# The Counter-Enlightenment Speaker: Justin Smith-Ruiu Course: Enlightenment and Its Discontents Watch: https://ergo.org/videos/justin-smith-ruiu-the-counter-enlightenment Transcript: https://ergo.org/videos/justin-smith-ruiu-the-counter-enlightenment/transcript/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P82rsioYuMQ When quoting, name the speaker and link to the watch URL. In this fifth lecture of his course on the Enlightenment and its discontents, Justin Smith-Ruiu pivots toward the thinkers that pushed back against Enlightenment ideals. He begins by mapping the intellectual landscape from Hume and Kant to modern anti-liberal thought, then retraces the utopian tradition from Plato and Campanella through Bacon's New Atlantis. The lecture examines how social contract theory, developed by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, laid the groundwork for the modern nation-state, and how the construction of national identity became a political project in its own right. Smith-Ruiu then turns to the French Revolution as a turning point: the moment when Enlightenment universalism was tested by terror, colonial blowback, and the contradictions of imposed reason. He also considers the Dutch republican tradition and the fate of the public sphere in the age of the internet. The lecture closes by promising a deep dive into German Counter-Enlightenment thought, where the real challenge to Enlightenment philosophy takes shape. ## Welcome to the Discontents Welcome back. This is the fifth lecture in the course on the Enlightenment and its discontents. I'm Justin Smith-Ruiu, and as I've promised, we're going to be moving on to the second part of the course title, discontents. That is to say, we're going to be looking at a cluster of ideas and figures that we tend to associate with the counter-enlightenment. And I want to talk a little bit about that vague notion before we begin. It's not so surprising that if enlightenment itself is a vague term, let's call it a grab bag term, that involves many different ideas, tendencies, sensibilities, some of which are not perfectly compatible with one another. If that's the case already for the notion of enlightenment as a historical period and as a real cultural phenomenon, it's not so surprising either that anti-enlightenment or counter-enlightenment should be vague as well. ## What Is the Counter-Enlightenment? Practically by definition, they're going to be vague. This is a term, counter-enlightenment, that emerges in the context of 20th-century intellectual history. It's strongly associated with the name of Isaiah Berlin, who is among the first to identify a proper lineage of thinkers whose distinguishing feature is their opposition to a number of the ideas we've already been looking at that we associate with the Enlightenment. But again, as with enlightenment, so with counter-enlightenment, we find that this notion houses ideas that are often at odds with one another, or that could just as easily be slotted or found under the heading of enlightenment as well. Just to give an example, one of the features we most often hear evoked in connection with counter-enlightenment thought is that it is subjectivist. That is to say that it values or centers or celebrates individual subjective experience that is indifferent to, and if you are a counter-enlightenment thinker, deeper and more truth-revealing than what we can establish as objectively true independently of us. So if that is a counter-enlightenment tendency, we also have to recognize that to a certain extent, we also find it in enlightenment thought. And there's a long lineage of what is sometimes called sensationalism as it passes through John Locke, whom we've discussed, into the 18th century French thinker Condillac, both of whom tend to take sensory reception as the primary point of access to the world along, broadly speaking, empiricist lines, but then are constrained by this commitment in the theory of knowledge to attributing to sensation a more important role than thoroughgoing rationalist enlightenment thought would want to give it. And once you attribute to sensation that elevated role, then you are somewhat constrained to building your theory of knowledge and your account of the human place in the world up from the kind of subjective experience that counter-enlightenment thinkers tend to value. ## Hume: Enlightenment Thinker or Its Critic? Another example, let's take David Hume. David Hume is, in some respects, the great ambassador of the Scottish Enlightenment. No one is more strongly associated with the Scottish Enlightenment than he is. Hume is an empiricist philosopher like Locke. He is also strongly committed to the view that reason must be the slave of the passions. That's a line from David Hume. And typically, that view, or something similar to it, is also associated with the counter-enlightenment. That is to say, the counter-enlightenment emerges as a reaction to the enlightenment's promotion or elevation of reason as the greatest and most noble and most distinguishing faculty of human beings. So again, Hume is a paradigmatic enlightenment thinker, and he also gives us at least some of the fuel for the tendency that we describe as counter-enlightenment. So is that to say that all of this is just a big jumble and applying these labels means nothing at all? No, not really. It's just to say that inevitably, our labels are to some extent a historiographical convenience, something that helps us to impose order on what is, in fact, a rather messy and contentious landscape of individual thinkers who are often partially overlapping, partially in agreement, and indeed, who change their own views from moment to moment. So again, take everything not with a grain of salt, but just with a little asterisk or a footnote that will remind you at any moment that these labels we are applying are inexact, provisional, and primarily helpful for us to impose order on a messy period and to make some sense of it. ## Kant as the Last Common Ancestor When we finished the last lecture, we concluded with Kant's third critique of 1790, and we considered Kant, as I put it before, the last common ancestor to philosophical debate in the Western world in the 19th and 20th and 21st centuries. Kant is the last person whom more or less everyone agrees you have to pay attention to. And to that extent, practically another way of saying this is that Kant embodies the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment spirits together. We'll be picking up from Kant later on today, or maybe in the next lecture, depending on how much we get done in this one. But I would like, before we turn definitively to the world of roughly the era of *The Critique of the Power of Judgment* and into the early 19th century, before we get there, I wanted to talk a little bit about the history of political philosophy, because ultimately, as we're going to see, Counter-Enlightenment is primarily a political notion. ## Dark Enlightenment and Anti-Liberal Thought And that's true, incidentally, today, as it was when Isaiah Berlin was talking about it in the middle of the 20th century. You might know, if you are on social media, that terms are circulating these days. People talk a lot about Dark Enlightenment, associated with the renegade philosopher Nick Land, and other tendencies that are often described as anti-Enlightenment or Dark Enlightenment or Counter-Enlightenment. These are all terms we hear that designate a cluster of positions that are all, broadly speaking, anti-liberal, post-democratic, skeptical of the idea that a democratic, egalitarian rights-based political order of the sort that emerged out of the Enlightenment is something we can realistically hope to achieve in the 21st century. Now, I'm not going to myself take up any positions on that here, and I'm not going to discuss 21st century Dark Enlightenment intellectual tendencies either. I just wanted to suggest that this stuff is still going around, and in its circulation in the present day, the partisans of Dark Enlightenment ideas, or those who have a Dark Enlightenment sensibility, are not primarily thinking about epistemology. They're primarily thinking about our social and political order. And for that reason, if for no other, it is particularly important to place both Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment tendencies, such as we have been discussing, in the history of political philosophy more generally. ## Utopian Visions from Plato to Campanella Now, where should we start? It's tough to know how far back to go. We're going to have to evoke, at least in passing, Plato's *Republic*, if only because by a long, complex chain of transmission, early Renaissance and early modern political philosophy often takes a cue from Plato's *Republic*, and to the extent that it conceives the task of political philosophy as the imagining of a utopian society. Now, *Utopia* is the name of a mid-16th century text by Sir Thomas More. It means literally, well, actually, this is tough. It could mean one of two very different things. That U, the letter U, might be a contraction of U as in EU, in which case Utopia means the good place, or it could be a contraction of OU, in which case it means the no place. It's not clear whether a Utopia is good or whether it is non-existent as its primary feature. In any case, even before Thomas More coins the term and uses the term for his own contribution to the genre, there is already, since the earlier Renaissance, a long tradition of writing that in a kind of quasi-proto science fiction vein articulates a vision of the ideal society. And you can think, for example, here of Tommaso Campanella's *The City of the Sun*, a very good example of a Renaissance, broadly speaking, Platonist vision of an ideal society. Among other things, you can see such utopian writing as an anticipation of what will emerge over the following centuries as socialism. In, for example, utopian socialism of the 19th century, figures like Fourier, for example, can be traced back in a direct line to people like Campanella and More. ## Bacon's New Atlantis and Scientific Utopia Another very good contribution to the genre that somewhat complexifies the genre comes from an author we have already discussed at length in this course, namely Francis Bacon, whose contribution carries the title *New Atlantis*. And typical in this genre, by the turn of the 17th century, is a tendency to project the utopian society off somewhere onto an island off the coast of South America, and that's the case for Francis Bacon. It's somewhere near Peru. One of the common themes that we see repeated, not just in Bacon, but in other contributions to the genre, is the idea that the island inhabitants arrived there from somewhere else, but lost the art of navigation since their arrival, so they've been isolated since time immemorial. And so in Bacon, it's an interesting twist because the utopian society on the island off Peru that he imagines is also a kind of blueprint for what will become the Royal Society of London. That is to say, his utopian society, in addition to sharing property and being constructed in a radically egalitarian way and so on, is also a society dedicated to carrying out scientific experiments and advancing knowledge under these ideal institutional conditions, such as are found on this island. So Bacon is an interesting variation because his utopianism among other things has a direct historical link to the emergence later in his century of scientific societies, of academies, and so ultimately of research institutions such as the ones we know in the 21st century. And this is a remarkable historical fact that that is itself a kind of utopian thinking. If we go more far afield, we also have to recognize that the 17th century, especially in England, is a period of significant radical ferment. Among other things, we have the English Revolution, and we have Oliver Cromwell, and we have in the chaos of this moment of religious sectarian strife, we find a lot of new radical sects that are Christian Protestant, but also clearly ancestral to what is taking shape, again, as utopian socialism. And they bear names that even in their names you can get a sense of the radicalism of it. Groups like the Levelers and the Diggers and so on are in various ways proposing some pretty radical things, including the abolition of private property in many cases, including what we today would call polyamory, and it's really quite a ferment. ## Radical Protestant Sects and Revolution And some of these groups are still with us today, like the Quakers, for example. The Quakers in the United States, and going back to the colonial period, are a quiet, peaceable bunch. But the name itself, Quaker, suggests an earlier period in their history when they were what anthropologists of religion call, let's say, in a state of effervescence. Like when one speaks in tongues, that's effervescent religion, and the Quakers certainly had that as well for a time. Many philosophers, including Spinoza, including Anne Conway, who was associated with the Cambridge Platonists, were attracted to Quakerism. There's some indication that Spinoza was rather close, having been excommunicated from the Jewish community of Amsterdam, was rather close to associating himself openly with the Quakers at the time of his death. And so the radicalism, the political radicalism, if you read, for example, Anne Conway, the political radicalism of Quakerism was articulated also in a metaphysics that emphasized the possibility of progress and evolution. Just to give you an example, Anne Conway proposes in her work, *The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, which is published posthumously, I believe, in 1690. Anne Conway suggests that in principle, any substance can become, or can come to share in the divine nature. Even an animal can become Christ, as she puts it. So this is radical stuff to the extent that it's still working very much within a Christian framework, but it is prepared now to recognize, or let's say, to dissolve certain boundaries that had been crucially important for, let's say, traditional ontology, for the way human beings prior to the modern period conceptualized social and natural relations. But also, more than that, these boundaries were really important for, let's say, maintaining the social order. So it is a time of tremendous ferment. ## Social Contract: Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau Now, what else happens in the 17th century? I'm trying to move quickly because our terminus ad quem, the direction we're trying to move is towards the early 19th century. And I want to go fast, but I do feel like there's a certain number of significant moments we have to touch on first, in order to understand the historical basis of Counter-Enlightenment political philosophy. In the 17th century, of course, we also have projects like Thomas Hobbes' early social contract theory. Hobbes, who remains in many respects a, let's say. Well, he's a complicated figure. He believes that people must submit to sovereign power on the trade-off, in order to live in harmony and safety and security. Hobbes, who famously says that in the state of nature, life is nasty, poor, brutish, and short. And we accept a certain limitation on our freedom in exchange for security. And when we talk about Hobbesian political philosophy, we're talking about a world of realpolitik where power is really the ultimate reality, and we have to maneuver within the framework that acknowledges power as inevitable. At the same time, that said, Hobbes' innovation of social contract theory, the idea that the state can be conceptualized as the result of some kind of historical choice, and that human life need not always be something that unfolds within a state structure. This is an important insight that will have consequences for Counter-Enlightenment thought 200 years later through the arc of the development of social contract theory through Locke and Rousseau. It's also important to emphasize that for Hobbes, political philosophy can only properly be done as part of a systematic project that includes, at an earlier stage, the natural philosophy. So he has a sequence of works, one of which is called *De Corpore*, On Body, followed by a work called *De Cive*, on the city or on the state, hard to translate. The point being that he takes it for granted that you have to analyze body in general, particles in motion, in order then to be in a position to articulate what the ideal political system is. Because in the end, a state is itself a form of very complex bodily organization. And so you can see an underlying principle of equality then in Hobbes' social contract theory, to the extent that it is based on a deep commitment to ultimately the interchangeability of the particles that constitute the natural world, and then in consequence also, further down the line, the social world. So I can't possibly survey all of social contract theory, but it's important to appreciate that the three great social contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, are at the same time at the beginning of very different traditions of political philosophy. Locke himself is identified typically as a classical liberal who develops a theory of private property that is custom-made for liberalism and also indeed is custom-made for the expropriation of the territory of the New World by Europeans, the so-called terra nullius argument, given that the indigenous people of the Americas have no conception of private property. It's not or can't be conceived, so Locke thinks as theft to take the property away for which there was, in any case, no concept. Obviously, I'm simplifying the argument, but this is a really important dimension of Locke's political philosophy, that he has implicated himself in the goings-on in the Virginia company and has his antennae out and is closely watching the ongoing colonization of the Americas in his own political philosophy. Now, Rousseau, we'll talk about Rousseau later because Rousseau is a key Counter-Enlightenment thinker, and I don't want to give that away before we get there. But nonetheless, it will be enough to say for now that Rousseau is hard to classify in terms of, let's say, a conservative versus liberal versus radical spectrum. There are some aspects of his political thought that make him or that sometimes lead to him being characterized as a kind of anarchist thinker. Well, just to give you a little bit of him and then we'll step back from Rousseau for a bit. It is famously Rousseau who takes the reverse of Hobbes's view, Hobbes who thinks that life in the state of nature was nasty, poor, brutish, and short. Rousseau, by contrast, argues famously the famous line from the social contract, "Man was born free, but everywhere is in chains." That is to say that there was ultimately a regrettable loss at the moment of humanity's entry into state structures. And this is a leitmotif of subsequent, broadly speaking, anarchist anthropology. You can cite figures like Marshall Sahlins, Pierre Clastres or indeed David Graeber as broadly speaking Rousseauvian in their understanding of the trade-off between early human societies and the state. Now, none of the social contract theorists are making paleoanthropological claims, or they're not working as prehistorians or anything like that. They're not saying there was this moment 9,500 years ago when men assembled and said, "Let's make a state," or anything like that. It's more a thought experiment than a hypothetical reconstruction of the past. Nonetheless, even as a thought experiment, it does help to get the ball rolling on the historicization of human society, the ability to conceptualize human social being as having a history. So that's all I want to say about the social contract theorists for now. And again, we'll return to Rousseau soon enough. But another kind of early Enlightenment, many would consider this proto-Enlightenment development that I think needs to be emphasized as well is a little bit of a consideration of the history of the emergence of the nation-state as the gold standard of the political unit in the modern world. This is an ideal that is often described as Westphalian or the Westphalian order. The term comes from the Peace of Westphalia signed in 1648 and coming at the end of the terribly violent and nasty Thirty Years' War which establishes or which enshrines into explicit language for the first time in many respects the nation-state as the paradigmatic political entity in contrast with the world that Europe is at the moment emerging from that continued to uphold to a certain extent as a fiction, but that continued to uphold the Germany of the Holy Roman Empire. ## Birth of the Nation-State There was, as is often said, very little that was holy or Roman or imperial about this. What it actually was, was ethnic Germans organized into countless little duchies and principalities and so on, but still retaining a conception of the polity as ultimately descending from and bound to the legal structure of the actual Roman Empire, which had, of course, migrated to the east, but still in Byzantium, there was a real claim to historical continuity with the Roman Empire. So everyone was, so to speak, bound to Rome until the modern period in one way or another. With the emerging Westphalian order of the middle of the 17th century then, there's a new concern to organize polities around ethnicities, and that's what nation-state means. The nation is the ethnicity, the French or the German, and the state is the political structure. And this is an ideal that is still very much with us in the 21st century. There are stateless nations that make a political cause out of obtaining for themselves an independent state, say an independent Kurdistan as the political objective of Kurdish nationalists, for example. The fact that that is still with us is the continuing unfolding of a political aspiration that begins to emerge in the modern period. And there are early adopters of this ideal, so to speak, and we can certainly place France at the center of this process, France as the place that really is driving the emergence of this new ideal. But what's often more interesting is to look at the way this ideal is taken up by some of the somewhat more marginal late arriving nations. ## Constructing National Identity For example, in Sweden in the mid-17th century, you have nationalists like Olaus Rudbeck who are actively working to construct a coherent national identity in part through standardization of language, grammar, dictionaries, through reforms that impose a normative structure on how one should write in the language. In part also through archeology which is emerging in the period. It still doesn't have a name, it's still not called that. It's called antiquarianism. But the emerging awareness that one can use coins and weapons and tombstones and rune stones that are buried in the ground, one can use these objects to help consolidate a national identity. This is a process we can see happening more clearly again in the places that are not, let's say, the absolute vanguard of the emergence of the modern nation state. One can certainly count Sweden here, and curiously, one can also count Germany. Indeed, one can identify Leibniz as one of the drivers of early nationalist thinking, that is an interest in conceptualizing German identity as something comparable to French identity rather than being this particulate residue left over in this loose arrangement known as the Holy Roman Empire. Leibniz is among the first German thinkers to say, "Wait a minute, we can pull ourselves together," so to speak, literally, and actively construct a national identity out of such things, again, as language reform, but also new history writing that brings into sharper relief the ancient and medieval origins of the nation in question. So in Sweden, sometimes this is called Gothicism, the concern to write a new history of the Swedes that emphasizes the central role in ancient and medieval European history of their antecedents, the Goths, in order to establish that Sweden is, let's say, an ancient nation with a significant presence in the history of European and indeed Byzantine and Eastern European politics, political history. So all of this is going on at the level of culture and politics. And it is, in a sense, the beginning of the Counter-Enlightenment. ## The French Revolution Changes Everything In what sense? Well, I suppose here one would need to say a few more words about France, because France is, of course, the site of the first of the great modern revolutions that are meant to, or that are hoped to bring about, let's say, an upgrade, and a motion, an elevation to a new stage of history. So I say this is the first of these revolutions, and one might say, "Well, wait a minute, there was also the Glorious Revolution in England in the late 17th century." And one could say, yes, but the difference is that in England in the 17th century, and I already mentioned these radical Protestant sects, the conception of utopia is typically filtered through biblical prophecy. And this is the famous idea of England as the new Jerusalem, or the new Jerusalem being located in England. So everything is interpreted through a Christian prophetic and often apocalyptic or millenarian framework. But also more significantly, through the end of the 17th century, the idea of revolution itself continues to be shaped by the literal meaning of the term, which is the meaning that you might have paused to think about when you are looking at your dashboard and you see that it's telling you how many revolutions per minute your engine is going through. That is the original sense of revolution, which suggests something circular, arriving back at the place where you had set out from. And so maybe something more like restoration would be a closer synonym than elevation or upgrade, as I put it before, in the older sense of a political revolution. So we could also talk about the shift from circularity to linearity well beyond the history of the idea of revolution. In some sense, the great modern innovation is the linearization of history. Previously, history had been the experience of the cyclical rotation of, or let's say the cyclical return of the seasons, and suddenly we have it flattened out into a single timeline, like an arrow. And one way people have described this is that the modern, let's say, conceptual revolution in the history of temporality is that we effectively spatialize time. We begin to conceive of time as occupying all the points on an arrow, which is a sort of geometric line. So we could go on and on about that, but I only want to evoke that tremendous change in the modern period in order to suggest the significant distance between the way revolution is conceptualized in England in 1688 versus the way it's conceptualized in France in 1789. And indeed, we might also mention in Philadelphia in 1776 as well. So this is a huge change, and it justifies saying that in some respects, the French Revolution is the quintessential modern historical event. It is the event that gives shape and meaning to everything else that we call modern. It is a revolution, not in the sense of turning things back to the way they should have been before, but in the sense of an event that is conceptualized as upgrading or updating the organization of society in a way that will now be suited or fitted to the actual phase of history in which we find ourselves. And that is, in particular, if you're looking at this through a Marxist lens, the phase of history in which the bourgeoisie now holds power and is in a position to take it away from the aristocracy. ## Equality Tested: Terror and Colonial Blowback A lot more could be said about the French Revolution, and it's significant in large part as a kind of consequence. Well, should we call it a consequence in a causal sense? That depends on your view of the place of intellectual history in history as such. I think many people, Marxists included, would be inclined to say, well, the revolution would have happened no matter what the intellectuals were saying. It was not the intellectuals who stormed the Bastille. That was the sans-culottes, and they never read any Diderot or Rousseau or et cetera. That's one way of seeing it, but nonetheless, there was an awful lot of talk going on in the years preceding the French Revolution, and in that talk, there was a general tendency towards this ultimate upgrade event, as we called it, as the inevitable result of the circulation of these Enlightenment ideas. And of course, these ideas are being promoted by members of the aristocracy. In a previous lecture, we discussed Madame de Pompadour, who's a very good example of someone who is hosting salons where radical egalitarian thinking is hot stuff, and she's also, at the same time, the mistress of Louis XV. So the conditions for the revolution are being fomented, in part, by members of the aristocracy. That is to say, people who stand to lose out as a consequence of the revolution. What can at least be said is that the revolution is the embodiment of a certain number of Enlightenment principles. That's clear. And we also have to emphasize that there are different factions. There's Jacobins, there's Girondins, and there are different degrees of radicalism. How committed exactly one is to egalitarianism is a very complex question. And we know that in the wake of the revolution, people like Olympe de Gouges, for example, who was an aristocrat, an early feminist, some kind of anarchist. She's the one who, immediately after the 1791 Declaration of the Rights of Man, writes a kind of near perfect copy of it called the Declaration of the Rights of Woman. The argument is consistent and clear and pretty hard to object to, that if by man, you mean men and women, *homme* includes *femme*, then you ought to be able to replace *homme* in the Declaration of the Rights of Man by the word *femme* on each occurrence without losing any of the consistency of the argument. So that move got her head cut off. She was a victim of the Reign of Terror, like many solid Enlightenment thinkers ended up being, as the saying goes, this is a case where the saying literally is appropriate. Many Enlightenment thinkers ended up getting hoist on their own petard. That is to say, ended up being brought down in the Reign of Terror after having themselves been boosters of the revolution. And I guess, alongside Olympe de Gouges, we should also, of course, mention the Haitian Revolution and the radiation or the impact out into the French colonial world of such ideals as are expressed in the 1791 Declaration of the Rights of Man. So the blowback from the colonies seems to be in effect. You're talking about universal equality, well, okay, what about us colonized subjects of the French Empire? That seems to be the gist of the rhetorical point of a Haitian revolutionary like Toussaint Louverture. And so, in the years following the revolution, in the Reign of Terror, we're having the limits of this commitment to universality and to equality tested and questioned and exposed, one must reasonably acknowledge, exposed as ultimately pretty hypocritical and out of step with what was actually happening in the real world. ## Napoleon, Terror, and Temples of Reason We don't need to do the whole history of the French Revolution, but one must at least appreciate that it brought about some very turbulent years that ultimately resulted in the rise of Napoleon's empire, which in many respects with the return to this high imperial hierarchical structure was an ultimate betrayal of the Enlightenment ideals that led to the events of 1789. One could also say that the rise of Napoleon is something like a lesson about the inevitable descent into authoritarianism of revolutionary projects of the sort that was begun in 1989. But if we look just at the 1790s, the Reign of Terror, and then the few years after 1793, '94, after Robespierre himself gets his head cut off after having so many other people's heads cut off, we see also a testing of the limits of this push for secularism, the anti-clericalism of the revolution. There are deconsecrated churches that are rebranded as Temples of Reason, which is quite significant. And then, with Napoleon and then with the Bourbon restoration in the early 19th century, there's a reversion to, let's say, rather more moderate relationship between church and state. And most of what we think of as French Republican secular culture today actually descends from laws that were passed in the early 20th century, in 1905, under the Third Republic. So it's a complicated history, but if you look at the early years of the revolution, there really are these concerted efforts not just to suppress and marginalize traditional organized religion, but also to erect some kind of secular philosophical religion. And the clearest example of this is the restyling of Catholic churches into Temples of Reason. So we'll inevitably be circling around the French Revolution. Again, this isn't the last time it's going to come up. But I wanted to highlight. Again, we're not doing the history of political events here. We're trying to do intellectual history. But we need to seize on to certain significant events in order to have any sense of what the triggers for these new ideas that were going around actually were. ## Dutch Republicanism and the Public Sphere Now, well before the French Revolution, long before France is a republic, in the 17th century, the model of republicanism was the Netherlands. And the Netherlands being the safe haven for the most radical, the most progressive, the most heretical ideas had a lot to do with the fact that it was out beyond the bounds of the Inquisition, it was outside the Catholic world, and also with the fact that it was not a monarchy. For that reason, incidentally, it's worth noting that Leibniz, who keeps coming up again and again, Leibniz himself remains a committed monarchist, and I believe I mentioned earlier that at some point when Leibniz is a young man in his early 20s, he's trying to convince Louis XIV to invade Egypt in order to one-up the Dutch, because there's tremendous political tension with the Netherlands at the moment, or really with all of Habsburg Europe. And in the course of arguing for this, Leibniz says something very interesting, like it is important that France achieve regional hegemony on the European continent as the first daughter of the Church, as is often said of France, as a kind of predestined role in contrast with the Netherlands, which Leibniz says being a republic is really just the armed security wing of the Dutch East Indies Company. Now, I'm exaggerating a little bit, but that's pretty close to what Leibniz says. The idea is just that a country without a monarch is really just some kind of protection racket for commerce. And so that's interesting because at the same time, the much more familiar picture we have of 17th century Dutch republicanism is that it is the vanguard of egalitarian politics, and it's the context in which Spinoza is working as a great egalitarian political philosopher. And many people have tried to make him into some kind of proto-Marxist. That's a bit of a stretch. What's certain is that Spinoza does begin to articulate an idea of the masses as a powerful political force. And it's fairly clear that he's able to pursue that line of thinking in part as a result of the political reality he's observing around him in the Republican Netherlands. So it's an interesting contrast, but one thing that is really worth noting, not just about Dutch republicanism but also about the intellectual currents that helped to shape Dutch republicanism and that were shaped by it in turn, it's really in this context, in particular a century before Spinoza, in the Dutch humanism of people like Erasmus and his contemporaries, Grotius as well, Grotius, the pioneer figure in international law, maritime law. Key Dutch humanists who are very important as being among the first to articulate the idea of a neutral, secular public sphere. And this is what Spinoza, as originally a member of an Iberian Jewish community in Amsterdam, this is what Spinoza is benefiting from, the appearance of an ideal of a neutral secular public sphere. If you read, for example, Cervantes, if you read *Don Quixote*, there's a Muslim woman traveling through Catholic Spain, and at some point when she's found out, the attitude is, well, you're going to have to convert. So no hard feelings, but it's just by definition compulsory to hold the religion of the place you dwell. So this is sometimes articulated as the principle of cuius regio, eius religio. That is to say, whose region, his religion. That's a literal translation. The idea is you've got to have the same religion as the sovereign. And that was simply taken for granted. Again, it wasn't seen as political persecution, persecution like the denial of the freedom of religion because that doesn't exist. But in the context of Renaissance Dutch humanism, you start to see the articulation of this ideal of the public space as the space where you kind of put your particular communitarian identity in the lockers before you go out to interact with the others in the public space. You can have your communitarian identity, you can remain a Sephardic Jew, for example, to evoke Spinoza's situation, but when you're out in public, you are encountering people in a neutral space where your communitarian commitments have no purchase, have no force. And that is, of course, still the basis of French Republican secularism in the 21st century. That's the basis of arguments against state employees wearing the Islamic veil, for example. And it's contested, it's constantly contested. Where to draw the line is constantly contested. But there is a long-standing association between the emergence of the modern secular sphere and the ideal of neutrality of that sort. And this is a theme that has been well investigated by political philosophers in the 20th century. Jürgen Habermas, in particular, writes in wonderful detail on the emergence of the public sphere. And also, much more recently, or somewhat more recently, we're seeing a lot of discussion of the crisis of the public sphere in the internet age, in the sense that the closest thing we have to a speaker's corner, so to speak. I don't know if this is familiar to you, but one of the corners of Hyde Park in London is a place where everyone can go to shout whatever conspiracy theory they want. And this is considered a good thing. ## Can the Public Sphere Survive the Internet? This is considered a kind of achievement of secular modernity, that there's a protected space for sharing your opinion, however ridiculous it is, and so on. And so there's much discussion today of the problems or the threats that we face when the most obvious venue for that kind of public sphere self-expression is found online and on an economic model that is controlled by profit-seeking corporations. So can we really have a public sphere when it is based on a for-profit economic model as we have today? You can go stand on a street corner if you want and shout, and that's not controlled by corporate interests, but that's also not the most effective way to communicate in the 21st century. The internet is. So I mentioned this just to drive home the point that many of the questions being debated today in social epistemology and in political philosophy as concerns our new information technologies, these emerge directly out of familiar old discussions in the history of early modern political philosophy. I think I'm going to end this lesson here in order, in the next lecture, to move on to a cluster of questions that are discussed, in particular in Germany, having to do with the limits of the universality that French Enlightenment philosophy pretends to be delivering, especially in the years immediately following the French Revolution. ## Next Time: German Counter-Enlightenment And that's when we're really going to get to the core of the Counter-Enlightenment thought that up until now, we've just been pointing towards and alluding to in a promissory way. We're finally going to get to it. So we'll see you in the next lecture.