment. And again, the actual designation of it as such is a long way off yet, but already in very early modern philosophy, we see a reliance on the metaphor of light and an association of the metaphor with the faculty of reason.
▶︎ 11:30 We've started to define our terms, and what I would like to do in this first lecture is bring you all the way through a consideration of, let's say, the three defining features of Enlightenment philosophy. I'm going to be speaking in very general terms. In later lessons, we can get far more into the details, the fine-grained details. But today, I would like to sketch out what Enlightenment philosophy is under a couple of, in fact, three different headings.
▶︎ 12:13 This is necessary. I'll tell you what the headings are soon enough, but this is necessary, I think, and it's key to understand the topic under discussion. There are no necessary and sufficient criteria for identifying whether a given body of work, or a given text, or a given thinker counts as Enlightenment or not. There are no necessary and sufficient criteria. We're looking at a loose association of features, some of which are present in a given text, some of which are not.
▶︎ 12:54 I suppose you could find the paradigmatic Enlightenment text, say the conversation between d'Alembert and Diderot or something like that, circa 1770. That would be a good candidate. Maybe Pierre Bayle's Historical and Critical Dictionary. There are candidates for the ultimate Enlightenment text where all the features are present, but ultimately, we also find various thinkers and various texts that hold incompatible views, being the one and the other described more or less rightly as Enlightenment thinkers or texts.
▶︎ 13:37 It's a cloud, it's a loose cloud of associated features. That's frustrating for philosophers. It's good for intellectual historians, but we're going to work somewhere in between those two veins of inquiry.
▶︎ 13:57 So the three headings now are authority, universality, and progress. And I'm going to try to get through all three of those. We'll see how far I get before the end of the first lesson. I might have to pick up in a second one. Think for a moment. Let's talk about authority and what changes in the early modern period.
▶︎ 14:26 We're talking, let's say, between 1550 and 1610, so the period of the shift from the Renaissance to what the French call l'âge classique, the classical age, by which they mean the age of Molière and Racine and so on, but also centrally Descartes, Malebranche, and other figures like that. So what changes in that period, late 16th, early 17th centuries, as regards the relationship of, we're talking about, let's be blunt here, educated Europeans, men, ultimately, some women mixed in. We'll see that as well soon enough. What changes in their relationship to authority? That's what we have to figure out in order to understand where the Enlightenment comes from.
▶︎ 15:28 Now, think about you might have, let's say, some biographical connection to evangelical Christianity. Maybe not. Maybe you've seen them on TV. Maybe you can draw analogies from other kinds of collective religious experience. It's all over the place. But picture an evangelical pastor who is explaining a point of principle or rule regarding, let's say, sexual morality or something like that. And in order to drive the point home, to make the case, the pastor says, "Turn to Paul's second letter to the Corinthians, chapter so and so." And then he reads it, and that buttresses the case he's making about a particular rule, or let's call it a particular moral principle.
▶︎ 16:28 Now that, when we're doing philosophy, when we're teaching at a university or when we're giving a master class, we have at least an implicit understanding that that's not going to fly. You can't do that here. And the reason you can't do it is because it is a sort of reliance on authority that we consider out of bounds in trying to persuade someone to see something your way.
▶︎ 17:07 Now, if you want to be charitable about what you're seeing there, if you want to take a generous, open-hearted anthropological perspective, what you could say is that is a form of argument that seems to be a human universal. We find people appealing to authority, appealing to the ancestors, appealing to the holy texts, appealing, well, you could also say to the law books, but that would get things very complicated a bit too early on, but appealing to authority derived from the past of our people, broadly speaking. Where are the bounds of our people? That's another problem we'll get back to later on.
▶︎ 17:53 But in any case, this is something that doesn't fly in most social contexts in the modern world. It exists, but at least relative to the neutral sphere of the university, or the lecture hall, or the hotel conference center, those sorts of venues, that kind of appeal to authority is out of bounds. So it exists in the modern world, but so to speak, on the down low. It's something that has to be contained within a very special domain of human social existence, like the church.
▶︎ 18:43 Now, imagine a world where that's the only kind of argument anyone knows. Imagine a world where it is simply taken for granted that in order to persuade another person, you simply have to pull out from your official text that binds your society together a line that seems to support what you're saying as opposed to what the other person is saying. Imagine that that's the only kind of argumentation available. Now, there actually probably never was such a world where that was the only sort of argumentation available, but you do find relatively greater reliance on that kind of appeal to authority prior to the Renaissance in European intellectual history.
▶︎ 19:48 And it's interesting, as I've said, you probably never find any pure cases. What you tend to find instead, and you see this also very clearly in anticipation of the European Renaissance, you see this also in medieval Islamic philosophy, that starts in a tradition called kalam that is a formalized disputation on a particular point, usually of Quranic interpretation. Now it's a familiar story, we don't need to go through it, but at some point, certain thinkers started telling themselves, "Wait a minute. I've got the Quran down by heart. I know it inside and out. What if I were to supplement the point that I'm making with a bit of Aristotle, too? Maybe that would help me make my case."
▶︎ 20:48 So then you get, depends how you see things, either vitiated Quranic interpretation, takes a turn for the worse, or looking at it from another direction, you get a Quranic interpretation plus a new, so to speak, power tool that enables you to really rigorously buttress whatever point you might be trying to make. So that happens, a hybridization of scriptural commentary, both in all the Abrahamic religions over the course of the Middle Ages. It happens somewhat later in Christian Europe than in the Islamic Middle Ages, and it happens in direct dialogue with the Islamic Middle Ages.
▶︎ 21:48 When Thomas Aquinas writes the Summa Contra Gentiles, that is to say against the Gentiles, which is by his perspective, against the Jews and Muslims. When Thomas Aquinas writes this, he is effectively trying to show that, in fact, Aristotle is an even more powerful power tool when you adapt him for the purposes of buttressing Christian theology.
▶︎ 22:19 So then what you have over the course of the later Middle Ages is you might think a hybrid philosophy/theology. But there's another more complicating factor that you have to pay attention to here, which is that when Aristotle is cited often, and I don't want to exaggerate here because there are nuances and there's a lot of variety of course, but when Aristotle is cited, for example, in order to buttress points of Christian faith, he's cited much as if he were, let's say, coming out of scripture himself. That is to say, much as if his authority were scriptural authority, that is to say divinely dictated in the end. And of course, everybody knew this wasn't true, or almost everybody knew it wasn't true.
▶︎ 23:24 There are efforts beginning in the Renaiss-- or picking up speed in the Renaissance. There are efforts like the so-called Prisca theologia tradition to show how maybe Plato disappeared for a while into the desert, met Moses there. Moses was a prophet, so Moses could tell him everything that was going to happen in the future history of Christianity. And in that way, the Greek philosophers had access to the same body of truths that those of us with revelation also have. There were efforts to do that, to make that work.
▶︎ 24:05 But for the most part, it was understood that, say, Aristotle is no prophet. He's just a human being, he's a pagan human being, and he just happened to be very good at observing stuff. Nonetheless, if you look at the way he is invoked, even if no one would ex-- or again, few people would explicitly say that this has the same status as revealed truth. Nonetheless, the authority that Aristotle often, and I cite Aristotle as the main guy for much of late medieval and Renaissance philosophy, even if it was understood that this was not divinely inspired, nonetheless, the understanding of the proper relationship to Aristotle's authority was, so to speak, borrowed from the world of scriptural interpretation.
▶︎ 25:17 And so this then, if we're looking at authority as the first heading under which to understand this cluster of ideas we call Enlightenment, take as a paradigmatic moment around 1610, at least according to what Galileo Galilei writes in a letter of that year about the scholastic, that is to say, the Catholic natural philosophers at the University of Padua, who are constantly giving him a hard time about his observations with the telescope. So one day, and I forget the guy's name, and it's quite possible that this is all just apocryphal, it's a crude legend. What we find in Galileo's actual letter is something very minimal and slight that the legend is based on. But so what? Let's run with the legend.
▶︎ 26:27 Galileo is out there with his telescope, looking at the moons of Jupiter, and a priest comes along and starts ragging on him for wasting his time with that foolish device. And Galileo says, "Oh, no, no, but you've got to see this. There are moons around Jupiter." And the priest/natural philosopher says, "No. No, thanks. I don't need to look." And Galileo says, "What? Come on, this is a great opportunity. You can see something new in the world." And the priest says, "I don't need to see anything new in the world. I already know there are no moons around Jupiter because Aristotle never mentions them."
▶︎ 27:05 So that, if it actually happened, could be understood as a kind of clash of, not to sound too technical or fancy here, but a clash of epistemes, to use the term introduced by Michel Foucault. If you want to flesh that out a bit more, a clash of two different epistemic regimes, or a clash of, if you want to put this in more natural language, a clash of two different ways of understanding how we are to establish truth. And again, we don't want to say that prior to 1610 or so, nobody bothered to check Aristotle's wild claims against what they observed with their own two eyes. Aristotle said female bees don't sting. He said that all hyenas are hermaphrodites. He said all sorts of things that you can imagine over the centuries, everyday observation falsified.
▶︎ 28:22 And so no one wants to say that people were blind idolaters before Aristotle up until 1610 or anything like that. Just that circa 1610, you have, again, as what I've called a clash of epistemic regimes, that kind of shows that up until that moment, a conception of truth as grounded primarily in authority was completely acceptable. And you could still respectably say in 1610, "I don't need to look through the telescope. I know Aristotle never mentions any moons around Jupiter." That was still a respectable move to make, so to speak, in the sociology of knowledge.
▶︎ 29:19 A century later, it would not be, even if you were locked away in a monastery. In 1710, everybody had to conform to a different epistemic regime in which deductive argument and observation were now the gold standard of what was to count as knowledge. And there was a new, so to speak, sensibility that tended to downplay authority and tended to see the kind of reliance on authority, even in so-called pagan sources, could now see that reliance as a kind of vestige or a borrowing, that might be better, from the traditional practices of scriptural interpretation.
▶︎ 30:28 That is the first heading. We're working our way through three of them. The second is universality. And this is a tricky one, in part because there is, in Enlightenment philosophy, as we'll see in later lessons, there is a prominent strain of subjectivism and of a rejection of the ideal of universal reason in favor of what's sometimes called sensationalism or perspectivalism, and we need to take that into consideration. As I've already said, the Enlightenment is often one thing and its opposite. But I want to talk about something historically and I think conceptually prior to the universalism of reason, which is universalism about the physical world and about nature.
▶︎ 31:41 If you talk today to a theoretical physicist or a philosopher of physics, it's very common to hear expressed the idea that mathematics is the language of nature, and that mathematical physics is, and supplemented by chemistry and the other natural sciences are, so to speak, the definitive accounts of the structure of reality. And it's very typical to depict in science fiction, for example, I just watched a movie on an airplane that involved an encounter with an alien civilization, and they're looking for a common language. And the first moment of communication is when the alien creates an object with illuminated points that floats in the air that represents the molecular structure of oxygen. And the idea here, it's a commonplace of astrobiology at this point that when we do get to communicate with our peer species from other star systems, we're going to be able to presuppose that they have the same mathematics and the same physics we do.
▶︎ 33:15 They might express them differently. There might be some fundamental laws that they got to first. There might be some that we got to first, but it's the same structure of reality, and we can count on reality being the same across the tremendous differences of our contingent biological or astrobiological evolution.
▶︎ 33:43 That idea would have been very foreign 800 years ago. Why? Well, because on most cosmological models prior to the modern period, we can eliminate ancient atomism as a rare exception. And looking at both Christian and Hellenic cosmological models, and if you want, we can go abroad as well and look at South Asian and Chinese models and multiply the point. In general, pre-modern cosmologies presuppose a difference, a metaphysical and ontological difference between the realm in which we dwell and what goes on in the heavens.
▶︎ 34:43 In the medieval Christian schema, which might be familiar to many, the various layers of heaven and different articulations give us different numbers of layers. But the various layers are for the hierarchies of angels and archangels, and sometimes angels have bodies, sometimes they don't. When they do have bodies, they're weird bodies, they're angelic, ethereal bodies, and everything is done to drive home the point that things just aren't the same out there or up there. There is a different law that governs the motion of angelic bodies, for example.
▶︎ 35:30 Or indeed, in the Aristotelian cosmological scheme, the difference is articulated in terms of the sublunar and superlunar realms. Sublunar is everything below the moon. What side of the boundary the moon itself is on is a problem that has occupied many minds. But the division in the Aristotelian tradition between the sublunar and the superlunar is all important.
▶︎ 36:02 In our lowly sublunar world, in particular, everything you encounter is a mixture of earth, air, fire and water. And because everything is a mixed body or a composed body, it follows necessarily for the Aristotelians that everything that exists below the moon is mortal, is finite. That is to say, is going to be corrupted. Whereas for the Aristotelians in the superlunar realm, every body is composed of one element. Sometimes this gets articulated in the tradition as the so-called quintessence. Which if you think about it, it's the fifth essence. That is to say, that which is not earth, air, fire, or water.
▶︎ 36:56 And being composed of one element only, it follows that these bodies cannot corrupt. That is to say, they can't come apart. Coming apart is when the earth separates from the fire, for example. And so it follows then that the celestial bodies, for the Aristotelians, are immortal, as they put it, in number. Whereas biological entities on Earth are immortal only in species.
▶︎ 37:32 And so this is just one of the many possible examples of how pre-modern cosmology creates or projects a kind of boundary between our world and the heavens. And this was a conception that suited the reigning geocentric cosmology very well. But that once we break away from the reigning geocentric cosmology, and we start modeling the cosmos on the presumption that it's the sun and not the Earth that's at the center of the cosmos, then the perfect, neat, tidy image of the Russian doll, the Matryoshka doll, layers of, or spheres within spheres with the Earth at the center, that disappears.
▶︎ 38:43 And we're, so to speak, thrust into a cosmos with no bounds, to cite the title of the classic work on the history of modern science by the French-Russian historian Alexandre Koyré. We moved from the closed world to the infinite universe. And it's only in this context that we start speaking in terms of the universe. Now, that will have existential consequences within a few decades.
▶︎ 39:20 It's Copernicus who, in the mid to late 16th century, is making the observations that lead to the cosmological shift to heliocentrism. But it's really the early 17th century and the confirming observations and better dissemination mechanisms that Galileo had, that really triggers the shift to heliocentrism in the early 17th century. And then it radiates out very slowly. For example, the first translation of any non-geocentric text into Russian occurs in 1699, and that's a translation of Christiaan Huygens' so-called Cosmotheoros of some years earlier. So imagine an entire century that's required for word to fully spread that, sorry, but the Earth is not the center of the universe.
▶︎ 40:37 Let me just say, I mentioned, and then I'll get back to universality, I mentioned that this will have existential consequences, and what I was of course thinking of here is Blaise Pascal, who famously says, "These vast, empty, infinite spaces horrify me." The very thought of an infinite universe where the Earth is not positioned in any particularly prime real estate seems to have consequences for our own understanding of who we are and what we're doing here. And I think it's likely Pascal who's really the first to fully seize onto that, and we'll come back to that at a later point.
▶︎ 41:22 But indeed, what we have now is in part an infinitization of the universe, a shattering of the spheres, and an increasing reflection also on the concept of world. So you get many texts, for example, Thomas Moore, who writes already in the mid-17th century of the infinite worlds and each star must be a world system with planets orbiting it, with civilizations inhabiting them, and so on. And indeed, from the beginning of the new modern cosmology through the 18th century, virtually every prominent philosopher takes for granted the existence of extraterrestrials.
▶︎ 42:20 Kant writes about it at great length. Kant is in a dispute with another character named Emanuel Swedenborg, who also believes very strongly in the existence of extraterrestrials. So this seems to be a kind of natural implication of this infinitization process and of this discovery that stars are not fundamentally different, are not eternal as opposed to mortal, or are not divine as opposed to mere dirt or something like that. Stars are just like the sun, which is nothing particularly special at a cosmological level.
▶︎ 43:11 All of this is coming together in the early 17th century. And what's so significant about this is that you see already, for example, in Descartes.
▶︎ 43:24 Descartes' treatise is called Le Monde, or The World. It's an effort to show how you can get an elaborately structured cosmos, including everything on the surface of the Earth, but also including the solar system and so on. How you can get that on the basis of a very minimal set of principles of natural philosophy. Extended stuff, which is how he sees matter, how he defines matter, extended stuff in motion, Descartes wishes to show can of itself result in such elaborate structures as, say, the human body or the solar system.
▶︎ 44:24 From minimal laws, and we'll get back to the notion of laws soon enough and how this is a kind of borrowing from the notion of divine law or civic law extended to nature in the early modern period, with minimal laws and a kind of minimal raw ingredients necessary, you can, so to speak, build a world. And this means, as Descartes already articulates, that whatever happens here on Earth, say, the
▶︎ 45:04 arc traced by a projectile that is studied by the science of ballistics, whatever happens here on Earth has its analog processes anywhere else in the universe. This is something that the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whom we'll be discussing in some detail in later lessons, the philosopher Leibniz, who's alive from 1646 to 1716, so a good generation after Descartes, Leibniz will come to call this the harlequin principle. It's not so important why. Apparently, Leibniz attended the opera in Paris in 1676, and Harlequin was a common stock figure of Italian comedic opera.
▶︎ 46:01 He went to an opera that no one can find a trace of the script or whatever they call it, the libretto, called Harlequin in the Moon, Dans La Lune. And apparently, Harlequin says in this comedic opera, "Here, as everywhere, it is always the same," or something like that. I won't translate it back into French, but that's the idea. Harlequin in this opera that is now lost, but we can nonetheless deduce, seems to be thinking broadly in a Keplerian way.
▶︎ 46:41 Johannes Kepler, writing some decades earlier than Leibniz, produces a very interesting text in the early 17th century called Somnium, that is to say, The Dream, or A Treatise of Lunar Astronomy. Lunar astronomy means, for Kepler in particular, doing astronomical observations from the surface of the moon. It's lunar in the sense that the people making or the creatures making the observations are lunar. What would the rotation of the heavenly spheres look like if that were our perspective? Kepler deigns to show us.
▶︎ 47:35 And in the course of the Somnium, it's a strange text. It seems to involve elements of Kepler's experience with his own mother, who is currently on trial in Stuttgart for practicing witchcraft, and this is in real life. This is Kepler's real mother. In the story, there is an Icelandic witch who gives Duracotus, the protagonist of the Somnium, a potion of mixed herbs that she's picked. And she's like, "Here, take this."
▶︎ 48:10 And he swallows it, and the next thing he knows, he's being transited to the surface of the moon. Presumably, there is some kind of naturally occurring psychedelic supplement that is being hinted at by Kepler there. It's a fascinating text, and that proto-science fiction zaniness takes up the first third or so of this treatise, but then the second two-thirds are just solid lunar astronomy.
▶︎ 48:46 But when it comes to Kepler's description of the legendary dark side of the moon, he lets himself cut loose again, and he starts describing in great detail the creatures, the animals that live there, and it turns out they look a lot like camels and have long legs and stuff like that. And this is all very important. It might look completely nuts, but it's very important for the simple reason that we're seeing for the first time the concrete suggestion that the sentient beings that exist beyond the Earth are zoological in nature, as opposed to the many other things they could be, such as, for example, angels.
▶︎ 49:44 So in the early modern period, you get the invention of extraterrestrials, which can be understood as the consequence of the naturalization of the entire cosmos. That is to say, of the newfound perspective according to which what is out there everywhere in nature is essentially the same as what we find on Earth. And all of this, in turn, is formalized and rendered most rigorously into a new paradigm for understanding nature by the end of the 17th century, in particular in 1686, '87, when we get Isaac Newton's Principia Mathematica.
▶︎ 50:46 And that's a significant title. We usually leave off the second part, and call it the Principia Mathematica or just the Principia, but it's actually Principia Mathematica Naturalis Philosophiae. That is to say, it's the mathematical principles of natural philosophy. And it's crucial that we appreciate the second part of the title, because this is precisely as much as to say that we now have mathematical principles for studying what previous pretenders to the title of natural philosopher used to describe in wishy-washy, qualitative terms. That is to say, they contented themselves with saying, "This body is hot," or, "This body is cold," and in many other ways, found qualitative description sufficient to account for external reality.
▶︎ 51:58 Now, so then it's when natural philosophy is mathematized, that we are able to appreciate, to go back to an earlier example that I've used, that we are able to appreciate that the arc traced by a projectile has something to do with the ellipse of the orbit of a planet. And similarly, for the rising and lowering of the tides or for the water cycle, or even perhaps for the growth and motion of the body, the biological body, the living body, we have the same underlying principles or laws.
▶︎ 52:56 And I mentioned, and I don't want to dwell on this for too long, but it is significant also, we tend to think of the idea of natural law, force equals mass times acceleration or something like that, as a paradigmatic instance of what we mean by law. Obviously, there's a significant disanalogy between natural law and civic law. Civic law is something you can violate if you want to. I don't recommend it, but if you want to, you can go murder someone. Whereas bodies in motion cannot violate the laws of natural motion.
▶︎ 53:45 So the disanalogy should already clue you in to the fact that one comes later than the other, and indeed, it's the idea of law of nature that gets inserted, shoehorned into a much older notion according to which law is grounded in civic tradition, but ultimately also, almost always prior to the modern period, in God's divine decree. So then the idea of a natural law is, in some ways, an attempt to take over from God, or reassign to nature itself what had previously been assured at every moment by a transcendent creator. And we'll come back to that, the significance of this shift for the idea of religious belief and religious faith, and so on, on another occasion. I just want to flag for now the importance of the notion of law.
▶︎ 55:21 As I said before, the new hope under the reign of the harlequin principle, as Leibniz calls it, or under the reign of the uniform external nature, Descartes could dare to hope not just that the same laws govern the projectile and the orbit of the planet but also govern, for example, the formation of the heart and the kidneys and things like that. And indeed, one of Descartes' most outlandish, or you shouldn't say that, daring, bold works is called The Treatise on the Formation of the Fetus, published only posthumously.
▶︎ 56:23 In this treatise, Descartes gives an extremely speculative account in purely thermomechanical terms of the way the semen heats up the menstrual blood, which then begins to clot, which then begins to separate out into different chambers, which become the aorta and the different parts of the heart. And then at some point, part of it gets very hard, and then the initial germ of the spinal column comes out of that, and then eventually you get all the other internal organs, and then eventually you get a full-fledged individual horse or dog or man. Well, man comes with some added complications that we'll get to later. But this was all, as I've said, wildly speculative.
▶︎ 57:36 Many were willing to say, like Nicolas Malebranche in his treatise called The Search after Truth of 1676, says, "Look, maybe you could get the basic formation of some generic organs by thermomechanical explanation alone, but how you could so reliably get not just a generation, but also species reproduction, in particular, why partridges always have baby partridges," to use Malebranche's example, "and not crows, that seems entirely, hopelessly beyond the bounds of a mechanical explanation." So that's Malebranche speaking, again, a generation after Descartes, and we see a really interesting back and forth about the limits of mechanical explanation in this period, and this will culminate in the critical work of Kant in the late 18th century, which we'll see soon enough. But Descartes, nonetheless, as a pioneer mechanical philosopher, as a true revolutionary, so to speak.
▶︎ 59:02 Descartes is a peculiar figure. I should maybe pause to highlight this. He was educated at a Jesuit college in La Flèche. Hume would later spend time there as well, David Hume. And we know with certainty that as at any Jesuit college, the boy, René Descartes, had very, very significant exposure to Augustine and Aquinas and all these beautiful, intricate scholastic debates.
▶︎ 59:42 Nonetheless, when Descartes writes, he commits the ultimate sin from the point of view of contemporary academia today, and consistently fails to cite his sources. We know, for example, that in the argument for the existence of God, of the third of his meditations, for example, and more importantly, in the second meditation in the argument around the cogito or the I think, we know that he has, in the back of his mind, Augustine's own reflection on his own knowledge of his own existence. But Descartes would never dream of saying, "Hey, thanks, Augustine, for bringing me to the point where I could articulate my own variation on this point."
▶︎ 1:00:44 And that is because Descartes is what is sometimes called, and this is a term he himself uses, he is a novator, an innovator. That is to say, he belongs to the school of the new philosophy, and the whole spirit of the new philosophy is to think things through on your own. And so this is, again, getting back to the point about authority, this is a clear expression of that first heading of Enlightenment philosophy. You've got to think for yourself. And this will become a slogan in Kant, like the slogan of Kant's paradigmatic conception of the Enlightenment, Sapere aude, dare to know, figure it out for yourself. Even if you have read Augustine, pretend not to have done so and so on.
▶︎ 1:01:42 So I mention all of that because I want to characterize Descartes as sociologically a revolutionary. And that's significant because in the dynamics of revolution, what you typically see as someone barging in and knocking all the china off the shelves, and then the next generations trying to see what can be salvaged, but also trying to move on to what comes next. And that's very much the case here in the scientific revolution and in the revolution of mechanical philosophy as represented by Descartes.
▶︎ 1:02:29 As a foolhardy move fast and break things style revolutionary, Descartes then, to get back to the treatise on the formation of the fetus, explicitly says, "If I cannot explain how you get a puppy out of these initial primitive fluids, if I cannot explain that," Descartes says, "all of my philosophy will have been in vain." All of it, including all the mechanical physics. The reason is because for Descartes, you can't have special sub-regions of nature with their own special ontology. You can't have exceptions to the general principle that nature is nothing but elementary particles in motion. You can't say, "Well, nature is nothing but elementary particles in motion, except when it comes to plants and animals," and then you've got an archeus or a plastic nature or some other je ne sais quoi that is doing the hard work of shaping the being in the course of gestation.
▶︎ 1:03:57 This is fascinating, and I'll drop this in a moment, but to get to the final of the three headings, this is fascinating in part because traditional historiography of science, and it really only gets going in the 20th century. Think of mid-century classic works of history of modern science like the Dutch scholar Dijksterhuis' work called The Mechanization of the World Picture. Dijksterhuis' work is very typical of this, and I think this dates to around 1953. I might be mistaken. We can check. Dijksterhuis would have you believe if you only read The Mechanization of the World Picture that all anyone cared about in the 17th century was physics, and that there's nothing to say about the history of the life sciences.
▶︎ 1:05:00 And that is true if by interesting stuff going on you're only willing to consider steps forward, discoveries, something new. And indeed, the 17th century was, for physics, a century of tremendous breakthroughs, tremendous discoveries. By contrast, they didn't have nearly enough empirical knowledge in place in the 17th century to say anything at all about the great majority of biological phenomena, in particular, animal generation. We will need Darwin and Mendel and the new synthesis in the early 20th century, Julian Huxley, Watson, and Crick. We'll need all of that to come together before the life sciences are going to find their own place. Whereas what you have between, say, 1610 and the late 19th century at least, what you have there is rather a conceptual vacuum.
▶︎ 1:06:23 You're not allowed anymore to appeal to final causes of the sort Aristotle invoked. Why do I have eyes? Well, because I had the teleology of seeing, so the organ slapped itself together, congealed out of matter to make that happen. But it was the purpose that was ontologically prior on the Aristotelian explanation. That's not going to fly anymore in the 17th century. But giving an evolutionary and a rigorous, in terms of genetic science, account of where photoreceptors came from, if not from final causes, it was a total vacuum.
▶︎ 1:07:15 So people were grasping at straws. You find examples like the British author Thomas Browne suggesting that the reason polar bears are white is because the mother polar bear, while she's pregnant, is surrounded by snow and so sends a signal of a white perception down the optic nerve, in the nerves, down into the womb. And so each generation anew bleaches, so to speak, the embryonic polar bear pups. And that sounds silly, but it's a good example of how when you've got a conceptual vacuum, you just start throwing hypotheses out there.
▶︎ 1:08:05 All of this is to say that the life sciences were a real mess. But if what interests you is not just the history of natural philosophy and science conceived as a great parade of discoveries and progress, but rather as an interesting laboratory of desperate hypotheses, then the life sciences in the 17th century are very interesting. Among other things, it's there that you find the most deep and serious reflection on how much mechanical explanation can get you. And again, if you are a true committed mechanical philosopher, Descartes doesn't use that term. Mechanical philosophy is a term that's coined by Robert Boyle only in the 1680s. So again, this is a retroactive label.
▶︎ 1:09:10 But nonetheless, I think it's safe to say Descartes is a committed mechanical philosopher. And so again, for him, everything has to be explained by the same basic minimal principles. And if biology can't be explained by the same basic minimal principles, then all of his philosophy, Descartes' philosophy, is to be tossed in the scrap heap.
▶︎ 1:09:37 That's how committed to the uniformity of nature, which we're describing under the heading of universality here, was for a modern thinker like Descartes. A final heading, and then we can conclude the first lecture, is the heading of progress. This is obviously a political, ideological notion, and we have to consider it both in light of the history of natural philosophy and science, but also in light of the history of politics and ideology.
▶︎ 1:10:20 Speaking very generally, for much of human history, in many times and places, what knowledge was taken to be was not necessarily cumulative with each generation. In fact, if you look at traditions of scriptural commentary or Kalam, or it doesn't have to be Christianity, there are comparable traditions all over the world. In these traditions, the presumption is sooner that the really smart people, the people who really had things right, existed in the distant past. They were prophets. Or what you often also find is that there was an age of wisdom, and that's how you get types like Solon in the Greek case or Solomon in the Hebrew Bible, people who are said to, I think as we find it in the Hebrew Bible, if I recall correctly, is something like he knows the motions of the heavens and he knows the, this isn't quite the terminology, but he knows the properties of plants or something like that, among other things.
▶︎ 1:11:48 To be wise in that sense is to apprehend all of the workings of nature and its first causes. In that way of thinking, in that kind of tradition then, to pursue knowledge like, I don't know, to the knowledge of whether the water in a given pond is drinkable or not, or whether such and such transgression by one member of your village against another should be treated with harsh punishment or something like that. The typical frame in which knowledge is pursued is, again, checking with the ancestors, checking with the old timers, checking with tradition, and seeing what it dictates for us.
▶︎ 1:12:37 As you can imagine, one implication of this is that it's a stagnant conception of knowledge. It doesn't build. Of course, you get some kind of notion of appeal to precedent in a jurisprudential sense in these sorts of traditions, but there's no idea that knowledge itself should be constantly growing. To be wise is just to have absorbed as much existing knowledge as possible, and that's the ideal.
▶︎ 1:13:12 It's hard to say exactly when. You can't say, "Here's the moment everything changes." Of course, you see already in the early Renaissance, in massive polymathic projects, for example, of the likes of Leonardo da Vinci, who is a natural philosopher and engineer, among other things, who seems to be working on the presumption that as history moves forward, we're going to have ever-increasing sophistication in our machines. We're going to have helicopters and power-generating dams to cite some of Leonardo's examples. Already in the Renaissance, you see this commitment to progress.
▶︎ 1:14:10 You also see much more strongly in the late 17th century, I think we can take paradigmatically here a figure like Leibniz, a real expectation that in the near future, things are going to get really, really nice. This is Leibniz's famous optimism, and it is all pervasive. It's incredible what Leibniz was able to conceptualize about the human world to come. He thought there was going to be rapid transit between Hanover and Amsterdam. He thought there were going to be networked reckoning engines that could transmit complex data across long distances. And indeed, there are.
▶︎ 1:15:10 And he saw it coming. He saw at least all of the constituent elements that would be necessary, if not necessarily how to put them all together for the hyper-connected world of telecommunication that we live in today.
▶︎ 1:15:29 And he thought it was all going to be great. There's a famous line attributed to Leibniz. It's a single word, it is calculemus. That is a third person hortatory plural of the verb to calculate or to compute in Latin. That is to say, let us calculate. Let's do the calculating. Something like that.
▶︎ 1:16:04 And Leibniz, the context here is in part for Leibniz, thinking about high-level diplomacy. Leibniz was, among other things, a diplomat. For example, he very early on tried to convince Louis XIV to invade Egypt in order to avoid an intra-European conflict with the Netherlands. The French king paid him no attention at all, but he kept trying with various sovereigns, and toward the end of his life, he was a privy councilor to Peter the Great of Russia.
▶︎ 1:16:52 So decades before he got involved with the Russians, he was imagining some scenario where, for example, two diplomats would be negotiating over disputed territory or something like that. And one of them could then say, "Let us calculate." And they would just punch their arguments in a kind of formalized language, a sort of universal characteristic into a machine, or you could do it on paper if you had the patience. And the outcome of this calculating would tell you which party was right. And once you know which party is right, then you don't have to go to war. You can just thank the computer basically for solving your human problems.
▶︎ 1:17:50 Now, we are inclined to think today that it's a bit more complicated than that, that that's not enough, that having sophisticated computers is not enough to bring about perpetual peace, to say the least. But this is indeed one of the key ideas of the Enlightenment, the third heading, which we will explore more in subsequent lessons.
▶︎ 1:18:23 But what I've wanted to establish so far is, again, just to repeat, there's a shifting attitude towards authority and what is to count as authority. There is an increasing appreciation for what I've called universality or uniformity. These are two sides of the same coin, and there is an emerging reconceptualization of what you might call the philosophy of history. History is, or the human temporality is no longer either stagnant or circular as you could also argue it was conceived, but is rather a timeline with an arrow, and the arrow for many Enlightenment thinkers is moving ever upwards to the better and the cooler.
▶︎ 1:19:15 So that's the end of the first lesson. When we begin the second one, I'd like to start looking in some more detail at the primary developments and conceptual innovations associated with the scientific revolution and with the schools of thought that we describe as empiricism and rationalism. And that will be for lesson two. Thank you.